Interviews, News, Perspectives 0 comments on AFRAS, NDAW and Tunisia Skills conférence : Libyan elections Algerian – Moroccan Conflicts and Regional transformations .. By Kamel Ben Younes

AFRAS, NDAW and Tunisia Skills conférence : Libyan elections Algerian – Moroccan Conflicts and Regional transformations .. By Kamel Ben Younes

Will Tunisia, the countries of the Maghreb and the Sahel and Sahara region be entitled to a period of stability, economic recovery, sustainable development and democratization?

This question was recently addressed by around thirty Tunisian, Maghreb and Euro-Mediterranean experts, during a conference-debate on the upcoming elections in Libya and the geostrategic effects of the new conflicts between Rabat and Algiers.

Participated in this conference – debate of experts from the Averroès center for Arab-African strategic studies, from the association “Tunisie Compétences” and from “NDAW” (Network of Democrats of the Arab World, the “Network of Democrats of the Arab World” “).

The presentations and discussions focused on the regional and global dimensions of the new political, security and geostrategic conflicts in Libya, in the Maghreb, Sahel and African Sahara regions and in the Mediterranean.

“Report” of the elections in Libya

Speakers confirmed that internal and international conflicts in Libya are worsening and risk causing the “postponement” or even cancellation of the presidential and legislative elections scheduled for December 24, 2021.

According to the majority of experts, this is a “proxy war” whose fate is linked to the military, security and political conflicts which have paralyzed most of the countries of the “greater Middle East” for twenty years and especially since. 2011 and the outbreak of the “Arab revolutions”.

Internal, regional and international conflicts of interest risk to abort the “political resolution processes” of “civil wars” in Libya and in other countries of the region, notably in Tunisia, the “destabilization” of which would have an impact. . very dangerous for its neighbors and for the whole Euro-Mediterranean region.

No description available.

Interference

These same conflicts of interest complicate the differences and tensions between the countries of the Maghreb, the Sahel region and the Sahara. They accelerate “foreign interference” and the risks of new tensions, in particular between Morocco and Algeria, Mali, Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Sudan, Djibouti or between Egypt and Ethiopia. …

The participants explained the involvement of dozens of countries around the world in international conferences on the conflicts in Libya, Syria, Sudan, Mali, etc. by the “divergences” and “new conflicts of interest” between them. main foreign players in these countries, including France, Russia, China, Turkey, the United States, the Gulf countries and Israel.

Algiers-Rabat conflicts

The risks of instability and insecurity have increased after the emergence of new tensions between Algeria and Morocco and the rise in tensions in Mali, south of the Sahara and in the eastern Mediterranean between the major European capitals, Ankra, Beijing, Moscow and Washington.

Moroccan and Algerian speakers noted the gaps by analyzing the emergence of the new tension between Rabat and Algiers and the causes of the new security threats.

However, the majority of speakers called for a high-level Algerian-Moroccan political dialogue to avoid all scenarios of the outbreak of an “armed confrontation”, the opening of borders and the revival of bilateral and regional cooperation.

No description available.

For the Libyan dossier, the speakers recommended to the political decision-makers of the countries of the Maghreb, the Arab world and the Euro-Mediterranean region to “overcome their classic quarrels” and their “proxy wars” to succeed in playing a role in life. Politics. to treat. then at the stage of “reconstruction” and “reinvestment”. Otherwise the big world capitals will have the last word and will have the opportunity to marginalize the neighboring countries of Libya in the “next big markets”.

Calls were made for the evacuation of foreign forces and militias established throughout Libyan territory, while strengthening security and preventive measures to prevent the “flight” of mercenaries and terrorists to Tunisia and others. neighboring Libyan countries. .

However, international engagement with political and democratic processes in Libya could be an opportunity not only for the Libyan people, but also for Tunisia and the region.

Interviews, News, Perspectives 0 comments on Reframing Vienna: What about Iran’s Side of the Story?

Reframing Vienna: What about Iran’s Side of the Story?

There’s a problem with the way Iran is being made out to be in terms of the revival of the Vienna Talks. This isn’t new, of course. It’s part of the anti-Iran narrative that’s been espoused since the Iranian Revolution, but ever since the end of the 6th round of talks, Iran has been portrayed as a country that is unreasonably intransigent in its dealings with the E3 and the US and unwilling to engage in dialogue.

Reality disagrees, however. Iran’s approach to the talks stems from its tried and tested distrust toward the West. Be it imperialism, occupation, massacres, coerced monopolies, or military and security interventions, Iran has been subjected to them all in modern times, and these are all matters very much alive in the Iranian collective memory.

The distrust is real, grounded, and based on experience. If anything, Iran has shown a great deal of pragmatism and diplomatic know-how in its talks with the West over the past 42 years. The JCPOA bespeaks the country’s willingness to hold dialogue with international peers.

So how did we get from former President Rouhani’s optimism vis-à-vis a possible revival of the deal to the talks being delayed time and time again until the end of November?

Interviews, News, Perspectives 0 comments on Algeria, Tunisia and Libya pledge to continue efforts for Libyan elections to succeed

Algeria, Tunisia and Libya pledge to continue efforts for Libyan elections to succeed

  • The foreign ministers also affirmed their support for unifying Libya’s institutions and withdrawing mercenaries and foreign fighters

LONDON: The foreign ministers of Algeria, Tunisia and Libya on Monday affirmed their continuous support for the success of the upcoming Libyan elections and for mobilizing the necessary international support to preserve the security and stability of Libya and all neighboring countries.
This came during a meeting that was held on the sidelines of national celebrations commemorating the 67th anniversary of the outbreak of Algeria’s liberation revolution against French colonial rule, with the attendance of several African leaders and officials.
The ministers commended the success of the Libya Stability Conference, held in Tripoli on Oct. 21, and exchanged views on upcoming meetings on Libya, especially the Paris conference, Algerian El-Bilad newspaper reported.
They also affirmed their support for the unification of Libya’s institutions, the withdrawal of mercenaries and foreign fighters, and the advancement of national reconciliation efforts.

Interviews, News, Perspectives 0 comments on Geopolitics, Profit, Poppies: How CIA Turned Afghanistan into a Failed Narco-State

Geopolitics, Profit, Poppies: How CIA Turned Afghanistan into a Failed Narco-State

The war in Afghanistan has looked a lot like the war on drugs in Latin America and previous colonial campaigns in Asia, with a rapid militarization of the area and the empowerment of pliant local elites.

The COVID-19 pandemic has been a death knell to so many industries in Afghanistan. Charities and aid agencies have even warned that the economic dislocation could spark widespread famine. But one sector is still booming: the illicit opium trade. Last year saw Afghan opium poppy cultivation grow by over a third while counter-narcotics operations dropped off a cliff. The country is said to be the source of over 90% of all the world’s illicit opium, from which heroin and other opioids are made. More land is under cultivation for opium in Afghanistan than is used for coca production across all of Latin America, with the creation of the drug said to directly employ around half a million people.

This is a far cry from the 1970s, when poppy production was minimal, and largely for domestic consumption. But this changed in 1979 when the CIA launched Operation Cyclone, the widespread funding of Afghan Mujahideen militias in an attempt to bleed dry the then-recent Soviet invasion. Over the next decade, the CIA worked closely with its Pakistani counterpart, the ISI, to funnel $2 billion worth of arms and assistance to these groups, including the now infamous Osama Bin Laden and other warlords known for such atrocities as throwing acid in the faces of unveiled women.

From statements by U.S. Ambassador [to Iran] Richard Helms, there was little heroin production in Central Asia by the mid 1970s,” Professor Alfred McCoy, author of “The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade,” told MintPress. But with the start of the CIA secret war, opium production along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border surged and refineries soon dotted the landscape. Trucks loaded with U.S. taxpayer-funded weapons would travel from Pakistan into its neighbor to the west, returning filled to the brim with opium for the new refineries, their deadly product ending up on streets worldwide. With the influx of Afghan opium in the 1980s — Jeffrey St. Clair, co-author of “Whiteout: The CIA, Drugs and the Press,” alleges — heroin addiction more than doubled in the United States.

In order to finance the resistance for a protracted period, the Mujahideen had to come up with a livelihood beyond the weapons that the CIA was providing,” McCoy said, noting that the weapons issued could not feed the fighters’ families, nor reimburse them for lost labor:

So what the resistance fighters did was they turned to opium. Afghanistan had about 100 tons of opium produced every year in the 1970s. By 1989-1990, at the end of that 10-year CIA operation, that minimal amount of opium — 100 tons per annum — had turned into a major amount, 2,000 tons a year, and was already about 75% of the world’s illicit opium trade”.

The CIA achieved its goal of giving the U.S.S.R. its Vietnam, the Soviets failing to quash the Mujahideen rebellion by the time they finally pulled out in 1989. But American money and weapons also turned Afghanistan into a dangerously unstable place full of warring factions that used opium to fund their battles for internal supremacy. By 1999, annual production had risen to 4,600 tons. The Taliban eventually emerged as the dominant force in the country and attempted to gain international legitimacy by stamping out the trade.

In this, they were remarkably successful. A 2000 ban on opium cultivation by the Taliban-led government led to an almost overnight drop to just 185 tons harvested the following year, as frightened farmers chose not to risk attracting their wrath.

The Taliban had hoped that the eradication program would win favor in Washington and entice the United States to provide humanitarian aid. But unfortunately, history had other ideas. On September 11, 2001, the U.S. experienced a massive case of blowback, as Bin Laden’s forces launched attacks on New York and Washington. The U.S. ignored the Taliban’s offer to hand him over to a third party, instead opting to invade the country. Less than a month after the planes hit the World Trade Center, U.S. troops were patrolling the fields of Afghanistan.

The world’s first true narco-state

The effect of the occupation was to expand drug production to unprecedented new proportions, Afghanistan becoming, in Professor McCoy’s estimation, the world’s first true narco-state. McCoy notes that by 2008, opium was responsible for well over half of the country’s gross domestic product. By comparison, even in Colombia’s darkest days, cocaine accounted for only 3% of its GDP.

Today, the United Nations estimates that around 6,300 tons of opium (and rising) is produced yearly, with 224,000 hectares — an area almost the size of Rhode Island — planted with poppy fields.

But even while it was financing a widespread and deadly aerial spraying campaign in Colombia, the United States refused to countenance the same policy in Afghanistan. “We cannot be in a situation where we remove the only source of income of people who live in the second poorest country in the world without being able to provide them with an alternative,” said NATO spokesman James Appathurai.

Not everyone agreed, however, that a passionate commitment to defending the quality of life of the poorest was the actual reason for rejecting the policy. Matthew Hoh, a former captain in the U.S. Marine Corps is one skeptic. Hoh told MintPress that airborne fumigation was not carried out because it would be outside the control of Afghan government officials, who were deeply implicated in the drug trade, owning poppy fields and production plants themselves. “They were afraid that, if they went to aerial eradication, the U.S. pilots would just eradicate willy nilly and a lot of their own poppy fields would be hit.” In 2009, Hoh resigned in protest from his position at the State Department in Zabul Province over the government’s continued occupation of Afghanistan. He told MintPress:

NATO forces were more or less guarding poppy fields and poppy production, under the guise of counterinsurgency. The logic was ‘we don’t want to take away the livelihoods of the people.’ But really, what we were doing at that point was protecting the wealth of our friends in power in Afghanistan”.

According to Hoh, there was widespread disillusionment within the military among service members who had to risk their lives on a day to day basis. “What are we doing here? This is bullshit,” was a common sentiment among the rank and file.

The heroin trade implicated virtually everyone in power, including Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s brother Ahmed Wali, among the biggest and most notorious drug kingpins in the south of the country, a man widely understood to be in the pay of the CIA.

U.S. attempts to stymie the opium trade, such as the policy of paying domestic militias to destroy poppy fields, often backfired. Locals came up with ways of profiting, such as refraining from planting in one area, collecting large sums of money from occupying forces, and using that cash to plant elsewhere — effectively getting paid both to plant and not to plant. Even worse, local warlords and drug bosses would destroy their rivals’ crops and collect money from the U.S. for doing so, leaving themselves both enriched and in a stronger position than before, having gained NATO forces’ favor.

One notable example of this is local strongman Gul Agha Sherzai, who eradicated his competitors’ crops in Nangarhar Province (while quietly leaving his own in Kandahar Province untouched). But all the U.S. saw was a local politician seemingly committed to stamping out an illegal drug trade. They therefore showered him with money and other privileges. “We literally gave the guy $10 million in cash for rubbing out his competition,” Hoh said. “If you were going to write a movie about this, they’d say ‘This is too far fetched. No one is going to believe this. Nothing is this insane or stupid.’ But that is the way it is”.

McCoy noted that the Taliban was one of the prime beneficiaries of the drug trade, and used it to increase their power and vanquish the U.S.:

That booming opium production, and the U.S. failure to curb it, provided the bulk of the financing for Taliban, who captured a significant but unknown share of the local profits from the drug traffic, which they used to fund guerrilla operations over the past 20 years, becoming a determinative factor in the U.S. defeat in Afghanistan”.

The needle and the damage done

It is not particularly difficult to grow opium. Opium poppies flourish in warm and dry conditions, away from the damp and the wind. Consequently, they have found a fertile home across much of central and western Asia. The plant has flourished in Afghanistan, particularly in southern provinces like Helmand, close to the tripoint where Afghanistan meets Pakistan and Iran. Much of the irrigation system in Helmand was underwritten by USAID, an organization that acts as the CIA’s public-facing front. In full bloom, the poppy fields look spectacular, with beautiful flowers of vibrant pink, red or white. Underneath the flowers, one can find a large seed pod. Farmers harvest these, draining them of a sap which dries into a resin. This is often transported out of the country through the so-called “Southern Route” via Pakistan or Iran. But, as with any pipeline, much of the product is spilled along the way, causing an epidemic of addiction across the region.

The effect on the Afghan population has been nothing short of a disaster. Between 2005 and 2015, the number of adult drug users jumped from 900,000 to 2.4 million, according to the United Nations, which estimates that almost one in three households are directly affected by addiction. While Afghanistan also produces copious amounts of marijuana and methamphetamine, opioids are the drug of choice for most, with around 9% of the adult population (and a growing number of children) addicted to them. Added to this has been a spike in HIV cases, as users share needles, Professor Julien Mercille, author of “Cruel Harvest: U.S. Intervention in the Afghan Drug Trade,” told MintPress.

Only contributing further to the despair has been 20 years of war and U.S. occupation. The number of Afghans living in poverty rose from 9.1 million in 2007 to 19.3 million in 2016. A recent poll conducted by Gallup found that Afghans are the saddest people on Earth, with nearly nine in ten respondents “suffering” and zero percent of the population “thriving,” in their own words. When asked to rate their lives out of a score of ten, Afghans gave an average answer of 2.7, a record low for any country studied. Worse still, when asked to predict the quality of their life in five years, the mean answer was even lower: 2.3.

The effects of the CIA operation to bleed the Soviets dry in Afghanistan have also produced a humanitarian crisis in neighboring Pakistan. As McCoy noted, in the late 1970s, Pakistan had barely any heroin addicts. But by 1985, Pakistani government statistics reported over 1.2 million, turning the two nations into “the global epicenter of the drugs trade” almost overnight.

The problem has only grown since. A 2013 U.N. report estimated that almost 7 million Pakistanis use drugs, with 4.25 million requiring urgent treatment for dependency issues. Nearly 2.5 million of these people were abusing heroin or other opioids. Around 700 people die every day from overdoses. The highest rate of dependency is, unsurprisingly, in provinces on the Afghan border where heroin is manufactured. The same U.N. study notes that 11% of people in the northwestern province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa use illicit substances — primarily heroin.

The drug crisis, of course, is also a medical crisis, with overstretched public hospitals filled with drugs-related maladies. The social stigma of addiction has ripped families apart while the money and power illicit drugs have brought has turned many towns into hotspots of violence.

Iran has a similar number of opioid users, generally estimated at between two and three million. In towns close to the Afghan/Pakistani border, a gram of opium can be bought with loose change — between a quarter and fifty cents. Thus, despite the extremely harsh penalties for drug possession and distribution on the official books, the country has the highest addiction rate in the world

On a micro level, addiction tears apart families and ruins lives. On an international scale, however, the opium boom has placed an entire region under significant strain. Therefore, one consequence of U.S. policy in the Middle East — from supporting jihadists to occupying nations — has been to unleash a worldwide opium addiction that has made a few people fantastically wealthy and destroyed the lives of tens of millions.

Domestic despair

The boom in production has also led to a worldwide disaster. In the past decade, opioid-related deaths increased by 71% globally, according to the United Nations. Much of the product grown by Afghan warlords ends up on Western streets. “I don’t see how it can be a coincidence that you have that explosive growth in poppy production in Afghanistan and then you have the worldwide opioid epidemic,” Hoh stated, a connection that raises the question of whether users in Berlin, Boston, or Brazil should be seen as victims of the war in Afghanistan as much as fallen soldiers are. If so, the numbers would be staggering. Nearly 841,000 Americans have died of a drug overdose since the war in Afghanistan began, including more than 70,000 in 2019 alone. The majority of these have involved opioids.

Officially, the DEA claims that essentially all illicit opioids entering the U.S. are grown in Latin America. Hoh, however, finds this unconvincing. “When you look at their own information and their reports on the illicit opioid production hectarage in Mexico and South America, it is clear that there is not enough production in the Western hemisphere to meet the demand for illicit opiates in the U.S.,” he told MintPress.

A dirty history

The U.S. government has a long history of directly involving itself with the worldwide narcotics trade. In Colombia, it worked with President Alvaro Uribe on a nationwide drug war, even as internal U.S. documents identified Uribe as one of the nation’s most important drug traffickers, an employee of the infamous Medellin Cartel and a “close personal friend” of drugs kingpin Pablo Escobar. Profits from drug-running funded Uribe’s election runs in 2002 and 2006.

General Manuel Noriega was also a key ally of the U.S. For many years, the Panamanian was on the CIA payroll — despite Washington knowing he was involved in drug trafficking since at least 1972. When he became de facto dictator of Panama in 1984, little changed. But the director of the Drug Enforcement Agency initially praised him for his “vigorous anti-drug trafficking policy.” Eventually, however, the U.S. decided to invade the country and capture Noriega, sentencing him to 40 years in federal prison for drug crimes largely committed while he was still in the CIA’s pay.

At the same time as this was going on, investigative journalist Gary Webb exposed how the CIA helped fund its dirty war against Nicaragua’s leftist government through sales of crack cocaine to black neighborhoods across the United States, linking far-right paramilitary armies with U.S. drug kingpins like Rick Ross.

To this day, the U.S. government continues to support Honduran strongman Juan Orlando Hernandez, despite the president’s well-established connections to the cocaine trade. Earlier this year, a U.S. court sentenced Hernandez’s brother Tony to life in prison for international drug smuggling, while Juan himself was an unindicted co-conspirator in the case. Nevertheless, President Hernandez has proven himself effective at suppressing the anti-imperialist Left inside his country and cementing the U.S.-backed 2009 military coup, one reason he is unlikely to face charges in the near future.

Using the illegal drug trade and the profits from it to fund imperial objectives has been a constant of great empires going back centuries. For instance, in the 1940s and 1950s, the French Empire utilized opium crops in the so-called “Golden Triangle” region of Indochina in order to help beat back a growing Vietnamese independence movement. Going further back, the British used its opium machine to subdue and economically conquer much of China. Britain’s insatiable thirst for Chinese tea was beginning to bankrupt the country, as the Chinese would accept only gold or silver as payment. It therefore used the power of its navy to force China to cede Hong Kong, from which Britain began flooding China with opium it grew in its possessions in South Asia.

The humanitarian impact of the Opium War was staggering. By 1880, the British were inundating China with over 6,500 tons of opium every year — equivalent to many billions of doses, causing massive social and economic dislocation as China struggled to cope with a crippling, empire-wide addiction. Today, many Chinese still refer to the era as “the century of humiliation.” In India and Pakistan, too, the effect was no less dramatic, as colonists forced farmers into planting inedible poppy fields (and, later, tea) rather than subsistence crops, causing waves of huge famines, the frequency of which had never been seen before.

Millions of losers

The story is much more nuanced than some “CIA controls the world’s drugs” conspiracy theories make out. There are no U.S. soldiers loading up Afghan carts with opium. However, many commanders are knowingly enabling warlords who do. “The U.S. military and CIA bear a large responsibility for the opium production boom in Afghanistan,” Professor Mercille said, explaining:

Post-9/11, they basically allied themselves with a lot of Afghan strongmen and warlords who happened to be involved in some way in drug production and trafficking. Those individuals were acting as local allies for the U.S. and NATO, and therefore were largely protected from retribution or arrest for drug trafficking because they were U.S. allies”.

From the ground, the war in Afghanistan has looked a lot like the war on drugs in Latin America and previous colonial campaigns in Asia, with a rapid militarization of the area and the empowerment of pliant local elites, which immediately begin to embezzle the massive profits that quietly disappear into black holes. All the while, millions of people pay the price, suffering inside a militarized death zone and turning to drugs as a coping mechanism. In the story of the opium boom, there are few winners, but there are millions of losers.

Interviews, Perspectives 0 comments on L’ONU renouvelle sa mission de maintien de la paix au Sahara occidental et appelle à des pourparlers

L’ONU renouvelle sa mission de maintien de la paix au Sahara occidental et appelle à des pourparlers

La résolution du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies exprime son inquiétude face à la rupture du cessez-le-feu entre le Maroc et le Front Polisario indépendantiste.

Le Maroc a proposé une large autonomie pour le Sahara occidental, mais le Front Polisario insiste sur le fait que la population locale a le droit à un référendum sur l’indépendance [File: Fadel Senna/AFP]
Publié le
29 octobre 2021
Le Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies a prolongé d’une mission de maintien de la paix de l’ONU dans le Sahara occidental contesté, exprimant sa préoccupation face à la rupture du cessez-le-feu de 1991 entre le Maroc et le Front Polisario indépendantiste et appelant à une reprise des négociations dirigées par l’ONU.

Le vote du vendredi était de 13-0 avec l’abstention de la Russie et de la Tunisie.

CONTINUE DE LIRE
Un tribunal de l’UE annule les accords commerciaux marocains sur le Sahara occidental
L’Algérie rappelle son émissaire au Maroc sur le Sahara occidental
L’ONU exhorte le Maroc et le Polisario à accepter le candidat au poste de W Sahara
Pourquoi la Biden sur de politique le Sahara Occidental à l’study Reste
la résolution par was Menée les États-Unis, Qui, sous l’ancien président Donald Trump, with the Ontario monde rompu répandrai claim du Reconnaître Maroc sur le territoire qu Alors » ils persuadaient le royaume de normaliser ses relations avec Israël.

Quelques après la nomination d’un nouvel envoyé de l’ONU au Sahara Occidental, le diplomate chevronné Staffan de Mistura, la résolution appelait « les parties » à reprendre les négociations « sans conditions préalables et de bonne foi » à la recherche d’ une « politique juste, durable et tout à fait acceptable ». Solution”.

La résolution d’appel à un objectif « d’autodétermination du peuple du Sahara occidental », une phrase qui, selon les diplomates, a été ajoutée par les États-Unis à la demande de la Russie, qui aurait pu opposer son veto au texte.

La résolution « réaffirme également la nécessité du plein respect » d’un cessez-le-feu qui s’est effondré l’année dernière.

Le Maroc a proposé une grande autonomie pour le Sahara occidental. Mais le Front Polisario insiste sur le fait que la population locale, qu’il estime à 350 000 à 500 000, un droit à un référendum.

L’Algérie soutient le Front Polisario en quête d’indépendance et a rompu en août les relations avec le Maroc, qui contrôle près de 80% du territoire aride et peuplé contrôlé par l’Espagne jusqu’en 1975.

Les pourparlers en table ronde ont eu lieu pour la dernière fois début 2019 et ont réuni le Front Polisario ainsi que le Maroc.

L’Algérie s’oppose à une reprise des pourparlers, le Polisario se considérant comme un mouvement de libération qui devrait négocier directement avec Rabat.

« Limiter l’escalade »
L’envoyé de la France à l’ONU, Nicolas de Rivière, a déclaré que l’effort de maintien de la paix de l’ONU, connu sous le nom de Mission des Nations Unies pour le référendum au Sahara occidental (MINURSO), restait vital dans des conditions de sécurité incertaines.

“Plus que jamais depuis la rupture du cessez-le-feu, cette opération joue un rôle essentiel pour limiter les risques d’escalade et apporter la stabilité dans la région”, at-il déclaré.

La mission américaine de l’ONU a demandé le renouvellement du mandat, affirmant que sa priorité était de « relancer un processus politique crédible menant à une solution durable, digne et soutenue internationalement ».

Le Kenya, l’actuel président du Conseil de sécurité, a exprimé l’espoir que la mission de l’ONU pourrait éventuellement organiser un référendum, affirmant que c’était le droit de chaque nation anciennement colonisée.

“Nous devons être honnêtes et admettre que cet objectif est obscurci et frustré”, a déclaré la mission kenyane dans un communiqué.

La MINURSO a été créée par le Conseil de sécurité en 1991 dans le but d’établir un référendum entre l’indépendance et l’adhésion au Maroc.

Interviews, Perspectives 0 comments on Derrière les prises de pouvoir au Soudan et en Tunisie, l’ombre des monarchies du Golfe

Derrière les prises de pouvoir au Soudan et en Tunisie, l’ombre des monarchies du Golfe

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Des manifestants soudanais scandent des slogans à côté de pneus en feu lors d’une manifestation dans la capitale Khartoum le 26 octobre. (Mohammed Abu Obaid/EPA-EFE/REX/Shutterstock)
Cela a été une année record pour les coups d’Etat. D’après un tableau , il ya eu plus de prises de pouvoir réussies en 2021 qu’au cours des cinq années précédentes combinées. La junte du Myanmar a ouvert la voie avec son déraillement effronté de la démocratie naissante du pays en février et le maintien en détention de ses hauts dirigeants civils. En Afrique de l’Ouest, les militaires du Mali, de la Guinée et du Tchad ont tous mené leurs propres putschs et renversé les gouvernements en place.

Et puis vous avez la Tunisie et le Soudan. Dans le premier cas, un coup d’État au ralenti s’est déroulé depuis la fin juillet, lorsque le président Kais Saied a limogé le Premier ministre, dissous le parlement au milieu des troubles populaires généralisés et assumé des pouvoirs extraordinaires. Une décennie après un soulèvement tunisien qui a renversé un dictateur au pouvoir depuis longtemps, le pays se retrouve dans une sorte de limbes autocratiques, avec des nécrologies déjà écrites pour ce qui était la seule réussite du printemps arabe.

Au Soudan, au cours du mois dernier , les tensions entre une direction civile fragile et une armée puissante ont explosé au début de cette semaine lorsque l’armée a lancé un coup d’État, détenu le Premier ministre Abdalla Hamdok et le reste de son cabinet, dissous le parlement et déclaré un État. d’urgence. Tout comme Saied et les générations précédentes d’hommes forts potentiels, le lieutenant-général Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, le plus haut responsable militaire du Soudan, a présenté sa décision comme une poussée vers la stabilité et le progrès.

Lors d’un briefing mardi, Burhan a écarté les informations faisant état d’arrestations de nombreux responsables civils et d’attaques contre des militants pro-démocratie par les forces de sécurité. « Certaines personnes ont été placées en détention – ces personnes soupçonnées de porter atteinte à l’unité nationale et à la sécurité nationale », a-t- il déclaré . « Nous ne muselons pas les bouches, nous bloquons toute voix [qui] sape directement notre harmonie nationale. »

Burhan a affirmé que le Premier ministre Hamdok était chez lui : « Le Premier ministre était chez lui mais nous avions peur qu’il soit blessé. Il est avec moi dans ma maison et j’étais avec lui hier soir et il vit normalement là-bas. Une fois les choses réglées ou les menaces passées, il rentrera chez lui » #Soudan #السودان #البرهان pic.twitter.com/lTmleeAm36

– Mohamed Hachem (@mhashem_) 26 octobre 2021
L’intervention de l’armée, pour l’instant, interrompt un processus démocratique fragile qui a commencé il y a près de trois ans avec des manifestations massives contre le dictateur de longue date Omar Hassan al-Bashir. Le mouvement de protestation, qui représentait un vaste échantillon de la société soudanaise, a réussi à renverser Bashir en avril 2019 après que des personnalités clés de l’establishment de la sécurité soudanais se soient retournés contre le président. Au cours des mois agités qui ont suivi, le Soudan est sorti du froid diplomatique, réparant les barrières avec certains gouvernements occidentaux et remportant son retrait de la liste des États parrains du terrorisme par les États-Unis.

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Mais ces gains ont toujours été fragiles. « Les dirigeants militaires et civils du Soudan partageaient le pouvoir dans le cadre d’un accord précaire affaibli par la suspicion mutuelle et des désaccords sur des questions fondamentales telles que qui doit rendre des comptes pour des décennies d’atrocités commises sous Bashir et si l’armée devrait être en mesure de contrôler des parties de l’économie , a expliqué mon collègue Max Bearak . « Les joueurs, anciens et nouveaux, se disputent le pouvoir dans un Soudan qui semble à gagner. »

Le coup d’État de Burhan a eu lieu quelques heures seulement après le départ de l’envoyé américain dans la région, Jeffrey Feltman, de la capitale soudanaise Khartoum après avoir rencontré les principaux dirigeants civils et militaires du pays. Une administration Biden piquée a condamné la chaîne d’événements et a déclaré qu’elle gelait 700 millions de dollars d’aide directe au Soudan, qui avait été promise dans le cadre d’un plan américain d’aide à la transition démocratique du pays.

Mais Burhan, qui a le soutien tacite d’un certain nombre d’autocraties arabes ailleurs, est en position de force. “Burhan pourrait être en mesure de réussir avec le soutien d’autres alliés, à savoir l’Egypte, les Saoudiens et les Emiratis”, a déclaré à Bearak Magdi el-Gizouli, analyste soudanais au Rift Valley Institute. « Ce n’est pas un paria comme l’est devenu Bashir, ni un islamiste. Il trouvera un nouveau visage civil plus souple, il maintiendra les formalités et l’Occident finira simplement par traiter avec cette personne.

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Ce trio – l’ Égypte, l’Arabie saoudite et les Émirats arabes unis – a également applaudi le pari de Saied. Entre autres factions, le président tunisien était en désaccord avec le parti islamiste Ennahda, dont l’affiliation historique aux Frères musulmans lui a valu l’inimitié des anti-islamistes invétérés au pouvoir au Caire et à Abou Dhabi. Alors que le gouvernement de transition de Saied lutte pour obtenir un prêt du Fonds monétaire international pour combler un déficit budgétaire important, des rapports suggèrent qu’il est déjà en pourparlers avec les Émiratis et les Saoudiens pétro-riches pour un renflouement .

The United Arab Emirates supports the Tunisian state and decisions by President Kais Saied, an advisor to the #UAE president says after meeting with Saied.https://t.co/cRP2SWXFsd

— Al Arabiya English (@AlArabiya_Eng) August 7, 2021
En 2013, les deux monarchies du Golfe ont joué un rôle central en aidant à consolider le régime du président égyptien qui complotait le coup d’État, Abdel Fatah al-Sissi. Et ils peuvent également essayer de soutenir Burhan au Soudan, qui, comme la Tunisie, est parfois devenu l’arène d’ un «grand jeu» régional plus large opposant l’Égypte, l’Arabie saoudite et les Émirats arabes unis aux adversaires géopolitiques intermittents du Qatar et de la Turquie. Cette dynamique s’est manifestée avec le plus d’ acuité chez le voisin tunisien, la Libye , les deux camps soutenant des factions rivales rivales au milieu des tensions qui ont débordé sur la politique intérieure de la Tunisie .

Les analystes suggèrent que les largesses royales du Golfe ont déjà renforcé l’armée soudanaise dans ses manœuvres après la chute de Bashir. « Le soutien financier de l’Arabie saoudite et des Émirats arabes unis a donné aux généraux une marge de manœuvre cruciale pour résister aux demandes populaires de régime civil, façonnant un équilibre des pouvoirs déséquilibré qui a permis aux généraux de traverser une période de mobilisation de masse », a écrit l’universitaire soudanais Jean-Baptiste Gallopin . « Les flux financiers secrets des Émirats leur ont par la suite valu un effet de levier sans précédent sur de larges segments du spectre politique, ce qui a aidé les généraux… à consolider leur pouvoir. »

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Maintenant, les experts soutiennent que tout espoir de restaurer les perspectives démocratiques du Soudan peut nécessiter d’exercer des pressions sur ces puissances arabes. « Les monarchies du Golfe et l’Égypte, qui de toutes les puissances extérieures ont noué les liens les plus étroits avec Burhan et l’armée, devraient exhorter les autorités à faire preuve de retenue plutôt que de recourir à la force aveugle », a noté une note politique de l’International Crisis Group . “Les États-Unis et l’UE devraient utiliser l’influence considérable dont ils disposent sur les capitales du Golfe et le Caire pour les convaincre de pousser les généraux de Khartoum à changer de cap.”

« Les gouvernements arabes et les politiciens soudanais régionaux qui désignent le nouveau régime militaire seront démasqués dans les semaines à venir, et comme ils le sont, Washington et d’autres parties doivent préciser qu’il y aura des conséquences à soutenir un régime voyou », a noté Alberto Fernandez . un ancien chef de mission américain au Soudan. « Les premiers commentaires publics du Caire, de Doha, d’Abou Dhabi et de Riyad ont été coupés. Mais tous ces États devront trouver un équilibre entre leurs agendas individuels pour le Soudan et leurs relations compliquées avec l’Occident. »

News, Perspectives 0 comments on What Are Europe’s Capacities, Obstacles for Independence from US?

What Are Europe’s Capacities, Obstacles for Independence from US?

As deepening chill continues to upset the American-European relations, President Emmanuel Macron of France recently in an interview with The Economist newspaper emphasized on the need for NATO and Europe to engage in dialogue with Russia, warning that Europe needs to wake up and build itself as an autonomous geopolitical power as it teeters on the edge. Over the past three years, the French leader described NATO as “brain-dead” and talked about the necessity of European defense strategy under a purely European military force and the end of age of European-American alliance.

His remarks received welcome from some European countries like Germany and Turkey. After Europe was left in the dark about the American withdrawal from Afghanistan and France was snubbed by Biden in AUKUS submarine pact that brings together the US, Britain, and Australia in a new alliance, the death knell of the European-American alliance began ringing.

But this separation of ways raises a question: What are Europe’s challenges and capacities as it steps in a path of independence of policy from the US?

Here are the capacities:

The US unilateralism: The first and perhaps most important opportunity for European policy independence from the US can be seen in relation to Washington’s unilateralism in global decision-making and policy-making. The Americans have acted independently in various crises over the past two decades, ignoring Europe’s demands and fraying ties with it. The first signs of division appeared in the US invasion of Iraq during which France and Germany, contrary to Britain, refused to join in. Under President Barack Obama the White House embraced a doctrine of collectivism in the foreign policy, smoothening the troubled ties with Europe.

After Donald Trump came to power in 2017, the rift between Europe and the US became more apparent than ever. Under Trump, NATO member states began to notice that Washington could no longer be considered a shield provider for Europe as it was during the Cold War, so Europeans had to think of new solutions for their future. It was at this time that the leaders of France and Germany in 2019 spoke of the need to establish a “European Security Council”. In the new situation, Biden’s decision to withdraw US troops from Afghanistan, which did not take into account the positions of European countries, and ultimately the conclusion of the AUKUS agreement was a finishing blow to the Transatlantic alliance. So, this American policy unilateralism can provide an important motivation for Europe to think independence.

European Union’s successful experience

European countries, despite all the ups and downs and their allegiance to the US in the years after World War II, have shown that they have the ability to manage a successful alliance. A clear symbol of this is the European Union in which the European countries have extensive cooperation with each other, both politically and economically, and their regional union is pointed to as the largest and most successful union in the history. This success story can inspire positive European movement towards policy independence from the US.

Special European potentials

In addition to the mentioned capacities, European countries have appropriate historical potentials for independence from the US. Looking at the political history of Europe in the past centuries, it is clear that today’s US is the product of immigration of Europeans, and even in the history of this country, the States have been colonies of Britain. In fact, Europe’s unique historical and civilization background is an important potential that can serve as a stimulus to Europe’s quest for independence from the US. In other words, the civilization and historical background of Europe is a significant potential that can drive policy independence efforts from Europe.

Downscale in European-American trade

Another European capacity is the EU strategy in the trade with the US. In fact, the European Union has taken serious steps over the past year to reduce its economic dependence on US. China is now Europe’s largest economic partner and has the biggest trade deals with the European bloc. In 2020, the EU imports from the US dropped 11.4 percent and its exports to it dropped 10 percent. Perhaps this means that the bloc has already taken the steps to reduce dependence on Washington.

What are Europe’s obstacles towards independence from the US?

Inter-European division

The first obstacle ahead of the European policy autonomy from Washington is the division among the European countries. Despite the predominant desire of European citizens for independence from the US, European politicians do not share the same views on how to deal with Washington. For example, even between France and Germany, the main political and economic powers of the European Union, there is little consensus on independence from the US. Even these countries are not united on how to deal with various international crises such as Yemen, Syria, Libya, and Afghanistan. In general, this situation has led European countries to take cautious steps on the issue of independence from the US.

No clear roadmap for military and economic independence

In the past few years, France and Germany emphasized the need for Europe to end its military, security, and economic dependence on the US, however they have not prepared a clear roadmap to move in this path. Even many political observers believe that the issue of creating a European army and joint European military forces is more like a dream that a reality as it lacks the necessary support in terms of quantity and quality. Additionally, the European economy lacks a culture of risk-taking, which has left European countries economically unprepared to confront possible US outrage and pressure. Even many economic observers and technology experts hold that Europeans believe they are dependent on Washington for modern technology.

Europe’s psychological weakness for independence

There is a psychological aspect for this issue. Actually, the European transition to independence requires some psychological readiness. This is while all factors prove that Europe is never psychologically prepared for full movement to independence.

Lasting Russian threat and European phobia

A fear of Russian influence and military might in Eastern Europe is another repulsion forcing Europe away from its pro-independence aspirations. For decades reliant on the US military forces on their soil, the Europeans are afraid that in case of breakup of NATO or reduction of the US security commitments to them, they are far from ready to face off Russia. Therefore, existence of the Russian threat remains a strong repulsive force keeping Europe away from autonomous policy.

The independence outlook

Looking at the above-mentioned capacities and restrictions, the independence from the US should be seen a difficult and complicated job. Still, the Transatlantic alliance in the past sense is not possible anymore. Actually, the European separation of ways from the US is inevitable since Europe is increasingly coming to the notion that it has no other way than relying on its own potentials and adopting a policy independent from Washington. The new White House policies under President Joe Biden are even accelerating the European independence project.

Interviews, News, Perspectives 0 comments on Turkey’s Pursuit of Regional Hegemony

Turkey’s Pursuit of Regional Hegemony

 

If not for the COVID-19 pandemic, the Libyan Civil War would be at the forefront of 2020’s international headlines. The conflict has all the ingredients of a frontpage story: heavyweight state actors, lucrative natural resources, and strongman leaders. Russia and the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) involvement in the war should not come as a surprise, but Turkey’s active participation should no longer raise a brow either as Turkey has recently strived to exert more influence over its neighbors with a desire for regional hegemony.

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan led Turkey’s first major attempt at regional intervention during the 2011 Arab Spring. Mohamed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood ascended to power in Egypt with the hope that an Islam-focused group could succeed as a legitimate political party. Erdoğan and his Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) supported the Sunni party’s aspirations and aimed to capitalize on this relationship to secure a neighboring ally and economic opportunities.

Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood, however, were not able to sustain their power in Egypt due to a multitude of challenges. Erdoğan sent his national intelligence chief to support Morsi in the face of massive civil unrest and an impending military coup but to no avail. Morsi was eventually forced out and Erdoğan’s pursuit of influence failed, but it was an uphill battle from the beginning; there were rumors that Gulf states supported the coup. This initial taste of failure, however, may have contributed to more direct, aggressive approaches in future Turkish endeavors.

Turkey’s pursuit of regional influence escalated militarily throughout the course of the Syrian Civil War. Erdoğan’s rhetoric towards Assad and the Alawite-based regime became more reproachful early-on during the crackdowns on civilian protestors. Turkey began providing indirect military support to anti-Assad factions over the years such as the Free Syrian Army (FSA), a mostly Sunni opposition group filled with Syrian military defectors, and even some jihadist groups. Assad, however, has essentially achieved victory at this point largely due to Russian support. Erdogan saw this as another opportunity to gain influence over a fractious country, but direct military inaction hindered his success again.

While supporting Syrian rebel forces against Assad, Erdoğan fought another faction for regional influence – this time within his own borders. Turkey saw an opportunity to dampen Kurdish influence and hopes of separatism when U.S. troops pulled out of the Kurdistan region in October 2019. Turkey used military force to clear out a buffer zone along their southern border that overlapped with Kurdish lands. Even though this involved sharing occupation with Russia, this was a huge victory for Turkey as Erdoğan was able to simultaneously take lands previously occupied by the Kurds and secure a relocation area for millions of Syrian refugees in Turkey, hence diluting the Kurdish population. Here, Erdoğan experienced the positive results of direct military action after years of cautious, proxy interventions.

Fast forward to the present and we see what Turkey’s most brazen and successful foreign intervention could be yet. Libya has been in civil war since the fall of its dictator which led to the establishment of two major factions: the Libyan National Army (LNA), backed by Egypt, UAE, and Russia, and the UN-accepted Government of National Accord (GNA), which recently acquired the support of Turkey.

The relationship between Turkey and the GNA appears to have started after they established bilateral maritime borders favorable to Turkey in the Mediterranean Sea. There have long been disputes of these borders with Greece and Cyprus, but Turkey’s claims may have a little more legitimacy now. The waters are rich with natural gas which Turkey aims to capitalize from to become more energy independent; Greece, Cyprus, and the East-Med project, however, stand in the way.

After the recent LNA offensive failure on Tripoli, the GNA began pushing back and expanding their control of western Libya with Turkish supply of drones and Syrian mercenaries. The GNA are going head-to-head with, not only LNA forces, but also Russian mercenaries led by the active Wagner Group. This may even escalate the proxy war between Egypt and Turkey to a direct military clash if the GNA forces, now supported by Turkish troops, set their course for Sirte and the oil-rich LNA-controlled lands.

Turkey has become increasingly active in regional affairs as it vies for regional influence against traditional powers such as UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. Erdoğan sees economic and security-related opportunities in these conflicts in addition to an expansion of Turkey’s spheres of influence. The more success Turkey and Erdoğan experience, the more brazen and bold their methods will be. It started with indirect support in Egypt, but now it has evolved into boots on the ground in Libya. Erdoğan sees Turkey as the next great Middle Eastern power, and Libya is the stage to prove it.

.. By Jeffrey Nahm

Interviews, News, Perspectives 0 comments on The world 9/11 created: What if the U.S. had not invaded Iraq?

The world 9/11 created: What if the U.S. had not invaded Iraq?

This is the third installment in a short series from Today’s WorldView for the 20th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks. Sign up to get the rest of the newsletter free, including news from around the globe, interesting ideas and opinions to know, sent to your inbox every weekday.

There’s a scene in the 2014 film “American Sniper” that sums up the country’s post-9/11 war lust. Chris Kyle, the late U.S. Navy SEAL played by Bradley Cooper, watches a newscast of the twin towers crumbling before his eyes. The camera fixes on Kyle’s steely yet stunned face as he holds his shaken wife, before cutting to an image of him in full military gear, glaring through the scope of his sniper rifle in the middle of an Iraqi town. (He goes on to gun down a woman aiding Iraqi insurgents.)

The film, which some critics panned as proto-fascist agitprop, spends no time interrogating this implied connection between the events of 9/11 and the American decision to “preemptively” invade Iraq less than two years later to topple the regime of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. Neither did much of the American public or political establishment that got swept up in the George W. Bush administration’s rush to punish “evil-doers.” A Washington Post poll in September 2003 found that close to 7 in 10 Americans believed that it was at least “likely” that Hussein was directly involved in the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks.

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That, of course, proved to be preposterous, as was much of the case Bush and his allies made about the imminent threat posed by the Iraqi regime’s phantom weapons of mass destruction. Animated by a neoconservative zeal to oust enemy regimes and wield American might to make right — and unhindered by the bulk of the Washington press corps — the Bush administration plunged the United States and its coalition partners into a war and eventual occupation that would reshape the political map of the Middle East, distract from America’s parallel intervention in Afghanistan and provoke new cycles of chaos and violence.

The first couple of years after 9/11 marked “an era where the United States made major strategic errors,” Vali Nasr, a professor of international affairs at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, told Today’s WorldView. “Its vision was clouded by anger and revenge.”

But what if the United States had opted against invading Iraq? The decision to oust Hussein, even more so than the invasion of Afghanistan in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, was an unprovoked war of choice that, on one hand, sealed off a range of other policy options available to Washington’s strategists and, on the other, set in motion events that fundamentally altered the region. It’s impossible to unwind what the Bush administration unleashed, but indulge us at Today’s WorldView as we puzzle through just a few elements of this counterfactual proposition.

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First and foremost, there’s the Iraqi death toll. The Watson Institute at Brown University calculates that 184,382 to 207,156 Iraqi civilians were directly killed in war-related violence between the start of the American invasion in March 2003 through October 2019. But the researchers suggest the real figure may well be several times higher.

Even considering Hussein’s own long record of brutality, it is difficult to envision a future of greater suffering for the Iraqi people had the United States not swept him from power, argued Sinan Antoon, a New York-based Iraqi poet and author.

“No matter what — and I say this as someone who was opposed to Saddam’s regime since childhood and wrote his first novel about life under dictatorship — had the regime remained in power, tens of thousands of Iraqis would still be alive today, and children in Fallujah would not be born with congenital defects every day,” Antoon told Today’s WorldView, alluding to the impact of U.S. forces allegedly using rounds of depleted uranium in their battles across Iraq.

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Antoon added that we also would not have seen the rise of the Islamic State had the United States not invaded — a conviction shared by former president Barack Obama and echoed by myriad experts. “In the near term, the Iraqi political order probably would not have collapsed and created a void that nonstate or quasi-state actors could fill,” wrote international relations scholars Hal Brands and Peter Feaver in a 2017 study.

“The Sunni-Shia cleavage that has made Iraq so difficult to govern still would have been present,” they continued, “but without the violence, political chaos and Sunni marginalization of the post-invasion period, that cleavage would have remained in a less combustible state, and terrorist groups such as [al-Qaeda in Iraq] and [the Islamic State] would not have found such fertile ground for recruiting.”

Other paths were possible. In 2002, Shibley Telhami, a veteran pollster affiliated with the Brookings Institution and a professor at the University of Maryland, was part of a group of Middle East scholars based in the United States who opposed the Bush administration’s drumbeat to war in Iraq.

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“Bush had a chance to build global coalitions, strengthen international norms and institutions, focus on the threat from al-Qaeda, reshape relations in the Gulf region and use domestic and international support to end the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, which, before 9/11, was the central grievance against the United States in the Middle East,” Telhami told Today’s WorldView.

Instead, he added, “Bush chose a policy of unilateralism,” pursuing a war that ravaged the Middle Eastern country, stoked sectarian violence and extremist militancy and “ended the balance of power between Iran and Iraq.” Iran’s gain from seeing its longtime foe fall in Baghdad, in turn, would reset the geopolitical calculations of Gulf Arab states, which became “so insecure that they embarked on destabilizing policies of their own, including the Yemen war,” said Telhami.

In 2003, the Iraqi regime still faced asphyxiating international sanctions. Had those eventually weakened — various countries apart from the United States were eager to bring Iraq out from the cold — the country’s youths would have been better linked to the world and an entrenched regime could have faced its own Arab Spring uprising.

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Rasha al-Aqeedi of the Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy, a Washington think tank, suggests an “Iraqi spring” would still have been brutally put down by the country’s Baathist government. “Saddam would have passed away and [his son] Qusay would have become president — an Iraqi version of [Syrian President Bashar] al-Assad, basically,” she told Today’s WorldView, imagining a milder end for the Iraqi dictator who was hanged in 2006. The status quo in Baghdad would have been “as stable as an authoritarian Baathist state can be.”

Alternatively, there could have been a steady internal unraveling, with the United States in a stronger position to support democratic and economic development, Amy Hawthorne, research director at the Project on Middle East Democracy, told Today’s WorldView. “Iraq, under punishing international sanctions and totalitarian rule for another decade, would have become a failed state, with parts of the south and Iraqi Kurdistan falling outside Saddam’s control.”

Instead, by 2007, the United States was compelled to deploy a “surge” of its troops to combat an Iraqi insurgency it would never quite quell. For multiple reasons, from feckless leadership to sectarian enmities, the government that the United States helped prop up in Baghdad would make a catalogue of its own mistakes. The occupation swiftly became a parable for American blundering and hubris.

“The U.S. was barely keeping its head above water during the surge,” Nasr said. “The aura of its power was gone.”

.. By Ishaan Tharoor

Perspectives 0 comments on U.S. troops depart a dramatically changed Afghanistan after 2 weeks of chaos and 20 years of war .. By Pamela Constable and Dan Lamothe

U.S. troops depart a dramatically changed Afghanistan after 2 weeks of chaos and 20 years of war .. By Pamela Constable and Dan Lamothe

When the final U.S. troops departed Afghanistan just before midnight Monday, they left behind a country that looked unimaginably different than it did just weeks before.

The U.S.-backed government was no more, after its leaders slipped away along with the U.S.-trained security forces as the Taliban completed a near-total takeover. Banks and shops were closed, and a deep fear rippled through the country. Day after day, panicked mobs besieged Kabul airport, desperate to get out.

In the chaos, a brazen attack by a local affiliate of the Islamic State killed nearly 200 people, heralding a new era of international terrorism, which U.S. troops had originally been sent to Afghanistan to quash.

Now, with the final evacuation flights having departed, the United States has relinquished its remaining corner of Afghanistan to Taliban control, acquiescing to the Islamist militants’ demands that all troops be gone by Tuesday, as President Biden had pledged, even though that means leaving thousands of desperate, would-be evacuees behind.

Meanwhile, Afghans are waiting anxiously for whatever lies ahead, wondering what Taliban-dominated rule will mean for their freedoms, their livelihoods and their relations with the outside world. The country’s economy is plummeting by the day, and aid groups warn that a humanitarian crisis is brewing in the impoverished nation of 37 million unless foreign assistance resumes.

“For weeks now, the country has had no government, no armed forces, no system, no salaries, no leaders,” said Rahmatullah Nabil, a former national intelligence chief, who fled to Uzbekistan after the Taliban takeover of Kabul on Aug. 15. “The vacuum only adds to public confusion and endangers the hope for positive change.”

Militants hold Taliban flags in Kabul on Monday. Many Afghans are anxious about the Taliban’s rule. (Khwaja Tawfiq Sediqi/AP)

Over the past two decades, Kabul was transformed from a run-down, war-ravaged city to a modern capital, with high-rise condominiums and elaborate wedding halls, Internet cafes and beauty parlors, ATMs and mobile phone shops everywhere. Men and women mingled on college campuses and worked side by side in banks. Today, many people are lying low at home, and posters of women outside beauty parlors have been defaced.

The Taliban’s intentions are still far from clear, and its talks with Afghan officials about forming an inclusive interim government have progressed awkwardly. Senior Taliban leaders, cognizant of their need for international aid and support, if not full recognition, insist that they have changed since their repressive five-year rule in the 1990s, pledging not to persecute civilians or confine women to their homes.

But the group’s tough young fighters, suddenly assigned to patrol the capital as deputized police, have beaten people trying to reach the airport. Worse abuses have been reported in the countryside. And Taliban leaders have barred most women from work and school, though explaining that this is because their underlings have not been taught how to behave “kindly” with them.

The country is also battered and exhausted from years of war, which has exacted a heavy toll in casualties and other costs. About 2,400 U.S. service members have been killed in Afghanistan, including the 13 who died Thursday while providing security for evacuation flights. At least 48,000 Afghan civilians, 66,000 Afghan defense forces and 51,000 opposition fighters have also been killed as a direct result of the conflict.

Jane Horton, widow of U.S. Army Spec. Christopher D. Horton, watches as her husband’s casket is carried to a gravesite at Arlington National Cemetery in Virginia in October 2011. (Win McNamee/Getty Images)

Demands on American forces became heavier each year as the war dragged on with no end in sight. Thousands of enlisted troops were required to serve in repeated deployments. Nearly 800,000 U.S. troops rotated through Afghanistan at least once, and nearly 30,000 saw at least five deployments, according to Pentagon data provided to The Washington Post.

The U.S. military role was often controversial in Afghanistan. Hamid Karzai, who served as president from 2002 to 2014, stoked domestic antipathy by accusing foreign forces of occupying the country and blaming U.S. airstrikes for killing civilians. Public resentment showed in several protests and riots, one after a traffic accident in Kabul in 2006 and another in 2012 over allegations that Korans had been thrown out and burned at Bagram air base.

Even after 2014, when a majority of U.S. combat troops pulled out, thousands of service members remained as trainers and advisers in a continuing effort to build a modern, professional Afghan military and police corps. In the end, though, that long and costly effort proved to have been in vain. Afghan forces were demoralized by neglect, corruption and ethnic bias among their superiors. Often they went without pay and ammunition, and sometimes without rations.

“If there is a stalemate, the question is why and how it can be improved,” the U.S. special inspector general for Afghan reconstruction, John Sopko, told The Washington Post in 2017. “The why is corruption, the why is poor leadership,” he said. “If leadership is poor, the people below don’t care, and they wonder why they have to die.”

The demoralization intensified after the Trump administration, tired of protracted peace talks and eager to get out of a distant quagmire, signed a bilateral pact with the Taliban in early 2020. In return for a total U.S. withdrawal within 14 months, the deal called for the insurgents to cut ties with Islamist terrorist groups. It also led to the release of some 5,000 Taliban fighters from prison. To many Afghans, the pact seemed like a sellout.

By then, three administrations in Washington had spent huge sums — an average of $500 million in assistance per year — to help build a new country, modeled after Western institutions and rights, from the ashes of successive failures under Soviet occupation, civil war and Taliban religious oppression.

Afghan police officers stand guard in a poppy field as tractors destroy the crop during a drug-eradication operation outside Kandahar in 2004. (David Guttenfelder/AP)

Much had been accomplished, from surging enrollment in girls’ schools to widespread electrical power and cellphone access in once-isolated rural regions. There were projects to reduce opium poppy cultivation, promote women’s rights and hold credible elections. And year after year, the United States covered nearly three-quarters of public salaries, from teachers to traffic police.

But both the war and peace talks remained at a stalemate, and when Biden reached the White House, he decided it was time to cut American losses and turn to more pressing foreign concerns. In May, having rejected advice from U.S. military leaders to keep a sizable force in Afghanistan, Biden suddenly announced that all U.S. forces would leave by Sept. 11, then moved the date up to Aug. 31. Afghans, he said firmly, would have to determine their own future.

After that, the gradual drip of diminishing U.S. commitment became a more deliberate and urgent effort. American bases were stripped of equipment, and dozens of military cargo planes carried it away. Then, on July 1, U.S. military officials surreptitiously abandoned Bagram air base, the vast compound that had been the nerve center of the war effort for years, without informing some of their Afghan counterparts.

For Afghan forces, this meant diminished U.S. combat airstrikes that had been critical to the ground war. For the Taliban, it meant an opportunity to spring into action, pact or no pact. By late June, the militants had launched a fast-moving offensive across northern Afghanistan, overrunning province after province. Afghan troops, seeing no reason to die or sold out by their leadership, turned over their weapons and surrendered by the thousands as the Taliban gained territory and psychological momentum.

Afghan elite forces conduct a clearing operation in an area under Taliban control on the northern edge of Kunduz on July 15. (Lorenzo Tugnoli/For The Washington Post)

The Taliban momentum kept building in early August. Within little more than a week, its fighters overran Afghanistan’s three largest provincial capitals and were poised to enter Kabul. On Sunday, Aug. 15, they paused at the city gates and then entered, encountering almost no resistance. Just weeks before, U.S. intelligence officials had estimated that the Ghani government would survive for at least another six months. But by that Sunday, Ghani had secretly fled the country.

“We knew if they took Kandahar, they could reach Kabul the next day, but we believed the Americans when they said they would never let the Taliban take the capital,” said Haroun Mir, a former adviser to onetime vice president Amrullah Saleh. Mir was evacuated from his government office and flown to France. “But it turned out the Americans were not prepared either. They had stopped doing air raids, and the Taliban didn’t even have to fight. They had all the momentum.”

Now, the Taliban appears to be trying to restore order to the city, and its leaders are interacting regularly with senior Afghan political figures, including former president Hamid Karzai and Ghani’s former chief executive, Abdullah Abdullah.

But Thursday’s suicide bombing, which was claimed by a regional affiliate of the Islamic State, has thrust the Taliban and the United States into an awkward anti-terrorism partnership and has already resulted in the United States carrying out two counterterrorism strikes against suspected Islamic State targets inside Afghanistan. The United States has said it will continue to conduct counterterrorism operations against the Islamic State after the withdrawal.

While Biden has decided to withdraw all diplomatic personnel, the administration may now need to remain closely engaged with Kabul’s new leaders against a common enemy.

“President Biden, like President Trump before him, came to see Afghanistan as a problem to be gotten rid of because it had become too costly to solve,” said Davood Moradian, director of the Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies, who was evacuated from Kabul to Istanbul last week. “Now, it seems, not only did the U.S. fail to get rid of the problem, it is likely to be dragged back into it for a long time to come.”