La résolution du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies exprime son inquiétude face à la rupture du cessez-le-feu entre le Maroc et le Front Polisario indépendantiste.
Le Maroc a proposé une large autonomie pour le Sahara occidental, mais le Front Polisario insiste sur le fait que la population locale a le droit à un référendum sur l’indépendance [File: Fadel Senna/AFP] Publié le 29 octobre 2021 Le Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies a prolongé d’une mission de maintien de la paix de l’ONU dans le Sahara occidental contesté, exprimant sa préoccupation face à la rupture du cessez-le-feu de 1991 entre le Maroc et le Front Polisario indépendantiste et appelant à une reprise des négociations dirigées par l’ONU.
Le vote du vendredi était de 13-0 avec l’abstention de la Russie et de la Tunisie.
CONTINUE DE LIRE Un tribunal de l’UE annule les accords commerciaux marocains sur le Sahara occidental L’Algérie rappelle son émissaire au Maroc sur le Sahara occidental L’ONU exhorte le Maroc et le Polisario à accepter le candidat au poste de W Sahara Pourquoi la Biden sur de politique le Sahara Occidental à l’study Reste la résolution par was Menée les États-Unis, Qui, sous l’ancien président Donald Trump, with the Ontario monde rompu répandrai claim du Reconnaître Maroc sur le territoire qu Alors » ils persuadaient le royaume de normaliser ses relations avec Israël.
Quelques après la nomination d’un nouvel envoyé de l’ONU au Sahara Occidental, le diplomate chevronné Staffan de Mistura, la résolution appelait « les parties » à reprendre les négociations « sans conditions préalables et de bonne foi » à la recherche d’ une « politique juste, durable et tout à fait acceptable ». Solution”.
La résolution d’appel à un objectif « d’autodétermination du peuple du Sahara occidental », une phrase qui, selon les diplomates, a été ajoutée par les États-Unis à la demande de la Russie, qui aurait pu opposer son veto au texte.
La résolution « réaffirme également la nécessité du plein respect » d’un cessez-le-feu qui s’est effondré l’année dernière.
Le Maroc a proposé une grande autonomie pour le Sahara occidental. Mais le Front Polisario insiste sur le fait que la population locale, qu’il estime à 350 000 à 500 000, un droit à un référendum.
L’Algérie soutient le Front Polisario en quête d’indépendance et a rompu en août les relations avec le Maroc, qui contrôle près de 80% du territoire aride et peuplé contrôlé par l’Espagne jusqu’en 1975.
Les pourparlers en table ronde ont eu lieu pour la dernière fois début 2019 et ont réuni le Front Polisario ainsi que le Maroc.
L’Algérie s’oppose à une reprise des pourparlers, le Polisario se considérant comme un mouvement de libération qui devrait négocier directement avec Rabat.
« Limiter l’escalade » L’envoyé de la France à l’ONU, Nicolas de Rivière, a déclaré que l’effort de maintien de la paix de l’ONU, connu sous le nom de Mission des Nations Unies pour le référendum au Sahara occidental (MINURSO), restait vital dans des conditions de sécurité incertaines.
“Plus que jamais depuis la rupture du cessez-le-feu, cette opération joue un rôle essentiel pour limiter les risques d’escalade et apporter la stabilité dans la région”, at-il déclaré.
La mission américaine de l’ONU a demandé le renouvellement du mandat, affirmant que sa priorité était de « relancer un processus politique crédible menant à une solution durable, digne et soutenue internationalement ».
Le Kenya, l’actuel président du Conseil de sécurité, a exprimé l’espoir que la mission de l’ONU pourrait éventuellement organiser un référendum, affirmant que c’était le droit de chaque nation anciennement colonisée.
“Nous devons être honnêtes et admettre que cet objectif est obscurci et frustré”, a déclaré la mission kenyane dans un communiqué.
La MINURSO a été créée par le Conseil de sécurité en 1991 dans le but d’établir un référendum entre l’indépendance et l’adhésion au Maroc.
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Des manifestants soudanais scandent des slogans à côté de pneus en feu lors d’une manifestation dans la capitale Khartoum le 26 octobre. (Mohammed Abu Obaid/EPA-EFE/REX/Shutterstock) Cela a été une année record pour les coups d’Etat. D’après un tableau , il ya eu plus de prises de pouvoir réussies en 2021 qu’au cours des cinq années précédentes combinées. La junte du Myanmar a ouvert la voie avec son déraillement effronté de la démocratie naissante du pays en février et le maintien en détention de ses hauts dirigeants civils. En Afrique de l’Ouest, les militaires du Mali, de la Guinée et du Tchad ont tous mené leurs propres putschs et renversé les gouvernements en place.
Et puis vous avez la Tunisie et le Soudan. Dans le premier cas, un coup d’État au ralenti s’est déroulé depuis la fin juillet, lorsque le président Kais Saied a limogé le Premier ministre, dissous le parlement au milieu des troubles populaires généralisés et assumé des pouvoirs extraordinaires. Une décennie après un soulèvement tunisien qui a renversé un dictateur au pouvoir depuis longtemps, le pays se retrouve dans une sorte de limbes autocratiques, avec des nécrologies déjà écrites pour ce qui était la seule réussite du printemps arabe.
Au Soudan, au cours du mois dernier , les tensions entre une direction civile fragile et une armée puissante ont explosé au début de cette semaine lorsque l’armée a lancé un coup d’État, détenu le Premier ministre Abdalla Hamdok et le reste de son cabinet, dissous le parlement et déclaré un État. d’urgence. Tout comme Saied et les générations précédentes d’hommes forts potentiels, le lieutenant-général Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, le plus haut responsable militaire du Soudan, a présenté sa décision comme une poussée vers la stabilité et le progrès.
Lors d’un briefing mardi, Burhan a écarté les informations faisant état d’arrestations de nombreux responsables civils et d’attaques contre des militants pro-démocratie par les forces de sécurité. « Certaines personnes ont été placées en détention – ces personnes soupçonnées de porter atteinte à l’unité nationale et à la sécurité nationale », a-t- il déclaré . « Nous ne muselons pas les bouches, nous bloquons toute voix [qui] sape directement notre harmonie nationale. »
Burhan a affirmé que le Premier ministre Hamdok était chez lui : « Le Premier ministre était chez lui mais nous avions peur qu’il soit blessé. Il est avec moi dans ma maison et j’étais avec lui hier soir et il vit normalement là-bas. Une fois les choses réglées ou les menaces passées, il rentrera chez lui » #Soudan #السودان #البرهان pic.twitter.com/lTmleeAm36
– Mohamed Hachem (@mhashem_) 26 octobre 2021
L’intervention de l’armée, pour l’instant, interrompt un processus démocratique fragile qui a commencé il y a près de trois ans avec des manifestations massives contre le dictateur de longue date Omar Hassan al-Bashir. Le mouvement de protestation, qui représentait un vaste échantillon de la société soudanaise, a réussi à renverser Bashir en avril 2019 après que des personnalités clés de l’establishment de la sécurité soudanais se soient retournés contre le président. Au cours des mois agités qui ont suivi, le Soudan est sorti du froid diplomatique, réparant les barrières avec certains gouvernements occidentaux et remportant son retrait de la liste des États parrains du terrorisme par les États-Unis.
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Mais ces gains ont toujours été fragiles. « Les dirigeants militaires et civils du Soudan partageaient le pouvoir dans le cadre d’un accord précaire affaibli par la suspicion mutuelle et des désaccords sur des questions fondamentales telles que qui doit rendre des comptes pour des décennies d’atrocités commises sous Bashir et si l’armée devrait être en mesure de contrôler des parties de l’économie , a expliqué mon collègue Max Bearak . « Les joueurs, anciens et nouveaux, se disputent le pouvoir dans un Soudan qui semble à gagner. »
Le coup d’État de Burhan a eu lieu quelques heures seulement après le départ de l’envoyé américain dans la région, Jeffrey Feltman, de la capitale soudanaise Khartoum après avoir rencontré les principaux dirigeants civils et militaires du pays. Une administration Biden piquée a condamné la chaîne d’événements et a déclaré qu’elle gelait 700 millions de dollars d’aide directe au Soudan, qui avait été promise dans le cadre d’un plan américain d’aide à la transition démocratique du pays.
Mais Burhan, qui a le soutien tacite d’un certain nombre d’autocraties arabes ailleurs, est en position de force. “Burhan pourrait être en mesure de réussir avec le soutien d’autres alliés, à savoir l’Egypte, les Saoudiens et les Emiratis”, a déclaré à Bearak Magdi el-Gizouli, analyste soudanais au Rift Valley Institute. « Ce n’est pas un paria comme l’est devenu Bashir, ni un islamiste. Il trouvera un nouveau visage civil plus souple, il maintiendra les formalités et l’Occident finira simplement par traiter avec cette personne.
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Ce trio – l’ Égypte, l’Arabie saoudite et les Émirats arabes unis – a également applaudi le pari de Saied. Entre autres factions, le président tunisien était en désaccord avec le parti islamiste Ennahda, dont l’affiliation historique aux Frères musulmans lui a valu l’inimitié des anti-islamistes invétérés au pouvoir au Caire et à Abou Dhabi. Alors que le gouvernement de transition de Saied lutte pour obtenir un prêt du Fonds monétaire international pour combler un déficit budgétaire important, des rapports suggèrent qu’il est déjà en pourparlers avec les Émiratis et les Saoudiens pétro-riches pour un renflouement .
The United Arab Emirates supports the Tunisian state and decisions by President Kais Saied, an advisor to the #UAE president says after meeting with Saied.https://t.co/cRP2SWXFsd
— Al Arabiya English (@AlArabiya_Eng) August 7, 2021
En 2013, les deux monarchies du Golfe ont joué un rôle central en aidant à consolider le régime du président égyptien qui complotait le coup d’État, Abdel Fatah al-Sissi. Et ils peuvent également essayer de soutenir Burhan au Soudan, qui, comme la Tunisie, est parfois devenu l’arène d’ un «grand jeu» régional plus large opposant l’Égypte, l’Arabie saoudite et les Émirats arabes unis aux adversaires géopolitiques intermittents du Qatar et de la Turquie. Cette dynamique s’est manifestée avec le plus d’ acuité chez le voisin tunisien, la Libye , les deux camps soutenant des factions rivales rivales au milieu des tensions qui ont débordé sur la politique intérieure de la Tunisie .
Les analystes suggèrent que les largesses royales du Golfe ont déjà renforcé l’armée soudanaise dans ses manœuvres après la chute de Bashir. « Le soutien financier de l’Arabie saoudite et des Émirats arabes unis a donné aux généraux une marge de manœuvre cruciale pour résister aux demandes populaires de régime civil, façonnant un équilibre des pouvoirs déséquilibré qui a permis aux généraux de traverser une période de mobilisation de masse », a écrit l’universitaire soudanais Jean-Baptiste Gallopin . « Les flux financiers secrets des Émirats leur ont par la suite valu un effet de levier sans précédent sur de larges segments du spectre politique, ce qui a aidé les généraux… à consolider leur pouvoir. »
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Maintenant, les experts soutiennent que tout espoir de restaurer les perspectives démocratiques du Soudan peut nécessiter d’exercer des pressions sur ces puissances arabes. « Les monarchies du Golfe et l’Égypte, qui de toutes les puissances extérieures ont noué les liens les plus étroits avec Burhan et l’armée, devraient exhorter les autorités à faire preuve de retenue plutôt que de recourir à la force aveugle », a noté une note politique de l’International Crisis Group . “Les États-Unis et l’UE devraient utiliser l’influence considérable dont ils disposent sur les capitales du Golfe et le Caire pour les convaincre de pousser les généraux de Khartoum à changer de cap.”
« Les gouvernements arabes et les politiciens soudanais régionaux qui désignent le nouveau régime militaire seront démasqués dans les semaines à venir, et comme ils le sont, Washington et d’autres parties doivent préciser qu’il y aura des conséquences à soutenir un régime voyou », a noté Alberto Fernandez . un ancien chef de mission américain au Soudan. « Les premiers commentaires publics du Caire, de Doha, d’Abou Dhabi et de Riyad ont été coupés. Mais tous ces États devront trouver un équilibre entre leurs agendas individuels pour le Soudan et leurs relations compliquées avec l’Occident. »
As deepening chill continues to upset the American-European relations, President Emmanuel Macron of France recently in an interview with The Economist newspaper emphasized on the need for NATO and Europe to engage in dialogue with Russia, warning that Europe needs to wake up and build itself as an autonomous geopolitical power as it teeters on the edge. Over the past three years, the French leader described NATO as “brain-dead” and talked about the necessity of European defense strategy under a purely European military force and the end of age of European-American alliance.
His remarks received welcome from some European countries like Germany and Turkey. After Europe was left in the dark about the American withdrawal from Afghanistan and France was snubbed by Biden in AUKUS submarine pact that brings together the US, Britain, and Australia in a new alliance, the death knell of the European-American alliance began ringing.
But this separation of ways raises a question: What are Europe’s challenges and capacities as it steps in a path of independence of policy from the US?
Here are the capacities:
The US unilateralism: The first and perhaps most important opportunity for European policy independence from the US can be seen in relation to Washington’s unilateralism in global decision-making and policy-making. The Americans have acted independently in various crises over the past two decades, ignoring Europe’s demands and fraying ties with it. The first signs of division appeared in the US invasion of Iraq during which France and Germany, contrary to Britain, refused to join in. Under President Barack Obama the White House embraced a doctrine of collectivism in the foreign policy, smoothening the troubled ties with Europe.
After Donald Trump came to power in 2017, the rift between Europe and the US became more apparent than ever. Under Trump, NATO member states began to notice that Washington could no longer be considered a shield provider for Europe as it was during the Cold War, so Europeans had to think of new solutions for their future. It was at this time that the leaders of France and Germany in 2019 spoke of the need to establish a “European Security Council”. In the new situation, Biden’s decision to withdraw US troops from Afghanistan, which did not take into account the positions of European countries, and ultimately the conclusion of the AUKUS agreement was a finishing blow to the Transatlantic alliance. So, this American policy unilateralism can provide an important motivation for Europe to think independence.
European Union’s successful experience
European countries, despite all the ups and downs and their allegiance to the US in the years after World War II, have shown that they have the ability to manage a successful alliance. A clear symbol of this is the European Union in which the European countries have extensive cooperation with each other, both politically and economically, and their regional union is pointed to as the largest and most successful union in the history. This success story can inspire positive European movement towards policy independence from the US.
Special European potentials
In addition to the mentioned capacities, European countries have appropriate historical potentials for independence from the US. Looking at the political history of Europe in the past centuries, it is clear that today’s US is the product of immigration of Europeans, and even in the history of this country, the States have been colonies of Britain. In fact, Europe’s unique historical and civilization background is an important potential that can serve as a stimulus to Europe’s quest for independence from the US. In other words, the civilization and historical background of Europe is a significant potential that can drive policy independence efforts from Europe.
Downscale in European-American trade
Another European capacity is the EU strategy in the trade with the US. In fact, the European Union has taken serious steps over the past year to reduce its economic dependence on US. China is now Europe’s largest economic partner and has the biggest trade deals with the European bloc. In 2020, the EU imports from the US dropped 11.4 percent and its exports to it dropped 10 percent. Perhaps this means that the bloc has already taken the steps to reduce dependence on Washington.
What are Europe’s obstacles towards independence from the US?
Inter-European division
The first obstacle ahead of the European policy autonomy from Washington is the division among the European countries. Despite the predominant desire of European citizens for independence from the US, European politicians do not share the same views on how to deal with Washington. For example, even between France and Germany, the main political and economic powers of the European Union, there is little consensus on independence from the US. Even these countries are not united on how to deal with various international crises such as Yemen, Syria, Libya, and Afghanistan. In general, this situation has led European countries to take cautious steps on the issue of independence from the US.
No clear roadmap for military and economic independence
In the past few years, France and Germany emphasized the need for Europe to end its military, security, and economic dependence on the US, however they have not prepared a clear roadmap to move in this path. Even many political observers believe that the issue of creating a European army and joint European military forces is more like a dream that a reality as it lacks the necessary support in terms of quantity and quality. Additionally, the European economy lacks a culture of risk-taking, which has left European countries economically unprepared to confront possible US outrage and pressure. Even many economic observers and technology experts hold that Europeans believe they are dependent on Washington for modern technology.
Europe’s psychological weakness for independence
There is a psychological aspect for this issue. Actually, the European transition to independence requires some psychological readiness. This is while all factors prove that Europe is never psychologically prepared for full movement to independence.
Lasting Russian threat and European phobia
A fear of Russian influence and military might in Eastern Europe is another repulsion forcing Europe away from its pro-independence aspirations. For decades reliant on the US military forces on their soil, the Europeans are afraid that in case of breakup of NATO or reduction of the US security commitments to them, they are far from ready to face off Russia. Therefore, existence of the Russian threat remains a strong repulsive force keeping Europe away from autonomous policy.
The independence outlook
Looking at the above-mentioned capacities and restrictions, the independence from the US should be seen a difficult and complicated job. Still, the Transatlantic alliance in the past sense is not possible anymore. Actually, the European separation of ways from the US is inevitable since Europe is increasingly coming to the notion that it has no other way than relying on its own potentials and adopting a policy independent from Washington. The new White House policies under President Joe Biden are even accelerating the European independence project.
If not for the COVID-19 pandemic, the Libyan Civil War would be at the forefront of 2020’s international headlines. The conflict has all the ingredients of a frontpage story: heavyweight state actors, lucrative natural resources, and strongman leaders. Russia and the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) involvement in the war should not come as a surprise, but Turkey’s active participation should no longer raise a brow either as Turkey has recently strived to exert more influence over its neighbors with a desire for regional hegemony.
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan led Turkey’s first major attempt at regional intervention during the 2011 Arab Spring. Mohamed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood ascended to power in Egypt with the hope that an Islam-focused group could succeed as a legitimate political party. Erdoğan and his Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) supported the Sunni party’s aspirations and aimed to capitalize on this relationship to secure a neighboring ally and economic opportunities.
Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood, however, were not able to sustain their power in Egypt due to a multitude of challenges. Erdoğan sent his national intelligence chief to support Morsi in the face of massive civil unrest and an impending military coup but to no avail. Morsi was eventually forced out and Erdoğan’s pursuit of influence failed, but it was an uphill battle from the beginning; there were rumors that Gulf states supported the coup. This initial taste of failure, however, may have contributed to more direct, aggressive approaches in future Turkish endeavors.
Turkey’s pursuit of regional influence escalated militarily throughout the course of the Syrian Civil War. Erdoğan’s rhetoric towards Assad and the Alawite-based regime became more reproachful early-on during the crackdowns on civilian protestors. Turkey began providing indirect military support to anti-Assad factions over the years such as the Free Syrian Army (FSA), a mostly Sunni opposition group filled with Syrian military defectors, and even some jihadist groups. Assad, however, has essentially achieved victory at this point largely due to Russian support. Erdogan saw this as another opportunity to gain influence over a fractious country, but direct military inaction hindered his success again.
While supporting Syrian rebel forces against Assad, Erdoğan fought another faction for regional influence – this time within his own borders. Turkey saw an opportunity to dampen Kurdish influence and hopes of separatism when U.S. troops pulled out of the Kurdistan region in October 2019. Turkey used military force to clear out a buffer zone along their southern border that overlapped with Kurdish lands. Even though this involved sharing occupation with Russia, this was a huge victory for Turkey as Erdoğan was able to simultaneously take lands previously occupied by the Kurds and secure a relocation area for millions of Syrian refugees in Turkey, hence diluting the Kurdish population. Here, Erdoğan experienced the positive results of direct military action after years of cautious, proxy interventions.
Fast forward to the present and we see what Turkey’s most brazen and successful foreign intervention could be yet. Libya has been in civil war since the fall of its dictator which led to the establishment of two major factions: the Libyan National Army (LNA), backed by Egypt, UAE, and Russia, and the UN-accepted Government of National Accord (GNA), which recently acquired the support of Turkey.
The relationship between Turkey and the GNA appears to have started after they established bilateral maritime borders favorable to Turkey in the Mediterranean Sea. There have long been disputes of these borders with Greece and Cyprus, but Turkey’s claims may have a little more legitimacy now. The waters are rich with natural gas which Turkey aims to capitalize from to become more energy independent; Greece, Cyprus, and the East-Med project, however, stand in the way.
After the recent LNA offensive failure on Tripoli, the GNA began pushing back and expanding their control of western Libya with Turkish supply of drones and Syrian mercenaries. The GNA are going head-to-head with, not only LNA forces, but also Russian mercenaries led by the active Wagner Group. This may even escalate the proxy war between Egypt and Turkey to a direct military clash if the GNA forces, now supported by Turkish troops, set their course for Sirte and the oil-rich LNA-controlled lands.
Turkey has become increasingly active in regional affairs as it vies for regional influence against traditional powers such as UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. Erdoğan sees economic and security-related opportunities in these conflicts in addition to an expansion of Turkey’s spheres of influence. The more success Turkey and Erdoğan experience, the more brazen and bold their methods will be. It started with indirect support in Egypt, but now it has evolved into boots on the ground in Libya. Erdoğan sees Turkey as the next great Middle Eastern power, and Libya is the stage to prove it.
This is the third installment in a short series from Today’s WorldView for the 20th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks. Sign up to get the rest of the newsletter free, including news from around the globe, interesting ideas and opinions to know, sent to your inbox every weekday.
There’s a scene in the 2014 film “American Sniper” that sums up the country’s post-9/11 war lust. Chris Kyle, the late U.S. Navy SEAL played by Bradley Cooper, watches a newscast of the twin towers crumbling before his eyes. The camera fixes on Kyle’s steely yet stunned face as he holds his shaken wife, before cutting to an image of him in full military gear, glaring through the scope of his sniper rifle in the middle of an Iraqi town. (He goes on to gun down a woman aiding Iraqi insurgents.)
The film, which some critics panned as proto-fascist agitprop, spends no time interrogating this implied connection between the events of 9/11 and the American decision to “preemptively” invade Iraq less than two years later to topple the regime of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. Neither did much of the American public or political establishment that got swept up in the George W. Bush administration’s rush to punish “evil-doers.” A Washington Post poll in September 2003 found that close to 7 in 10 Americans believed that it was at least “likely” that Hussein was directly involved in the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks.
Advertisement That, of course, proved to be preposterous, as was much of the case Bush and his allies made about the imminent threat posed by the Iraqi regime’s phantom weapons of mass destruction. Animated by a neoconservative zeal to oust enemy regimes and wield American might to make right — and unhindered by the bulk of the Washington press corps — the Bush administration plunged the United States and its coalition partners into a war and eventual occupation that would reshape the political map of the Middle East, distract from America’s parallel intervention in Afghanistan and provoke new cycles of chaos and violence.
The first couple of years after 9/11 marked “an era where the United States made major strategic errors,” Vali Nasr, a professor of international affairs at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, told Today’s WorldView. “Its vision was clouded by anger and revenge.”
But what if the United States had opted against invading Iraq? The decision to oust Hussein, even more so than the invasion of Afghanistan in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, was an unprovoked war of choice that, on one hand, sealed off a range of other policy options available to Washington’s strategists and, on the other, set in motion events that fundamentally altered the region. It’s impossible to unwind what the Bush administration unleashed, but indulge us at Today’s WorldView as we puzzle through just a few elements of this counterfactual proposition.
Advertisement First and foremost, there’s the Iraqi death toll. The Watson Institute at Brown University calculates that 184,382 to 207,156 Iraqi civilians were directly killed in war-related violence between the start of the American invasion in March 2003 through October 2019. But the researchers suggest the real figure may well be several times higher.
Even considering Hussein’s own long record of brutality, it is difficult to envision a future of greater suffering for the Iraqi people had the United States not swept him from power, argued Sinan Antoon, a New York-based Iraqi poet and author.
“No matter what — and I say this as someone who was opposed to Saddam’s regime since childhood and wrote his first novel about life under dictatorship — had the regime remained in power, tens of thousands of Iraqis would still be alive today, and children in Fallujah would not be born with congenital defects every day,” Antoon told Today’s WorldView, alluding to the impact of U.S. forces allegedly using rounds of depleted uranium in their battles across Iraq.
Advertisement Antoon added that we also would not have seen the rise of the Islamic State had the United States not invaded — a conviction shared by former president Barack Obama and echoed by myriad experts. “In the near term, the Iraqi political order probably would not have collapsed and created a void that nonstate or quasi-state actors could fill,” wrote international relations scholars Hal Brands and Peter Feaver in a 2017 study.
“The Sunni-Shia cleavage that has made Iraq so difficult to govern still would have been present,” they continued, “but without the violence, political chaos and Sunni marginalization of the post-invasion period, that cleavage would have remained in a less combustible state, and terrorist groups such as [al-Qaeda in Iraq] and [the Islamic State] would not have found such fertile ground for recruiting.”
Other paths were possible. In 2002, Shibley Telhami, a veteran pollster affiliated with the Brookings Institution and a professor at the University of Maryland, was part of a group of Middle East scholars based in the United States who opposed the Bush administration’s drumbeat to war in Iraq.
Advertisement “Bush had a chance to build global coalitions, strengthen international norms and institutions, focus on the threat from al-Qaeda, reshape relations in the Gulf region and use domestic and international support to end the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, which, before 9/11, was the central grievance against the United States in the Middle East,” Telhami told Today’s WorldView.
Instead, he added, “Bush chose a policy of unilateralism,” pursuing a war that ravaged the Middle Eastern country, stoked sectarian violence and extremist militancy and “ended the balance of power between Iran and Iraq.” Iran’s gain from seeing its longtime foe fall in Baghdad, in turn, would reset the geopolitical calculations of Gulf Arab states, which became “so insecure that they embarked on destabilizing policies of their own, including the Yemen war,” said Telhami.
In 2003, the Iraqi regime still faced asphyxiating international sanctions. Had those eventually weakened — various countries apart from the United States were eager to bring Iraq out from the cold — the country’s youths would have been better linked to the world and an entrenched regime could have faced its own Arab Spring uprising.
Advertisement Rasha al-Aqeedi of the Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy, a Washington think tank, suggests an “Iraqi spring” would still have been brutally put down by the country’s Baathist government. “Saddam would have passed away and [his son] Qusay would have become president — an Iraqi version of [Syrian President Bashar] al-Assad, basically,” she told Today’s WorldView, imagining a milder end for the Iraqi dictator who was hanged in 2006. The status quo in Baghdad would have been “as stable as an authoritarian Baathist state can be.”
Alternatively, there could have been a steady internal unraveling, with the United States in a stronger position to support democratic and economic development, Amy Hawthorne, research director at the Project on Middle East Democracy, told Today’s WorldView. “Iraq, under punishing international sanctions and totalitarian rule for another decade, would have become a failed state, with parts of the south and Iraqi Kurdistan falling outside Saddam’s control.”
Instead, by 2007, the United States was compelled to deploy a “surge” of its troops to combat an Iraqi insurgency it would never quite quell. For multiple reasons, from feckless leadership to sectarian enmities, the government that the United States helped prop up in Baghdad would make a catalogue of its own mistakes. The occupation swiftly became a parable for American blundering and hubris.
“The U.S. was barely keeping its head above water during the surge,” Nasr said. “The aura of its power was gone.”
When the final U.S. troops departed Afghanistan just before midnight Monday, they left behind a country that looked unimaginably different than it did just weeks before.
The U.S.-backed government was no more, after its leaders slipped away along with the U.S.-trained security forces as the Taliban completed a near-total takeover. Banks and shops were closed, and a deep fear rippled through the country. Day after day, panicked mobs besieged Kabul airport, desperate to get out.
In the chaos, a brazen attack by a local affiliate of the Islamic State killed nearly 200 people, heralding a new era of international terrorism, which U.S. troops had originally been sent to Afghanistan to quash.
Now, with the final evacuation flights having departed, the United States has relinquished its remaining corner of Afghanistan to Taliban control, acquiescing to the Islamist militants’ demands that all troops be gone by Tuesday, as President Biden had pledged, even though that means leaving thousands of desperate, would-be evacuees behind.
Meanwhile, Afghans are waiting anxiously for whatever lies ahead, wondering what Taliban-dominated rule will mean for their freedoms, their livelihoods and their relations with the outside world. The country’s economy is plummeting by the day, and aid groups warn that a humanitarian crisis is brewing in the impoverished nation of 37 million unless foreign assistance resumes.
“For weeks now, the country has had no government, no armed forces, no system, no salaries, no leaders,” said Rahmatullah Nabil, a former national intelligence chief, who fled to Uzbekistan after the Taliban takeover of Kabul on Aug. 15. “The vacuum only adds to public confusion and endangers the hope for positive change.”
Militants hold Taliban flags in Kabul on Monday. Many Afghans are anxious about the Taliban’s rule. (Khwaja Tawfiq Sediqi/AP)
Over the past two decades, Kabul was transformed from a run-down, war-ravaged city to a modern capital, with high-rise condominiums and elaborate wedding halls, Internet cafes and beauty parlors, ATMs and mobile phone shops everywhere. Men and women mingled on college campuses and worked side by side in banks. Today, many people are lying low at home, and posters of women outside beauty parlors have been defaced.
The Taliban’s intentions are still far from clear, and its talks with Afghan officials about forming an inclusive interim government have progressed awkwardly. Senior Taliban leaders, cognizant of their need for international aid and support, if not full recognition, insist that they have changed since their repressive five-year rule in the 1990s, pledging not to persecute civilians or confine women to their homes.
But the group’s tough young fighters, suddenly assigned to patrol the capital as deputized police, have beaten people trying to reach the airport. Worse abuses have been reported in the countryside. And Taliban leaders have barred most women from work and school, though explaining that this is because their underlings have not been taught how to behave “kindly” with them.
The country is also battered and exhausted from years of war, which has exacted a heavy toll in casualties and other costs. About 2,400 U.S. service members have been killed in Afghanistan, including the 13 who died Thursday while providing security for evacuation flights. At least 48,000 Afghan civilians, 66,000 Afghan defense forces and 51,000 opposition fighters have also been killed as a direct result of the conflict.
Jane Horton, widow of U.S. Army Spec. Christopher D. Horton, watches as her husband’s casket is carried to a gravesite at Arlington National Cemetery in Virginia in October 2011. (Win McNamee/Getty Images)
Demands on American forces became heavier each year as the war dragged on with no end in sight. Thousands of enlisted troops were required to serve in repeated deployments. Nearly 800,000 U.S. troops rotated through Afghanistan at least once, and nearly 30,000 saw at least five deployments, according to Pentagon data provided to The Washington Post.
The U.S. military role was often controversial in Afghanistan. Hamid Karzai, who served as president from 2002 to 2014, stoked domestic antipathy by accusing foreign forces of occupying the country and blaming U.S. airstrikes for killing civilians. Public resentment showed in several protests and riots, one after a traffic accident in Kabul in 2006 and another in 2012 over allegations that Korans had been thrown out and burned at Bagram air base.
Even after 2014, when a majority of U.S. combat troops pulled out, thousands of service members remained as trainers and advisers in a continuing effort to build a modern, professional Afghan military and police corps. In the end, though, that long and costly effort proved to have been in vain. Afghan forces were demoralized by neglect, corruption and ethnic bias among their superiors. Often they went without pay and ammunition, and sometimes without rations.
“If there is a stalemate, the question is why and how it can be improved,” the U.S. special inspector general for Afghan reconstruction, John Sopko, told The Washington Post in 2017. “The why is corruption, the why is poor leadership,” he said. “If leadership is poor, the people below don’t care, and they wonder why they have to die.”
The demoralization intensified after the Trump administration, tired of protracted peace talks and eager to get out of a distant quagmire, signed a bilateral pact with the Taliban in early 2020. In return for a total U.S. withdrawal within 14 months, the deal called for the insurgents to cut ties with Islamist terrorist groups. It also led to the release of some 5,000 Taliban fighters from prison. To many Afghans, the pact seemed like a sellout.
By then, three administrations in Washington had spent huge sums — an average of $500 million in assistance per year — to help build a new country, modeled after Western institutions and rights, from the ashes of successive failures under Soviet occupation, civil war and Taliban religious oppression.
Afghan police officers stand guard in a poppy field as tractors destroy the crop during a drug-eradication operation outside Kandahar in 2004. (David Guttenfelder/AP)
Much had been accomplished, from surging enrollment in girls’ schools to widespread electrical power and cellphone access in once-isolated rural regions. There were projects to reduce opium poppy cultivation, promote women’s rights and hold credible elections. And year after year, the United States covered nearly three-quarters of public salaries, from teachers to traffic police.
But both the war and peace talks remained at a stalemate, and when Biden reached the White House, he decided it was time to cut American losses and turn to more pressing foreign concerns. In May, having rejected advice from U.S. military leaders to keep a sizable force in Afghanistan, Biden suddenly announced that all U.S. forces would leave by Sept. 11, then moved the date up to Aug. 31. Afghans, he said firmly, would have to determine their own future.
After that, the gradual drip of diminishing U.S. commitment became a more deliberate and urgent effort. American bases were stripped of equipment, and dozens of military cargo planes carried it away. Then, on July 1, U.S. military officials surreptitiously abandoned Bagram air base, the vast compound that had been the nerve center of the war effort for years, without informing some of their Afghan counterparts.
For Afghan forces, this meant diminished U.S. combat airstrikes that had been critical to the ground war. For the Taliban, it meant an opportunity to spring into action, pact or no pact. By late June, the militants had launched a fast-moving offensive across northern Afghanistan, overrunning province after province. Afghan troops, seeing no reason to die or sold out by their leadership, turned over their weapons and surrendered by the thousands as the Taliban gained territory and psychological momentum.
Afghan elite forces conduct a clearing operation in an area under Taliban control on the northern edge of Kunduz on July 15. (Lorenzo Tugnoli/For The Washington Post)
The Taliban momentum kept building in early August. Within little more than a week, its fighters overran Afghanistan’s three largest provincial capitals and were poised to enter Kabul. On Sunday, Aug. 15, they paused at the city gates and then entered, encountering almost no resistance. Just weeks before, U.S. intelligence officials had estimated that the Ghani government would survive for at least another six months. But by that Sunday, Ghani had secretly fled the country.
“We knew if they took Kandahar, they could reach Kabul the next day, but we believed the Americans when they said they would never let the Taliban take the capital,” said Haroun Mir, a former adviser to onetime vice president Amrullah Saleh. Mir was evacuated from his government office and flown to France. “But it turned out the Americans were not prepared either. They had stopped doing air raids, and the Taliban didn’t even have to fight. They had all the momentum.”
Now, the Taliban appears to be trying to restore order to the city, and its leaders are interacting regularly with senior Afghan political figures, including former president Hamid Karzai and Ghani’s former chief executive, Abdullah Abdullah.
But Thursday’s suicide bombing, which was claimed by a regional affiliate of the Islamic State, has thrust the Taliban and the United States into an awkward anti-terrorism partnership and has already resulted in the United States carrying out two counterterrorism strikes against suspected Islamic State targets inside Afghanistan. The United States has said it will continue to conduct counterterrorism operations against the Islamic State after the withdrawal.
While Biden has decided to withdraw all diplomatic personnel, the administration may now need to remain closely engaged with Kabul’s new leaders against a common enemy.
“President Biden, like President Trump before him, came to see Afghanistan as a problem to be gotten rid of because it had become too costly to solve,” said Davood Moradian, director of the Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies, who was evacuated from Kabul to Istanbul last week. “Now, it seems, not only did the U.S. fail to get rid of the problem, it is likely to be dragged back into it for a long time to come.”
Envoy says Washington and Islamabad now have a common interest in stopping the Taliban from exporting violence.
Asad Majeed Khan, Pakistan’s ambassador to Washington, speaks during a panel on “Pakistan’s Priorities” held by the U.S. Institute of Peace in Washington on March 4, 2019. Yasin Ozturk/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images
By Michael Hirsh, a senior correspondent and deputy news editor at Foreign Policy.
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Asad Majeed Khan, Pakistan’s ambassador to Washington, speaks during a panel on “Pakistan’s Priorities” held by the U.S. Institute of Peace in Washington on March 4, 2019. YASIN OZTURK/ANADOLU AGENCY/GETTY IMAGES
Pakistan’s ambassador to the United States, Asad Majeed Khan, says now that the Taliban have seized control of Afghanistan, there is, at last, an opportunity for the United States and Pakistan to work in concert rather than in an atmosphere of suspicion over Islamabad’s alleged support for the Islamist militants. In an interview with Foreign Policy on Tuesday, the career diplomat said he believes there is now a “convergence” of interests among Pakistan, the United States, China, and Russia in preventing the export of terrorism. Khan also contended that, contrary to reports of Taliban brutality and atrocities, the Taliban “seem to be listening to the counsel of the international community.”
At a news conference in Kabul later Tuesday, a Taliban spokesperson said the militant group would pardon anyone who had resisted it, and “the future government will be inclusive.”
“We do not want to have any problem with the international community,” said the spokesperson, Zabihullah Mujahid. Despite intelligence reports that the Taliban continue to harbor al Qaeda, he added “we are not going to allow our territory to be used against anybody, any country in the world.” He also said women would be allowed to work and study and will be “very active in the society but within the frameworks of Islam.”
This interview with the Pakistani ambassador has been edited for length and clarity.
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Foreign Policy: Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan said on Monday the Taliban takeover meant Afghans had broken “the shackles of slavery.” What did he mean by that?
Asad Majeed Khan: There is a lot of that appearing in the social media space, and sometimes, these things are quoted out of context, so I have not really seen the context in which what has been attributed to the prime minister have been said. I would recommend to you the statement that the [Pakistan] National Security Committee issued after it met Monday. That fairly and comprehensively articulates Pakistan’s position. [The statement said Pakistan is “committed to an inclusive political settlement” and “the principle of non-interference in Afghanistan must be adhered to.”]
FP: Did the prime minister not make that comment about slavery?
AK: It’s really hard to keep track. There’s so much out there in the social media space.
FP: Let me put it more broadly. There was some cheering at high levels in Pakistan over the Taliban victory. On Sunday, the minister for climate, Zartaj Gul Wazir, tweeted that the collapse of the civilian government in Kabul was “an appropriate gift for India on its Independence Day.” It’s clear that positing the Taliban as a hedge against Indian influence in Afghanistan has long been part of Pakistan’s strategic policy.
READ MORE
Pakistan and the United States Have Betrayed the Afghan People
Washington ignored Islamabad funding and supplying the Taliban. Now Afghans are paying the price.
AK: Really, if you were to put aside whatever these isolated statements are, obviously people … may have different takes as individuals. We are a free and democratic country, and there are a whole range of views for and against the policies of the government. But I think what is really important is to see where we have consistently stood over the past few years. I’ve been part of these conversations almost directly for more than 12 years, and I can say that we have covered a lot of ground in terms of addressing U.S. concerns on safe havens in Pakistan, and we are going all the way to cleanse those, addressing concerns on cross border movement and then doing whatever we could to bring the Taliban to the negotiating table. And we did it simply because we see that a continuing conflict in Afghanistan works to our utter detriment. It is against our interests completely.
FP: OK. Whatever the past issues of support by the ISI [Pakistan’s intelligence service] and Pakistani military—all that may not be as necessary now that the Taliban have taken control of Kabul. So what are your concerns going forward?
AK: It’s very important to basically go back because what we have seen or what we are seeing in Afghanistan is an eye-opener. It clearly brings out the fact that unfortunately, Pakistan has long been for the Afghan government an afterthought and excuse and a diversion to cover up for their deficiencies. Unfortunately, it suited the political convenience of the United States also. … We have supported the peace process completely, and we will continue to do that.
FP: Do you deny that, at least in the past, there has been support by the Pakistani ISI and military for the Taliban movement?
AK: It depends on what you mean by support, and does it imply—
FP: Everything from providing safe harbor to their leaders and their families to supplying logistical support to their military and hospitalization for wounded Taliban militants.
AK: Pakistan has been a safe harbor, but is there a distinction between Afghans and the Taliban? We have been a safe harbor and safe haven for all Afghans. And today also, if anything goes wrong, Pakistan will be the destination of choice again. So what can we do about that? And they don’t necessarily carry signs of who they are. So far as the Taliban’s military successes are concerned, what they have done in the field is something we have nothing to do with. We have basically stood by our commitment not to let our territory be used. There are these tribal areas that have been presented as safe havens, and for the past four years at least, we have completely cleansed them, integrated those areas into mainstream Pakistan. We have built a fence, you know.
FP: So there is currently no Pakistani support whatsoever for the Taliban takeover?
AK: Absolutely not.
FP: Obviously some U.S. officials believe there is.
AK: The point is their assessments have largely been proven wrong, and I think that right now, this is not the time to point fingers. … It’s not that the Taliban were on our payrolls.
FP: Is all the Taliban leadership out of Pakistan?
AK: I only know the leadership has moved from Doha to Afghanistan.
FP: So what are Pakistan’s main sources of concern right now?
AK: We would like to see an inclusive government, and that was something we hoped would come out of an inclusive peace process. These developments have clearly been a setback. So we are doing whatever we can, and the extended “troika” [the United States, Pakistan, China, and Russia] had a good meeting in Doha on Aug. 10 and Aug. 11. We are engaged with these key players to have all the ethnicities of Afghanistan represented. The diversity of Afghanistan also needs to be reflected in the composition of the government.
FP: What hopes do you have for achieving that? What kind of influence does Pakistan have now? This seems an even more extensive Taliban takeover than in the 1990s, since the anti-Taliban militias just folded. The Taliban are in total control.
AK: What we are hearing from the ground and what we are seeing in terms of developments is the Taliban seem to be listening to the counsel of the international community. There haven’t been very many violent incidents. Some schools have been opened. One of their leaders was interviewed by a female anchor.
FP: But there are many reports of brutality on the ground, women and girls taken from schools, mass killings, and then the heart-wrenching scenes of Afghan evacuees crowding into the airport. There seems to be quite a difference between what the Taliban leaders in Doha were saying and what’s happening in Afghanistan.
AK: I think they should be concerned because the international community is watching and they will be judging them based on what happens on the ground. … They have been in control of large parts of Afghanistan already for quite some time, and the reports we are getting is they are mostly conducting themselves responsibly. Despite some incidents a few weeks back, it’s been very smooth. … They are basically talking to everybody. Our embassy is open and working around the clock. We are doing what we can to facilitate the repatriation of nongovernmental organizations, journalists, and others. Many evacuations are taking place through Pakistan.
FP: Does this takeover clear the air in some ways between Islamabad and Washington? Obviously this issue of covert Pakistani support of the Taliban has been hanging over the relationship for a long time. Is there a way forward now?
AK: That’s the question we are grappling with because, frankly, our relationship with the United States has been defined and deeply influenced by Afghanistan. It’s been seen through the Afghan prism all these years. … So we are working toward moving onto another relationship. Despite all the challenges today, the United States is still the largest export destination for Pakistan. It is the third largest remittance sender to Pakistan. The United States has also been one of the top five investor countries in Pakistan.
FP: What are the concerns of your government now about extremist Islamist ideology spreading back across the border? After all, attacks by the TTP [Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan] have reportedly increased in recent months within Pakistan.
AK: There are two levels the TTP has been a concern and still is because when we cleared our areas, they found safe havens on the other side. And that’s a concern, and that is our expectation also: Afghan territory will not be used against us. Whoever will be in control must not let it be used. Having said that, I think the fear of extremism and sometimes the way it is going to impact Pakistan is exaggerated in the think tank space inside the Beltway. Because if you look at Pakistan, frankly all the mainstream political parties are more to the center or slightly to the right of center. And so-called fringe religious parties do not have that huge a following given the character of our society—we are religious, but at the same time, we believe in embracing a pluralistic Islam.
FP: But will there be more attacks from the extremists?
AK: It’s not about the Taliban. And that’s why we’ve been investing so much in the peace process. Our view is that even for the United States, the best counterterrorism investment is to invest in peace. If you don’t have peace, you have ungoverned spaces. Then you have militias and countries hedging their bets. We’ve seen that play out in the past, and we don’t want that repeated. So the best way to counter extremism is to have a government that is under control … ready to work with the international community.
FP: Have there been conversations between Islamabad and Washington in the last few days?
AK: Secretary [of State Antony] Blinken spoke to the [Pakistani] foreign minister, and this was quite lengthy. Really I think the good thing today is that regarding Afghanistan, there is a complete convergence between the United States and Pakistan. You want the parties to get to a common understanding. We want that. You want the violence reduced. We want that. You want the gains of the past preserved. We want that. … China and Russia are concerned too [about terrorism]. We are all worried.
FP: Are there any initiatives coming? For example, we know Pakistan wants no U.S. military presence within its borders, but will Islamabad help on intelligence and other things to support the U.S. posture of maintaining over-the-horizon vigilance against al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and other terrorists?
AK: It’s developed so fast. It’s been happening on an hourly basis. The bottom line is terrorism is our concern as much as it is your concern. And there are ways in which we can and will cooperate with the international community and the United States. We have cooperated in the past.
FP: You’re facing a sometimes aggressive India under Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Do you see the new Taliban-run Afghanistan as an ally against India?
AK: Unfortunately, Afghan territory has been used against us. Even this so-called Sanction Pakistan campaign—basically, a lot of it originated from India. It’s sad. … So therefore, Afghanistan will have to sort this one out. India has closed its embassy there. … We have made overtures for engagement, but Prime Minister Modi, the problem really is that his politics somehow puts Pakistan in the domestic political scene and context and … it suits him to maintain a hard line on Pakistan, and that’s what he’s continuing to do. And Kashmir is another place where he has taken a unilateral action. … So Modi is not conceding anything, and the stalemate continues.
FP: What do you think China’s relationship will be with Afghanistan? Here we are in another version of the so-called Great Game, where the great powers vie for influence on the world stage using Afghanistan as a platform. In Southeast Asia, we are dealing with an aggressive Chinese presence against Taiwan—and more broadly, a test of the overarching rivalry between the United States and China. Will China see the U.S. abandonment of Afghanistan as a signal that Taiwan is vulnerable too?
AK: Honestly, I think happily, Afghanistan is a convergence [of interests], and the extended troika … indicates the concerns are common.
FP:Shouldn’t these concerns be common? China has its concerns about Islamist insurgents, and Russia has its own worries about the Islamist Chechens. All the big powers fear Islamist extremists.
AK: Everybody. That’s the huge base to work from for peace in Afghanistan. We have always maintained that Afghanistan should be an arena for cooperation rather than a place for confrontation.
The international community was taken by surprise by the speed of the fall of Afghanistan. Panic spread through Kabul, with citizens fleeing and foreign governments organizing the evacuation of their citizens and Afghans who worked for them. The Taliban declared an “amnesty” across Afghanistan and urged women to join their government Tuesday, seeking to convince a wary population that they have changed a day after deadly chaos gripped the main airport as desperate crowds tried to flee the country. The Taliban have sought to portray themselves as more moderate than when they imposed a brutal rule in the late 1990s. But many Afghans remain skeptical. There is also deep concern that terrorist groups could make a comeback under Taliban rule, using Afghanistan as a veritable launchpad for terrorist attacks. Dr. Afzal Ashraf, Visiting Fellow at University of Nottingham, acknowledges that terrorist groups certainly could (make a comeback), “in theory, but one of the things the Taliban have made clear is that they won’t allow their territory to be used” for terrorist activity. Dr. Ashraf warns that “the problem isn’t whether the Taliban will allow it, it’s the fact whether the Taliban will have control over their territory.” Dr. Ashraf points out that “it’s very difficult for even developed nations to control terrorist groups on their soil. It’ll be (even more) difficult for the Taliban.”
When then Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali resolved to overthrow the ailing Habib Bourguiba in 1989, he made sure to inform Algiers and secure its backing beforehand. Hence, Ben Ali was able to avoid any regional fall-out or unnecessary tension with Tunisia’s most important (and powerful) regional neighbor and ally. When Rachid al-Ghannouchi’s Ennahda party won the first free and fair elections in Tunisia in 2011, the Ennahda leader’s first official foreign visit was to Algiers.
This time however, it is becoming apparent that President Kais Saied has not sought out a consultation with Algiers. When Saied announced his decision in late July to suspend parliament and assume executive, legislative, and judicial powers for himself, Algiers appears to have been caught by surprise.
If the current narrative touted in Algeria is to be believed, Saied called Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune a few hours after his announcement; not before. Whatever was said in that phone call appears not to have eased Tebboune’s concerns and he immediately ordered his Foreign Minister to fly to Tunis early the following morning.
Algeria has legitimate reasons to be concerned over Saied’s coup.
The Special Relationship
Saied’s decision not to inform Algiers before embarking on this sudden action suggests that he does not intend to respect the “special relationship” between the two countries. Algiers has always seen its rapport with Tunis as integral to its foreign policy, and the two have often operated in tandem to ensure a common approach to regional issues that affect them both. Tunisia in particular has always sought to uphold and promote this special connection with newly elected officials, as they are expected to make Algiers their first official foreign destination.
Algiers has always seen its rapport with Tunis as integral to its foreign policy.
The decision by Saied, and by extension the Tunisian security apparatus, to move forward with the coup without liaising with Algiers suggests a threat to the special relationship. This is further compounded by the implication that the UAE-Saudi Arabia-Egypt axis is seeking to supplant such ties.
Algeria has often publicly expressed its annoyance and concern with the Gulf’s settling of scores on North African territory. While the regime in Algiers was never in favor of the Arab Spring revolutions, it nevertheless adapted to the changing dynamics. Notably, it adjusted its foreign relations and respected the newly emerging democratic institutions in Tunisia. And it maintained ties with Libya’s disputing parties during the initial democratic transition and its subsequent collapse into civil war.
However, Algiers resents both Qatar and UAE interference in what it sees as its own stomping ground. Qatar has supported allies in the region which Algiers is not comfortable with. The UAE meanwhile has sought to transform North African states into proxies to settle its scores with Qatar and Doha’s allies, as well as expand its own maritime influence and international clout. Both agendas are seen as threats in Algiers.
The UAE has sought to transform North African states into proxies to settle its scores with Qatar and Doha’s allies.
In the case of Tunisia, Saied is overwhelmingly supported by the axis of the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. Prior to the coup, Algiers was fairly content with the balance of powers in Tunis. That power sharing helped Tunisia maintain relative independence by preventing any other states from pushing it into a foreign policy position that might run contrary to Algeria’s interests. Saied’s coup threatens to upend this “balance” by throwing Tunisia headlong into the arms of Abu Dhabi.
From Algiers’ perspective, Saied’s power takeover threatens to render Tunisia akin to an “8th Emirate” of the United Arab Emirates (“the UAE”) to be wielded by Abu Dhabi in order to secure foreign policy gains in North Africa at Algeria’s expense.
Throughout the Libyan civil war, Tunisia has always acted as a lifeline for the internationally-recognized government in Tripoli, amidst ex-General Khalifa Haftar’s bid to impose a military solution to the conflict. Algeria’s resentment of Haftar is no secret. Haftar has publicly threatened Algiers in the past and Algeria’s President Tebboune has reiterated numerous times that he will not allow Haftar to militarily seize Tripoli. Regardless of whether Algeria’s domestic upheaval would allow the President to make true on these statements, the sentiment nevertheless is clear.
Given Algiers’ stance towards Haftar and its preference for a political solution (that Haftar and the UAE seek to undermine), there are genuine concerns that Saied’s coup in Tunisia will shut off Tripoli’s lifeline to the West and result in Abu Dhabi being able to antagonize the internationally-recognized government via both Haftar to the East, and Tunisia to the West. With Haftar itching for a renewed military campaign, Tunisia’s stance will have a significant impact on whether the Libyan political process survives, or Haftar’s ambition is realized.
President Saied met with Morocco’s Foreign Minister immediately after sitting with the Algerian Foreign Minister. Saied’s coup is unfolding at a time of particular tension between Algiers and Rabat. Morocco has normalized ties with Israel in exchange for US recognition of its control of the Western Sahara. Algeria views this normalization as an underhanded tactic by Rabat to garner international support for Morocco on the Western Sahara issue at the expense of the Algeria-backed Polisario movement that seeks an independent state.
The UAE is seen as the prime beneficiary of Saied’s coup, and a firm ally of Rabat.
The UAE, which infuriated Algeria by establishing a consulate in El-Ayoun in the Western Sahara, is seen as the prime beneficiary of Saied’s coup, and a firm ally of Rabat that is committed to supporting Morocco in advancing its interests at the expense of Algeria.
Where Tunisia has often been either neutral or silent on the matter of the Moroccan-Algerian differences, there is concern in Algiers that the UAE will drive Tunisia to greater support of Rabat and to undermine Algeria diplomatically as it seeks to rein in a Morocco that is increasingly assertive.
What Does Algiers Want?
Algeria does not seek a public display of any loyalty. Rather, it seeks to prevent Tunisia being dragged into the Gulf states’ proxy warfare that has greatly exacerbated conflict in the region. Algiers wants a guarantee that whatever emerges from Saied’s coup will not result in the UAE being able to sway Tunisia in favor of its foreign policy.
As the UAE extends its influence in regional matters of exceptional importance to Algiers (Morocco, Libya, and Tunisia), there are rumblings in Algerian public discourse that the UAE is beginning to surround Algeria. The general feeling is that any complacency on the part of Algiers will lead to Abu Dhabi exacerbating a volatile domestic situation in Algeria itself. With Abu Dhabi’s reach now spanning nearly all of the North African states, there is a sense that if Saied’s coup succeeds, then Algeria will be next.
Algeria’s ideal outcome in Tunisia would be a power-sharing deal between Ennahda and Saied.
It is in this context that Algeria’s ideal outcome in Tunisia would be a power-sharing deal between Ennahda and Saied in which each acts as a check on the other. For all of Algeria’s reservations towards the Muslim Brotherhood and Ennahda, there is little doubt that they are an effective rein on any UAE overreach. The same applies for Saied with regards to Qatari overreach. Realistically, this is the only way to guarantee that neither the UAE, nor Egypt, France, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar are able to force Tunis into a position against Algerian interests.
Nevertheless, President Saied appears to now be engaging Algiers and making serious efforts to ease its concerns by assuring that no foreign powers are threatening the unstable region. On July 31, an official statement was released by the Algerian Presidency, stating that Saied had informed Tebboune that he would announce important decisions very soon.
Although, this does not mean that Saied will succeed in easing all of Algiers’ worries. Indeed, on July 31, UAE and Saudi Arabia-backed media outlet Al-Arabiya had its broadcasting license in Algeria revoked due to it “failing to uphold industry ethics, and its generally misleading content and dishonesty.” It seems Algiers remains on high alert over the Tunisian situation and its potential fallout, and only time will reveal whether such fears are valid.
On July 25, Tunisian President Kais Saied took drastic measures to bring “peace” to Tunisia and “save the state” from a political system that he claims is plagued by corruption and unfit to handle the current economic and health crises facing the country. President Saied invoked Article 80 of Tunisia’s constitution to sack Prime Minister Hichem Mechichi and freeze parliament. By invoking Article 80, which entitles the president to take the necessary measures to halt any imminent “danger threatening the integrity of the country,” Saied assumed full powers under the executive branch. In a publicly broadcast speech, President Saied said he would name a new prime minister within the next thirty days—a deadline which Saied said can be extended until the “situation settles down.”
Below, Atlantic Council experts react to the events, assess the impact on the fledgling democracy, and offer their thoughts on how the international community may respond.
Domestic crises were an excuse for Saied to act
Tunisian President Saied has decided to freeze parliament for at least a month, remove the immunity of parliamentarians, sack the prime minister, and take control of the security forces. That Saied considers these actions legitimate, according to his interpretation of Article 80 of the 2014 constitution, is not surprising. The crisis has been developing since the summer of 2020, when the president fired Prime Minister Elyes Fakhfakh and forced parliament to accept the appointment of his advisor, Hichem Mechichi. Many would argue that Saied felt threatened by the leader of the Islamist Ennahda party and Parliament Speaker, Rached Ghannouci. Immediately thereafter, when Mechichi disagreed with the president on several fronts, Saied initiated a series of aggressive political measures to have him removed.
The events of July 25 were the last resort for Saied to reach his objective to assume complete control of the country. The failure of the government to deal with the economic crisis and the coronavirus pandemic provided the excuse for President Saied to act. This divisive maneuver could have irreparable consequences for the fledgling democracy, chief among them an intensified confrontation between various political actors. The grievances and tensions within Tunisia are now high enough to worry about an eventual escalation from civil demonstrations to armed confrontation.
Karim Mezran, director of the North Africa Initiative and resident senior fellow.
The legal framework of Saied’s actions
Tunisia 2014’s constitution includes a specific provision on the state of emergency. According to Article 80 of the constitution, the president, “in the event of imminent danger threatening the nation’s institutions or the security or independence of the country, and hampering the normal functioning of the state, may take any measures necessitated by the exceptional circumstances.”
Per Article 80, exceptional measures can be imposed to maintain the integrity of state institutions and services and ensure the continuity of the government despite the gravity of a crisis. However, the president must also ensure that such measures guarantee a return to the normal functioning of state institutions and services as soon as possible.
The adopted measures should be suspended once the reasons for their implementation have ceased. Considering their exceptional character, certain conditions must be in place. Prior to the announcement of the state of emergency, the president must consult with the prime minister and the speaker of parliament and inform the head of the constitutional court. However, the latter is impossible to fulfill given that Tunisia has yet to institute a constitutional court that oversees a legitimate implementation of the constitution. Additionally, through an official statement to the people, the president must announce that he intends to implement such measures.
The condition expressed in Article 80 does not specify whether the president must consult with the parliament and government on the critical situation the country is facing, or on the measures to be taken. The president has a certain degree of discretion to decide whether to delay the state of emergency. However, Article 80 does not confer unrestricted powers to the president. It clearly states that during a state of emergency, parliament shall be deemed to be in a state of continuous session throughout such a period. Therefore, the president cannot dissolve parliament. Moreover, a motion of censure against the government cannot be presented. This implies that the state of emergency does not settle a constitutional dictatorship, which would have concentrated all three branches of government in the hands of the president nor allow the suspension of the separation of powers.
Given the nature of the measures announced by President Saied, he exercised his powers beyond the scope and conditions stipulated in the constitution. Yet, the crisis in the country has been ongoing for months and is undeniably of an exceptional character, which legitimately allows the recourse to Article 80. However, their scope should be limited and restricted, mainly in the absence of a judicial review by the constitutional court.
Haykel Ben Mahfoudh,nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs.
International repercussions
Once again, Tunisia is on the frontline of a major global crisis. In 2011, when soaring global prices led to a spike in the cost of living, socioeconomic despair in Tunisia converged thunderously with political dissent and kicked off the Arab Spring. This time, widespread anger over the mismanagement of COVID-19 and its calamitous fiscal fallout has set the stage for another political inflection point. International reaction to President Saied’s move will be complicated by the fact that he has not sought to suspend the constitution prima facie but rather to act within it. While Saied has enlisted the support of the armed forces and his sacking of the government was celebrated by large crowds in the streets, he ultimately lacks the party apparatus to consolidate his position formally. Just as Tunisia ten years ago became the trial case for democracy in the Arab world, so the coming weeks may test the prospects—and the dangers—of a political insurgent claiming to take on a corrupt system and unilaterally calling time on a dysfunctional elite. Therefore, the outcome will carry implications beyond the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, particularly as pandemic-related discontent intensifies globally.
Alia Brahimi, nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs.
How Algeria responded to the events
News of President Saied’s dismissal of the government and parliament reached neighboring Algeria amidst an already turbulent period.
Earlier this month, the Pegasus spyware scandal escalated tensions with Morocco, Algeria’s neighbor to the west, to their worst levels in years and raised delicate questions about the country’s cyber defenses. The coronavirus pandemic has swelled dramatically in recent days, threatening to overwhelm the country’s health services, sending citizens scrambling for oxygen and other supplies, and prompting renewed curfews. Preoccupied with these and other challenges, none in Algiers welcome the possibility of a constitutional crisis in Tunisia.
Algerian state media reported that Saied called his Algerian counterpart, Abdelmadjid Tebboune—likely to reassure Tunisia’s largest neighbor that the shakeup will not jeopardize the country’s stability. On the contrary, Saied will have presented his move to sideline the Ennahda party as best for Tunisia’s future prosperity. That message is unlikely to provoke objections from Algerian leaders, no strangers themselves to bending the rules to subvert Islamist advances—as they did most substantially in 1992, touching off a decade of violence. To maintain Algeria’s critical support, Saied will need to reassure Algiers that his move will not have such destabilizing effects on Tunisia or the wider region.
Ordinary Algerians, who share tight ties with their Tunisian neighbors, are also watching events closely, as they have ever since protests there touched off the Arab Spring a decade ago. To many Algerians, Tunisia’s rocky but heretofore successful democratic transition was proof that a third way existed between the strongmen and the Islamists. That hope was one of many factors that helped kindle Algeria’s Hirak, a mass protest movement for political change that began in 2019. Today activists in Algeria and across the region are watching Tunisia closely to see whether it will remain a model worth aspiring to.
Andrew Farrand, nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs.
What does the crisis mean for Egypt?
With his decision to dismiss the government and freeze parliament’s activity, President Saied attempted to sideline Ennahda, the main Islamist party, whose historical leader, Ghannouci, is the current parliament speaker. Saied and Ghannouci’s difficult relationship seems to mirror that of Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and the Muslim Brotherhood’s. In Egypt in 2013, one year after his election, Islamist President Mohamed Morsi was ousted by the military after large-scale protests against Morsi’s government. Today in Tunisia, we are witnessing a president riding on the anger of many Tunisians who have been protesting what they see as a corrupt and inefficient parliament. This anger is directed against Ennahda, which is being blamed for ineffectively addressing the country’s mounting economic and political problems. Furthermore, President Saied is not hiding the desire to concentrate all political power in his own hands, by imposing a robust presidential system and emulating what Egyptian President Sisi has already realized.
It is very likely—in the name of their shared aversion to political Islam—that Sisi will welcome and support the latest developments in Tunisia, as another example of the failure of the political branches of the Muslim Brotherhood and their inability to transform into reality the revolutionary ideals of the so-called Arab Spring. Cairo could favor a possible transformation of the Tunisian political landscape if it moves toward an anti-Islamist and strong presidential system. This could pave the way for creating an arch in North Africa against political Islam, possibly also influencing the political situation in Libya.
Alessia Melcangi, nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs.
What happens in Tunisia, doesn’t stay in Tunisia
The unfolding Tunisian crisis was an endmost litmus test for the credibility of countries that often hype liberal ideals, democratic norms, and progressive values as cornerstones for good governance. Yet, the settling dust of European and American complacency observed towards Tunisia’s democratic challenges is revealing a bleak picture that vindicates the MENA region’s authoritarians that often count on their Western counterparts’ complacency. Those whose thrones once creaked under the strain of freedom-seeking Tunisians’ ardor are now rejoicing in their gloom. The irony is not lost on observers: a decade that began with the region’s youth forcing an agenda for change through collective mobilization is ending with aging authoritarians applauding as the only fledgling democracy borne out of the decade’s early revolutionary fever has its wings clipped.
While there are legitimate questions about President Saied’s capabilities to steer Tunisia out of the quagmire he has embroiled it in, what is indubitable is that his intentions—well-meaning or not—are of no consequence to those already leveraging the ossifying president’s blundering impulses to push their own narrative. In neighboring Libya, an unrepenting General Khalifa Haftar has welcomed the move—congratulating Saied for acting against Islamists. Similarly, Gulf-funded media outlets are misleadingly using Tunisian developments to scapegoat Islamism for the country’s ills. The muted response of Western countries to the current crisis while they predominantly spectated as Tunisia’s post-revolutionary democratic candlelight dimmed has enabled these forces to reinforce their echo chambers.
Much like 2011, Tunisian developments and how they are dealt with will ripple beyond its borders. Neighboring Libyans, whose country’s precarious post-conflict transition currently hangs in the balance, will be the first to take the moral from Tunisia’s story to determine the rules of their own political game.
Emadeddin Badi, nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs.
What to watch for next?
In the past few months, Tunisians have taken to the streets to protest the government’s handling of the COVID-19 pandemic. Angered by the increasing death rates caused by the pandemic as well as the deadlock of the main political parties to solve the crisis, Tunisians have reached a tipping point. The frustration caused by the recent surge of cases has exacerbated a difficult economic situation caused by years of economic stagnation. Although it is still too soon to tell whether President Saied has the support of a majority of Tunisians, many protestors who took to the streets on July 25 after the president’s actions cheered his decision to dissolve parliament—reflecting their deep dissatisfaction with the current political deadlock.
We are witnessing many young Tunisians reacting to the inability of Tunisia’s ruling parties to govern the country. Soaring unemployment, corruption, and a growing number of COVID-19 cases have caused a wave of unrest which President Saied is using to secure more power for himself through new elections. To know whether Tunisia’s democratic institutions are at risk, it will be vital to monitor the following political scenarios:
Will Saied go as far as arresting opposition leaders after he revoked the immunity enjoyed by members of parliament?
Will clashes between the protestors and police turn violent and how will security services respond?
How soon will Saied nominate a new prime minister as he promised?
Will there be further restrictions on the press after the July 26 storming at Al Jazeera’s Tunis bureau and the expulsion of its journalists?
