News, opinion, Perspectives 0 comments on The war in Ukraine: A test for Algiers’ non-alignment doctrine

The war in Ukraine: A test for Algiers’ non-alignment doctrine

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine in late February could have unprecedented consequences for North Africa. Algeria will be swept up in the resulting shifts, forcing the country’s civilian and military leadership to make difficult international calculations.

Algeria abstained from voting on the United Nations resolution to condemn the war in Ukraine on March 2. Little more than a month later, Algeria joined Syria and 23 other member states in a vote against excluding Russia from the U.N. Human Rights Council. Some observers took these votes as a sign of Algiers’ support for Moscow’s geopolitical aspirations. Algeria’s recent positions, however, can only be understood in light of the country’s attempt to find the golden mean between siding with Russia and siding with Europe. Algeria has sought a middle ground between the Eastern and Western camps since independence in 1962. The newly independent state offered its mediation services and energy resources to the United States and Europe and sought to expand its security cooperation with Russia, maintaining its sovereign foreign policy stances. Algeria’s decision-making is now further complicated by the emergence of China as a major power. Understanding Algiers’ objectives requires an analysis of the various security, economic, and diplomatic dynamics at play.

Strategic interests

Algeria’s post-independence political establishment cultivated strong military bonds with the Soviet Union and later the Russian Federation. This historical partnership provided Algeria with a continuous and preferential flow of military equipment with no end-user license agreement, and this later benefited the Algerian security forces when Western partners imposed an undeclared arms embargo during the 1990s. Between 2016 and 2020, Algiers spent approximately $34 billion on Russian weapons, cementing Moscow’s place as its primary arms supplier. Amid rising tensions with Morocco, maintaining these links with Russia is more essential than ever in the eyes of the Algerian military. In fact, reports indicate that the two armies will hold joint counterterrorist exercises in November 2022 on Algeria’s western borders. This is unsurprising considering the regional agreement between Algiers and Moscow on issues such as Western Sahara. Moreover, statements by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov suggest that Algiers seeks to deepen its relations with Moscow in spite of the potential international backlash. This could raise concerns about Algiers’ willingness to gravitate toward Moscow’s strategic pole at the expense of other partners.

In recent years, the Algerian establishment’s approach to foreign policy has focused on avoiding major crises with international partners. Despite occasional hiccups and underdeveloped regional cooperation, Algiers has largely succeeded in its mission. Through this strategy, it developed a lucrative energy export market, geared toward southern Europe in particular, that helped to boost its foreign exchange reserves to almost $200 billion by 2012. Over the past decade, during a time of growing geopolitical disorder, Algeria has served as a stable and committed energy supplier for the Mediterranean. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, this encouraged unrealistic expectations in the West about Algeria’s short-term ability to replace Russian gas now subject to a partial ban. The Algerian government fed this delusion in talks at the presidential palace with senior Western officials like U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi. At the same time, the authorities have shown a readiness to cut loose European partners that oppose Algeria’s regional interests. During its recent dispute with Madrid over Western Sahara, Algiers suspended a two-decades-old friendship treaty. Hence, the country’s leadership may view the Ukraine war as a suitable moment to rehabilitate and strengthen its global standing, capitalizing on Europe’s desperate need for gas as it seeks to replace imports from Russia.

On March 20, Foreign Minister Ramtane Lamamra travelled to Beijing for a three-day visit. Since the signing of the 2014 “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership,” cooperation between Algiers and Beijing has extended beyond commercial activity into the realms of culture, politics, and the military. Against this background, Minister Lamamra’s trip concluded with a bilateral statement that rejected the “misuse of unilateral sanctions” while fast-tracking the Belt and Road Initiative. This announcement aligns with President Abdelmadjid Tebboune’s willingness to tolerate foreign debt for the sake of developing local infrastructure as well as his directive to focus on a $7 billion phosphate deal with China.

While joint projects could provide a momentary boost for Algeria’s economy, they also offer a window of opportunity for Chinese expansionism. Algiers has so far defended its “neutral” stance on the great power competition, reiterating its commitment to the non-alignment philosophy that has shaped its diplomacy since the Cold War. Still, Algeria today faces a new reality with international and domestic impediments that will determine the cost of its geopolitical choices. The circumstances, impact, and narratives around the war in Ukraine require an adapted doctrine in line with today’s events.

Emerging impediments

Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Tebboune administration restricted its official response to the Arab League initiative that created a Ministerial Contact Group uniting Algeria, Sudan, Iraq, and Egypt. Minister Lamamra joined his counterparts in Moscow and Warsaw to meet with Russian and Ukrainian officials. Furthermore, Army Chief of Staff Said Changriha reiterated, in the presence of a senior NATO official, Algeria’s non-involvement in global conflicts. Changriha’s statement builds off of Algiers’ tried-and-true narrative about its foreign policy, but maintaining “diplomatic flexibility” may become increasingly difficult, especially if the war drags on through next winter. Despite the official rhetoric, the military and economic rapprochement of convenience between Algiers, Moscow, and Beijing is likely to turn into a strategic liability. This will be particularly true as the global battle for influence expands to regions like the Sahel and the Mediterranean. Moreover, the historical and post-colonial lenses through which Algiers perceives the West and the international balance of power could hinder the Algerian establishment’s regional interests and efforts to ensure domestic sociopolitical harmony.

Since coming to power in 2019, Tebboune has declared his intention to revive Algiers’ diplomatic corps and defend its national interests. The administration is convinced of its status as a “regional power” and has staked a claim to leadership over several dossiers, including Arab attempts at mediation between Russia and Ukraine. Yet this ambitious agenda cannot be achieved without an international consensus lead by the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council. The Western bloc’s blessing is not forthcoming, as cozy relations between Algeria and the Eastern camp are apt to be taken as a sign of geopolitical alignment. Moreover, the recent participation of Tunis and Rabat in NATO military talks on Ukraine undermines Algiers’ old assumptions about the security order in North Africa. The emerging strategic shifts, therefore, impose serious limitations on the current administration’s vision for both its immediate neighborhood and the region at large.

Defense and foreign policy issues have clearly captured domestic public attention because of regional tensions and the administration’s focus on its diplomatic posture. Traditionally, the Algerian establishment shaped the country’s international direction according to its desires and with little regard for criticism, capitalizing on the silence of elites and the disinterest of citizens. But the 2019 Hirak protest movement and generational changes will result in calls for more accountability on all levels, making the usual carte blanche a thing of the past. Thus, the policies of the Tebboune administration are likely to face greater scrutiny as the political elite and social actors re-evaluate Algeria’s international stances through a more pragmatic and inclusive strategic lens. As a case in point, the recent round of talks between President Tebboune and the local political class demonstrated an unusual focus on geopolitical developments. In view of the rapidly changing environment, a popular foreign policy would need to provide both stability and socioeconomic relief for the silent majority.

Potential outcomes

The war in Ukraine poses an unconventional test for Algiers’ sovereigntist and principled doctrine. It is safe to say that Algeria is interrogating itself about its regional and international roles, which implies a sober assessment of its needs and comparative advantages. Senior officials, including President Tebboune, have repeatedly referred to the emergence of a new post-COVID global order. Within this context, regional shifts and domestic consensus will determine the administration’s next steps. And while Algeria knows it cannot replace Russian gas, it is still seizing the opportunity to attempt to reform its outdated energy sector and to deliver diplomatic messages. Algiers’ response to the Ukraine war is to walk a fine line between Europe’s gas needs and Russia’s strategic orbit, which may facilitate energy deals, such as that recently signed with Italy. Such steps will not, however, guarantee that Algeria has lasting regional influence.

Finally, the misconceptions at home and misunderstanding abroad about Algiers’ “non-alignment doctrine” highlight a bigger debate regarding its foreign policy. This reflects the new diplomatic dynamics that will be “negotiated” with international partners in the context of the process of recovery from the era of former President Abdelaziz Bouteflika. While Algiers does not respond well to pressure, the continuation and deterioration of the war in Ukraine will force the Tebboune administration to make some hard choices. This will likely trigger an unofficial dialogue within the establishment in anticipation of Algeria’s 2024 presidential elections, and only a national agreement can prevent dangerous sociopolitical polarization and mitigate underlying geostrategic risks.

Zine Labidine Ghebouli is a political analyst, postgraduate scholar at the University of Glasgow, and research assistant with the North Africa and Sahel Program at the Middle East Institute (MEI). His work focuses on Euro-Mediterranean cooperation and Algeria’s political and security dynamics. The views expressed in this piece are his own.

Photo by APP/NurPhoto via Getty Images

MEI is an independent, non-partisan, non-for-profit, educational organization. It does not engage in advocacy and its scholars’ opinions are their own. MEI welcomes financial donations, but retains sole editorial control over its work and its publications reflect only the authors’ views. For a listing of MEI donors, please click here.

The Middle East Institute (MEI) is an independent, non-partisan, non-for-profit, educational organization. It does not engage in advocacy and its scholars’ opinions are their own. MEI welcomes financial donations, but retains sole editorial control over its work and its publications reflect only the authors’ views. For a listing of MEI donors, please click here.

News, opinion, Perspectives 0 comments on The Future of Tunisian Democracy: US Policy and Tunisia’s Current Political Crisis

The Future of Tunisian Democracy: US Policy and Tunisia’s Current Political Crisis

Summary:
On June 2, Arab Center Washington DC (ACW) organized a virtual panel titled:
Panelists were Monica Marks, Professor of Middle East Politics at New York University Abu Dhabi; Radwan Masmoudi, President, Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy; and Jacob Walles, former US Ambassador to Tunisia and Nonresident Senior Fellow in the Middle East Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Daniel Brumberg, ACW Nonresident Senior Fellow and Director of Democracy and Governance Studies at Georgetown University, moderated the event.
Jacob Walles began by outlining current US policy toward Tunisia, which he called “a policy of ‘on-the-one-hand, on-the-other-hand.’” While the Biden administration has criticized Tunisia’s democratic backsliding and called for an inclusive dialogue, it has not conditioned assistance to the country or criticized President Kais Saied himself. Walles supposed a reason for this hesitancy is to avoid getting too involved and noted a mistaken assumption in many American and European policy circles: that Saied’s actions have broad public support. This, he argued, confuses support for Saied for the popular dissatisfaction that undermined support for parties like Nidaa Tounes and Ennahda. While Saied rode into power on a wave of popular distaste for the political class, he has no answers for the country’s serious economic problems, and his support has waned significantly.
Walles detailed Saied’s apparent attempts to avoid dialogue in ramming through his proposed constitutional revision. He described the upcoming July 25th referendum as reduced to plebiscite, a yes-or-no vote on a document no one has seen. He suspects that Saied will capitalize on low turnout for this referendum and upcoming parliamentary elections to push through his reforms with a compliant parliament. While cutting off avenues to dissent in this way may benefit Saied in the short term, this will likely lead to further instability and repression as the opposition is forced onto the streets. Drawing on the efforts of the National Dialogue Quartet during the 2013-2014 crisis, Walles explained that unilateral attempts at dialogue by either Saied or outside powers would be viewed as illegitimate by the Tunisian populace, and that the international community should support grassroots Tunisian alternatives to Saied. He concluded by saying that “the failure of Tunisia’s democratic experiment would be a tragedy, not only for Tunisia itself but also for the cause of democracy in the region and beyond.”
Monica Marks began her presentation by saying that the United States should not allow itself to be complicit in what is obviously a move toward authoritarian rule in Tunisia. She said that the US response to Saied’s announced roadmap last September was totally inadequate in that it expressed a false sense of relief when there was genuine belief that things were not going in the right direction. She added that there have been many abuses since the coup of July 25: stripping the judiciary of its independence, the takeover of the functions of the electoral commission, going after critics in military courts, and other practices that indicate that Saied is not interested in restoring democracy or in allowing the smooth functioning of constitutional institutions. She affirmed that “it is beyond clear for many months now that Saied is a nascent dictator, and that Tunisia is no longer a democracy.”
Marks repeated her assertion that Saied’s roadmap of last year is not democratic in any shape or form, a reality that she said does not seem to have been internalized in Washington, among policy circles who should know better. She said that Saied is dangerous in how he interprets any scant positive signs as support for his behavior and program. She said he is able to make mountains out of very small pockets of support and build policies on this mistaken understanding. She said that Saied needs to be pushed to allow more inclusivity. Carrots and sticks must be used with him to force him to change course, such as talking to him, allowing conditional IMF economic assistance, sanctioning military officers close to him but not the Tunisian army, and encouraging alternatives to provide clear political and economic visions for the future. She said that the Tunisian economy must be helped because people are hurting, but the US should not provide Millennium Challenge Corporation funds which would send the wrong signal because these are to support democratic governance.
Radwan Masmoudi reminded the audience of the dangerous situation in Tunisia today and of the current quick slide toward authoritarianism. He said that Kais Saied has just fired 57 judges because they do not agree with him; an act that is unconstitutional because he has no authority over the judiciary. Saied is also amending the law governing the work of the High Judicial Council and the electoral law without any consultation. He called for a national dialogue but only asked those who support his moves to be part of it. Masmoudi asserted that building a democracy in the Arab world is a very difficult undertaking. Tunisia’s experiment was essential and its democracy was not perfect. He said that “there were shortcomings, there were weaknesses, there were mistakes made in the last ten years. Of course, it is not an easy process.” He added: “we cannot improve our democracy by going back into dictatorship.”
Masmoudi asserted that the United States must have a clear vision and position about what is going on in Tunisia. The same applies to the European Union. He said that the US and the EU should do the following: 1) declare that Saied’s move on July 25 was indeed a coup, which would be a strong message to Tunisians and the international community; 2) condition assistance to Tunisia on progress on democratic change and restoration of constitutional life in the country; 3) oppose any IMF loans to Tunisia if that progress is not made; 4) invite and meet with members of the opposition; and 5) demand that the Tunisian army stay out of politics. Masmoudi thinks that Saied may not want to be offered an off-ramp to reinstate democratic institutions because he wants to rule by decree.
Finally, Masmoudi disagreed with propositions that the opposition is not unified; he said they are united in opposing the coup and against all the unconstitutional steps to which Saied has resorted.
VIDEOS
We are happy to send you these links to four excellent presentations by FOUR TOP EXPERTS on Tunisia and on democracy, namely:
Sharan Grewal, Shadi Hamid, Sarah Yerkes, and Larry Diamond
The next couple of months are going to be critical and vital for Tunisia’s nascent and fledgling democracy, so, please watch these short videos (15 minutes each) and please forward them to anyone you think can be interested in helping to save the “only successful” democracy in the MENA region.
Sharan Grewal
Assistant Professor of Government at the College of William & Mary,nonresident fellow at the Brookings Institution, and nonresident senior fellow at the Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED).
Shadi Hamid
Senior fellow in the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, and an assistant research professor of Islamic studies at Fuller Seminary
Sarah Yerkes
Senior fellow in Carnegie’s Middle East Program, where her research focuses on Tunisia’s political, economic, and security developments as well as state-society relations in the Middle East and North Africa.
Larry Diamond
Director of the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) at Stanford’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI).
Perspectives 0 comments on Let’s pray the ‘Cold War’ between America and Russia doesn’t turn hot

Let’s pray the ‘Cold War’ between America and Russia doesn’t turn hot

Robert Bridge

Robert Bridge 

In April 1947, the term ‘Cold War’ was uttered for the first time to describe the geopolitical rift between the US and the Soviet Union.

The confrontation supposedly ended with the fall of the USSR. But did the cessation of tensions happen only in our imagination?

While Washington and Moscow made invincible allies in the battle against Nazi Germany, the two ideological foes could no longer conceal their mutual enmity when World War II came to a close in 1945. Then, a severe chill swept the planet for nearly half a century that many feared would end in nuclear disaster.

Seventy-five years ago this month, Bertrand Baruch, the American financier and statesman, coined the term ‘Cold War’ to describe this protracted standoff. Speaking before a delegation of US lawmakers, Baruch, foreshadowing the Red Scare of the McCarthy years, told his audience: “Let us not be deceived, we are today in the midst of a cold war. Our enemies are to be found abroad and at home. Let us never forget this: Our unrest is the heart of their success.”

Historians tend to agree that the Cold War began in 1947 with the so-called Truman Doctrine, a program of ‘containment’ against America’s arch enemy as recommended by the US diplomat George Kennan, until December 26, 1991, when the Soviet Union gave up the ghost. Others argue that it actually began as early as 1945 when Washington dropped atomic bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the final days of World War II.

That dreadful act, which took Moscow and the world by surprise, compelled Joseph Stalin to ramp up the Soviet nuclear program. On August 29, 1949, Moscow tested its first nuclear weapon, thereby achieving strategic balance with the US.

It appears that the West doesn’t want peace in Ukraine

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It appears that the West doesn’t want peace in Ukraine

For millions of people around the world, this was the start of the real Cold War, a veritable nightmare out of Dr. Strangelove that saw two nuclear-armed camps locked in an ideological battle over their preferred -isms. In the US, as in the USSR, schoolchildren regularly participated in emergency drills (cowering under wooden desks apparently protected one from radiation) in preparation for the totally unthinkable.

Perhaps the closest the world has ever come to a full-scale nuclear war was during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis (called the ‘Caribbean Crisis’ in Russia), which saw US President John F. Kennedy and Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev take nerve-wracking steps to walk away from a standoff without losing face that involved removing American ballistic missiles from Turkey and Soviet missiles from Cuba.

Fast forward 30 years and the USSR was relegated to the history books. What remains questionable, however, is whether the Cold War joined it there, or are we merely living through a continuation of those dark times?

After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia faced the monumental challenge of transitioning from a command-and-control economy to a market one. At this point, Russians and Americans put aside their past animosities (personified by the jovial relationship between Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin) as Western advisers arrived on the scene to help reform the economy. The fruits of those efforts have been hotly disputed ever since.

Employing the so-called “shock therapy” techniques of IMF-sponsored liberalization, Russia gave up price controls and state subsidies while offering a “loan for shares” scheme for privatizing previously public-owned assets. The end result was, among other disasters, massive inflation, unemployment, endemic poverty, the rise of an oligarchic class and an unprecedented surge in the death rate, which at least one study blamed on the reckless rate of liberalization. Needless to say, this first instance of post-Soviet cooperation between Russia and America did not represent a promising start. Nor would things get better.

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Why do Europeans have to sacrifice hot showers to ‘stick it to Putin’?

The pivotal moment in modern US-Russia relations came following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Despite Vladimir Putin being the first global leader to telephone US President George W. Bush and offer Russia’s unconditional support, Washington returned the gesture in a way that Moscow would not soon forget. Just a few short months later December 13, 2001, Bush gave formal notice that the US would be withdrawing from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Signed by Moscow and Washington in 1972, the ABM treaty maintained strategic parity – and more importantly, peace – between the nuclear powers, a type of balancing act that has been described as ‘mutually assured destruction’.

What did the US proceed to do shortly after walking away from the 30-year-old treaty? It went ahead with plans to bolt down a sophisticated anti-ballistic missile system in Poland, a mere stone’s throw from the Russian border. To which they deployed soldiers this year.

“The U.S. Navy recently moved sailors aboard its newest base, a strategic installation in northern Poland that will support NATO’s European missile defense system,” Stars & Stripes reported in January. “Citing operational security, the Navy would not say how many personnel were assigned to the base or provide … details about the installation’s size or structure.”

Last year, Mikhail Khodarenok, a retired Russian colonel, discussed in an RT op-ed what this system means for Russia and European security.

“The development of the Aegis Ashore complex in Poland worries Russia,” Khodarenok wrote“Here is the problem. The Mark 41 launching system can be quickly adjusted, and the SM-3 would be replaced with Tomahawk land attack cruise missiles.”

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‘I couldn’t comprehend why we were there’: Many Americans hated the Vietnam War but then forgot about it

“What is Russia supposed to do in this situation, when such a transformation of the land-based Aegis system in Poland could pose a very real threat to its national security,” he asked.

Nobody should think, however, that Moscow has not been busy finding ways to respond to the US and NATO efforts at building anti-ballistic systems in Eastern Europe. In fact, Moscow immediately got to work on ways to overcome the US anti-missile systems once Washington pulled out of the ABM Treaty. Those efforts paid off in ways that the US may not have anticipated.

In 2018, Putin delivered a rather unorthodox State of the Nation speech in which he announced the creation of hypersonic missiles that travel so fast that “missile defense systems are useless against them, absolutely pointless,” he said.

“No, nobody really wanted to talk to us about the core of the problem [US anti-missile systems in Eastern Europe], and nobody wanted to listen to us,” the Russian leader stated defiantly. “So listen now.”

Moscow’s concern over the strategic military architecture being constructed in its ‘near abroad’ is no secret. Back in 2007, Putin delivered a speech to the Munich Security Conference in which he emphasized that for Russia, NATO expansion “represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust.” He went on to ask the rhetorical question: “against whom is this expansion intended?”

At this point, many more pages could be written on other areas of US-Russian relations that demonstrate the two nuclear superpowers may have survived the Soviet times, each in their own way, but the vestiges of the Cold War continue to live on. From unproven accusations that Russia interfered in the 2016 US presidential election to Washington’s unconcealed displeasure over Russia’s decision to intervene in the Syrian civil war against Islamic State, tensions between the US and Russia are reverting back to Cold War levels, and then some.

And now, with hostilities in Ukraine threatening to spill over into something beyond control, it may be a good time to pray that it remains a Cold War and doesn’t turn hot.

News, Perspectives 0 comments on Some Africans have good reasons not to condemn Russia over Ukraine

Some Africans have good reasons not to condemn Russia over Ukraine

On 2 March, 141 UN member states voted to “condemn” Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine, calling it a serious violation of the UN Charter. Thirty-five countries abstained or did not vote at all, among them seventeen African nations, which is another indication of increasing Russian influence in the continent. Uganda, for example, is supporting Russia. The majority of African leaders still remember the Soviet support for independence struggles across Africa.

This did not seem to please the US’s ambassador to the UN, Linda Thomas-Greenfield. In an interview published on her country’s UN mission website she said that many African countries saw “abstention as being neutral. And there is no neutral ground here.” She also said that such African states do not seem to understand the situation in Ukraine and that the US must “explain” to them that it is a matter of principle to support Kyiv.

- Cartoon [Sabaaneh/MiddleEastMonitor]

No human rights in Gaza – Cartoon [Sabaaneh/MiddleEastMonitor]

This is, very obviously, a hypocritical US position given that Washington has done much worse in Iraq, Afghanistan and Palestine. For example, during Israeli’s May 2021 offensive in Gaza, the US, three times in one week, vetoed a simple Security Council statement calling for a ceasefire. That Israeli aggression left over 2,000 people killed and injured while thousands more were made homeless. Israeli war planes bombed a building housing international media in an apparent attempt to keep the rest of the world in the dark about its crimes in the besieged Palestinian enclave. On that occasion the US failed to claim the moral high ground and its respect for international law. To try to claim such noble principles over the situation in Ukraine is simply to expose its double standards.

Criticising African nations for not condemning Russia is both a hegemonic and a one-sided view in which the US, as usual, does not condone any opposition at the UN. It is also disrespectful of the sovereignty and independence of those nations in making their own policies based on their own interests.

OPINION: Keep the Palestinian struggle out of Putin’s war in Ukraine

Moreover, not condemning Moscow does not mean support for its naked aggression against Ukraine. Why should African countries have to take sides? Why can’t they be neutral and call for peace?

Russia’s influence in Africa has, without doubt, been on the rise. Moscow is today linked to many African counties, such as Egypt, South Africa, Mali and Algeria, through trade and military supplies. Many African states import large quantities of grain from Russia as well as Ukraine. South Africa, for example, imports 34 per cent of its grain needs from Russian and 4 per cent from Ukraine, while Egypt imports over 60 per cent of its wheat from Russia. Cairo is also a big buyer of Russian weapons. Mali has been receiving military assistance from Russia’s Wagner Group, a private paramilitary company with which the Kremlin denies any links.

Moustafa Troare, a Paris-based Malian university lecturer, told me that Russia is becoming more important in Africa than some former colonial powers like France are. He pointed out that Russia does not “have any colonial history” in the continent. Troare added that the West seems to forget the fact that, in international relations, “Your enemy is not automatically my enemy.” He cited his country’s military links to Russia as being important for both sides, and pointed out that despite the war in Ukraine, the Russians secretly received the Malian defence minister recently. Some media reports say that the minister arrived in Moscow via Istanbul on 6 March, apparently for talks about the military help that Mali gets from Russia. Some Wagner Group personnel are already in Mali to help it in the fight against jihadists and secessionists in the north of the country.

Herman Cohen, a former US Under-Secretary of State for African Affairs, played down the issue of a conflict between the US and some African countries at the UN over the Ukrainian war. He told me that African countries see the invasion of Ukraine as “unprovoked” and that some abstained from voting because “they are receiving military aid from Russia.” He also emphasised that the issue is not causing any friction in relations between the US and those African nations. Cohen, though, rejected the idea that the war in Ukraine is more of a confrontation between Russia and US-led NATO.

OPINION: Senegal says no to racial profiling and neo-colonialism

Could the US impose punitive measures on the African countries which failed to join the condemnation of Russia? Cohen thinks it is unlikely. The US and its western allies have already imposed sweeping and severe sanctions Russia and Russian individuals, including the banning of sportsmen and women from international tournaments. Neither the US nor its allies have, so far, said what measures they will take against countries which violate their sanctions. The sanctions are not supported by any UN resolutions, so other countries are not obliged to enforce them.

Russian President Vladimir Putin's recognised two breakaway territories in Eastern Ukraine - Cartoon [Sabaaneh/Middle East Monitor]

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recognised two breakaway territories in Eastern Ukraine – Cartoon [Sabaaneh/Middle East Monitor]

In the background to all of this is the fact that some African countries were angered by Ukrainian attempts to recruit Africans to fight against the Russians. Senegal summoned the Ukrainian ambassador to explain a post on his embassy’s Facebook page calling for volunteer fighters to join the battle to defend Ukraine. A Senegalese foreign ministry statement made it clear that the ambassador “verified” the legitimacy of the post and was asked to remove it. Senegal is one of the African nations which abstained from condemning Russia at the UN. Ukraine has been calling for foreigners to go there to fight Russia and many have apparently answered the call. French, British and Polish citizens are known to have arrived in Ukraine to join the fight. The recruitment of mercenaries and volunteer fighters is illegal in many countries, including in Africa.

OPINION: The inherent racism is clear when the world speaks of Ukraine

The irony here is that hundreds of African students in Ukraine faced discrimination and abuse as they tried to flee the country after the Russian attack. Arrey E Ntui, a senior analyst with the International Crisis Group NGO, tweeted on 28 February that “there should be no place” for violations of human rights against “African people” caught up in the Ukrainian war. On the same day, the African Union also expressed its concern about the bad treatment of Africans trying to leave Ukraine.

It may not be what Washington wants to hear, but some Africans have good reasons for not condemning Russia over Ukraine.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.

Interviews, News, Perspectives 0 comments on After Ukraine, the Arab world faces new realities .. par Khemaies Jhinaoui

After Ukraine, the Arab world faces new realities .. par Khemaies Jhinaoui

The Middle East and North Africa will not be immune from the shockwaves of Russia’s war in Ukraine and the ensuing sanctions imposed on Moscow by the West.

The rapid evolution of the conflict, with its military, economic and humanitarian manifestations, has caught the world by surprise. It was even more so in Arab countries, which were fundamentally ill-prepared to deal with any contingencies challenging their own precarious balance.

In many regards, if no remedial and preventive actions are taken, the Ukraine conflict could very much exacerbate the region’s already volatile and complicated situation.

This is especially the case in the economic field.

Many of the MENA countries had been already struggling to curtail the financial fallout of the pandemic now find themselves dealing with a new and unprecedented economic crisis.

The prospect of sharp hikes in energy and wheat prices as well as the possible disruption of food supplies will, in various degrees, affect countries in the region. For the more vulnerable of the MENA countries, the situation could even lead to a new wave of social unrest reminiscent of the violent uprisings that shook the Arab world during the last decade.

Food security in the region is also at risk. Economically-challenged countries in MENA, such as Syria, Tunisia, Lebanon and Yemen, are exposed to the adverse impact of food and grain price hikes and shortages. But the poorer segments of all the region’s populations stand to lose even more than others.

 

Most Arab countries are major importers of food staples. Egypt is the world largest wheat importer with 80% of its supplies coming from Russia and Ukraine. Lebanon imports 60% of its wheat from Ukraine. Tunisia was already witnessing food price rises and supply disruption even before the start of war. The country imports 50% of its wheat from Russia and Ukraine.

The other obvious economic implication of the war for the MENA region is its impact on the energy market. Oil and gas producing countries, such as Algeria, Libya and the Arab Gulf states, are likely to benefit from the surge of energy prices as they will most probably be called upon to step in the vacuum left by Russia after EU and US sanctions. Countries such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, or even Libya, do have the capacity to pump more oil. They are likely, however, to maintain a delicate geostrategic balance when determining their policy on oil and gas prices and output.

A number of other Arab countries including Tunisia, Lebanon and Morocco, are net energy importers. They will need to find ways to assume the burden of financing unexpected heavy fuel bills in the future. Energy price hikes will push up inflation rates and potentially ratchet up social tensions.

 

Politically, changes are likely to affect the wider picture of relations with Europe and the US. The region, already coping with Washington’s geostrategic disengagement, may need to prepare for a diminishing European interest in Euro-Med partnerships, as European attention turns to consolidating strategic alliances within the continent itself. This new focus is likely to mean greater military and economic expenditures will be allocated to help with reconstruction in Eastern Europe. Fewer resources are therefore likely to be available for regional development projects and North-South integration.

This shift could also mean that the attention Europeans give their neighbours south of the Mediterranean will be self-servingly limited to combating illegal immigration and terrorism. The drive for reform, political or economic, will be put on the back-burner. Countries amid democratic transitions could be left to grapple with their own turbulent processes as their regional partners are busy with other priorities elsewhere.

But the West’s need for more oil and gas output is also likely to give Middle East and North African exporters more leverage and relieve them from European and US pressures for reform.

It is quite difficult to imagine a scenario in which the war in Ukraine will not adversely affect international efforts to resolve conflicts in the region. The war in Ukraine is surely going to increase instability of the MENA region rather than advance the agenda for peace.

A war in the heart of Europe risks relegating MENA conflicts to the back-burner. Multilateral institutions, especially the UN Security Council, already deeply divided on how to solve regional conflicts, particularly in Libya, Syria and Yemen, could find themselves unable to contribute to conflict settlement. Wars in Libya, Syria and Yemen could be left to local and sub-regional protagonists to handle.

Russia’s role in the region is also likely to change. Instability in the Middle East will be bigger problem for Europe than it is for Russia. With the exception of Syria and Iran, where Moscow has vested strategic interests, Russia could play the role of spoiler rather than an active peace builder, especially if it feels its vital interests to be in jeopardy. Moscow’s most recent obstructive move during the Iran deal

talks offers an indication of what to expect from a Russia under Western siege.

The rapidly deteriorating relations between Russia and the West will have their own impact on multilateral efforts to deal with various ongoing conflicts across the region. It will certainly widen the chasm within the UN Security Council, making it difficult if not impossible to reach any consensus among the P5 on possible settlement of crises in the MENA region.

It may be too soon to fully assess the real impact of the war on Arab-West relations and Euro-Med cooperation in particular. But there might be reason for hope. The current situation could offer an opportunity for leaders from the two shores of the Mediterranean, once a truce is in effect, to reflect together on the shortcomings of the past process and to explore new ways of cooperation in renewable energy, green economy and near sourcing.

For Arab countries, it is time to reassess and recalibrate all past calculations so as to adjust to unfolding changes. Pan-Arab regional institutions should be keener on closer cooperation amidst the current crisis. Having failed to coordinate their efforts to meet the challenge of the pandemic, they may not have now the luxury of ignoring the disastrous impact of the Ukraine war on their food security and their own stability at home.

 

Interviews, News, Perspectives 0 comments on Thirty years on, the western ‘liberal international order’ looks set to follow the USSR into history

Thirty years on, the western ‘liberal international order’ looks set to follow the USSR into history

The reality the US is stuck with is that its global system of economic, political and military control is ever more precipitously disintegrating.

The Soviet collapse signaled the end of not just Marxism-Leninism as a political force, but western Liberalism itself.

In historical terms, the twentieth century could be said to have been relatively short in that its defining events happened closer to each other in time, certainly in comparison to the ‘long’ 16th and 19th centuries. 1914 is typically taken to be the beginning of this period, given the outbreak of the First World War, setting in motion everything that was to follow, the carnage of the trenches, the Russian Revolution of 1917, the Great Depression and the Second World War, the second act of what began in 1914.

Europe emerged from 1945 in ruins and no longer dictating the world’s destiny for the first time in five centuries. In its place, the globe was divided between two supposedly ‘anti-colonial’ powers, the USA and USSR, championing their own versions of national self-determination and economic ‘modernization’ within the context of a worldwide ideological struggle between their respective national religions.

For the American-led west, this religion was Liberalism, a political response to the democratic movements of the 19th century that declared the “ignorant herd”, in other words the majority of the populace, to be unqualified and unsafe decision makers for society. Direct participation in the national political life was to be limited to a privileged clique of qualified technocrats; the social scientists, the journalistic class, and captains of industry and their lobbyists serving as the titular heads of the approved political parties.

In opposition to this ideology, we are told, was Marxism-Leninism as promulgated by the leadership of the Soviet Union where power was held by a ‘revolutionary vanguard’ of the Communist Party leadership. The great mass of society, it was concluded, had to be led by force, through what were thought to be the inevitable stages of economic development culminating in socialism on the ever-receding horizon. One of the many perversities of the twentieth century was the creation of much the same exploitation of labor and environmental destruction under the pretext of eventually transcending it.

Beneath the rhetorical differences, the two ideologies were more alike than different in the ways they functioned in the real world and especially in the assumptions they had about how much of society was qualified to have a political voice. The late American sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein, in his post-mortem of the USSR in ‘After Liberalism’ went so far as to claim that they were one and the same ideology. Going still further, he asserted that in the Cold War, the USSR acted as a de-facto American proxy in the way that it steered potentially dangerous third world nationalisms into a more politically attractive variant of western Liberalism, maintaining their country’s place in the existing world system.

Where mass-movements escaped the control of either superpower as in Civil-war era Spain, the Maoist seizure of power in China or the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the superpowers invariably found themselves both trying to sustain the forces of the status-quo.

Of course, we well know that this highly constrained system of governing the world did not last. The Cold War, and by extension the historical twentieth century, came to an abrupt end in 1989. In a state of internal disintegration, the USSR withdrew in humiliation from the quagmire of Afghanistan and then from its own designated sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, allowing its satellites in East Germany, Poland, Romania, and others to be overthrown. Such was its state of collapse that it did not survive long enough to be digested by Western capital. The Union, stripped of its empire, disintegrated in the second half of 1991, its last leader Mikhail Gorbachev resigning in disgrace and declaring the Soviet Union dissolved on Christmas Day.

Exactly 30 years have now passed since the death of the only power ever credibly presented as a challenger to the United States and 33 years since the end of the post-World War II global order and the twentieth century as a whole. Still all these years later, these momentous events, unforeseen by the Western security and military establishments, are still paraded as the final triumph of the western capitalist system and the dawn of a new unipolar American century.

With the benefits of hindsight, it is understandable that people would have interpreted events in that way. Since the onset of near permanent economic crisis in 2008, the deeply divisive Brexit referendum and the election of Donald Trump in the US in 2016, Wallerstein’s prognoses seem ever more eerily prescient. Rather than being the defeat of an alternative to western Liberalism, the fall of Marxism-Leninism as a viable political system signalled the beginning of the end of the West’s ideological hegemony. Into the ideological vacuum of the former Soviet Union has flowed all manner of radical, democratic, neofascist, indigenist, and nationalist political movements. From the Zapatista uprising against NAFTA in 1994, to the birth of the nascent pan-Islamic, pan-Arabist Ansar Allah Movement in Northern Yemen the same year to the return of narrow European nationalisms, the rising anti-systemic movements are far less co-optable by the global North since they generally reject the basic assumptions of Liberalism that have gone unchallenged for some two centuries.

The American-led west has spent the last 30 years scrambling to find a substitute for the ‘communist menace’ with which it justified its global military, economic, and cultural footprint. From 2001 up to around the election of Donald Trump the chosen enemy was “Islamist terrorism”, a conveniently vacuous category that swept up all religiously oriented Arab and Islamic popular movements of which Washington disapproved. Since 2016, the United States seems to have been pivoting to its old red-baiting tactics surrounding non-existent or inconsequential Russian and Chinese ‘interference’ in western elections. The Biden administration may well believe that US hegemony will rest more securely on a Cold War 2.0 and a theatrical power-struggle with China and Russia. The world, however, has not and will not return to the world of pre-1989. Russia is a shadow of its Soviet incarnation and a strategic threat to the west insofar as it continues to be cornered by NATO. Meanwhile, China remains deeply enmeshed within the global capitalist system which the US principally constructed.
Finally, the degree of internal division and unrest in the US itself negates the possibility of returning to the old Liberal consensus, however much Biden may fancy himself another FDR or LBJ. With a previously unthinkable number of Americans questioning the legitimacy of their own elections, the inexorable centrifugal forces that tore the communist world apart and are now clawing at the EU have finally reached the heart of the global capitalist system itself.

If the United States could wish about its ideal century, it would be a renewed Cold War against Moscow and Beijing. The reality it is stuck with is that its global system of economic, political and military control is ever more precipitously disintegrating.

The opinions mentioned in this article do not necessarily reflect the opinion of Al mayadeen, but rather express the opinion of its writer exclusively.

Interviews, News, Perspectives 0 comments on AFRAS, NDAW and Tunisia Skills conférence : Libyan elections Algerian – Moroccan Conflicts and Regional transformations .. By Kamel Ben Younes

AFRAS, NDAW and Tunisia Skills conférence : Libyan elections Algerian – Moroccan Conflicts and Regional transformations .. By Kamel Ben Younes

Will Tunisia, the countries of the Maghreb and the Sahel and Sahara region be entitled to a period of stability, economic recovery, sustainable development and democratization?

This question was recently addressed by around thirty Tunisian, Maghreb and Euro-Mediterranean experts, during a conference-debate on the upcoming elections in Libya and the geostrategic effects of the new conflicts between Rabat and Algiers.

Participated in this conference – debate of experts from the Averroès center for Arab-African strategic studies, from the association “Tunisie Compétences” and from “NDAW” (Network of Democrats of the Arab World, the “Network of Democrats of the Arab World” “).

The presentations and discussions focused on the regional and global dimensions of the new political, security and geostrategic conflicts in Libya, in the Maghreb, Sahel and African Sahara regions and in the Mediterranean.

“Report” of the elections in Libya

Speakers confirmed that internal and international conflicts in Libya are worsening and risk causing the “postponement” or even cancellation of the presidential and legislative elections scheduled for December 24, 2021.

According to the majority of experts, this is a “proxy war” whose fate is linked to the military, security and political conflicts which have paralyzed most of the countries of the “greater Middle East” for twenty years and especially since. 2011 and the outbreak of the “Arab revolutions”.

Internal, regional and international conflicts of interest risk to abort the “political resolution processes” of “civil wars” in Libya and in other countries of the region, notably in Tunisia, the “destabilization” of which would have an impact. . very dangerous for its neighbors and for the whole Euro-Mediterranean region.

No description available.

Interference

These same conflicts of interest complicate the differences and tensions between the countries of the Maghreb, the Sahel region and the Sahara. They accelerate “foreign interference” and the risks of new tensions, in particular between Morocco and Algeria, Mali, Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Sudan, Djibouti or between Egypt and Ethiopia. …

The participants explained the involvement of dozens of countries around the world in international conferences on the conflicts in Libya, Syria, Sudan, Mali, etc. by the “divergences” and “new conflicts of interest” between them. main foreign players in these countries, including France, Russia, China, Turkey, the United States, the Gulf countries and Israel.

Algiers-Rabat conflicts

The risks of instability and insecurity have increased after the emergence of new tensions between Algeria and Morocco and the rise in tensions in Mali, south of the Sahara and in the eastern Mediterranean between the major European capitals, Ankra, Beijing, Moscow and Washington.

Moroccan and Algerian speakers noted the gaps by analyzing the emergence of the new tension between Rabat and Algiers and the causes of the new security threats.

However, the majority of speakers called for a high-level Algerian-Moroccan political dialogue to avoid all scenarios of the outbreak of an “armed confrontation”, the opening of borders and the revival of bilateral and regional cooperation.

No description available.

For the Libyan dossier, the speakers recommended to the political decision-makers of the countries of the Maghreb, the Arab world and the Euro-Mediterranean region to “overcome their classic quarrels” and their “proxy wars” to succeed in playing a role in life. Politics. to treat. then at the stage of “reconstruction” and “reinvestment”. Otherwise the big world capitals will have the last word and will have the opportunity to marginalize the neighboring countries of Libya in the “next big markets”.

Calls were made for the evacuation of foreign forces and militias established throughout Libyan territory, while strengthening security and preventive measures to prevent the “flight” of mercenaries and terrorists to Tunisia and others. neighboring Libyan countries. .

However, international engagement with political and democratic processes in Libya could be an opportunity not only for the Libyan people, but also for Tunisia and the region.

Interviews, News, Perspectives 0 comments on Reframing Vienna: What about Iran’s Side of the Story?

Reframing Vienna: What about Iran’s Side of the Story?

There’s a problem with the way Iran is being made out to be in terms of the revival of the Vienna Talks. This isn’t new, of course. It’s part of the anti-Iran narrative that’s been espoused since the Iranian Revolution, but ever since the end of the 6th round of talks, Iran has been portrayed as a country that is unreasonably intransigent in its dealings with the E3 and the US and unwilling to engage in dialogue.

Reality disagrees, however. Iran’s approach to the talks stems from its tried and tested distrust toward the West. Be it imperialism, occupation, massacres, coerced monopolies, or military and security interventions, Iran has been subjected to them all in modern times, and these are all matters very much alive in the Iranian collective memory.

The distrust is real, grounded, and based on experience. If anything, Iran has shown a great deal of pragmatism and diplomatic know-how in its talks with the West over the past 42 years. The JCPOA bespeaks the country’s willingness to hold dialogue with international peers.

So how did we get from former President Rouhani’s optimism vis-à-vis a possible revival of the deal to the talks being delayed time and time again until the end of November?

Interviews, News, Perspectives 0 comments on Algeria, Tunisia and Libya pledge to continue efforts for Libyan elections to succeed

Algeria, Tunisia and Libya pledge to continue efforts for Libyan elections to succeed

  • The foreign ministers also affirmed their support for unifying Libya’s institutions and withdrawing mercenaries and foreign fighters

LONDON: The foreign ministers of Algeria, Tunisia and Libya on Monday affirmed their continuous support for the success of the upcoming Libyan elections and for mobilizing the necessary international support to preserve the security and stability of Libya and all neighboring countries.
This came during a meeting that was held on the sidelines of national celebrations commemorating the 67th anniversary of the outbreak of Algeria’s liberation revolution against French colonial rule, with the attendance of several African leaders and officials.
The ministers commended the success of the Libya Stability Conference, held in Tripoli on Oct. 21, and exchanged views on upcoming meetings on Libya, especially the Paris conference, Algerian El-Bilad newspaper reported.
They also affirmed their support for the unification of Libya’s institutions, the withdrawal of mercenaries and foreign fighters, and the advancement of national reconciliation efforts.

Interviews, News, Perspectives 0 comments on Geopolitics, Profit, Poppies: How CIA Turned Afghanistan into a Failed Narco-State

Geopolitics, Profit, Poppies: How CIA Turned Afghanistan into a Failed Narco-State

The war in Afghanistan has looked a lot like the war on drugs in Latin America and previous colonial campaigns in Asia, with a rapid militarization of the area and the empowerment of pliant local elites.

The COVID-19 pandemic has been a death knell to so many industries in Afghanistan. Charities and aid agencies have even warned that the economic dislocation could spark widespread famine. But one sector is still booming: the illicit opium trade. Last year saw Afghan opium poppy cultivation grow by over a third while counter-narcotics operations dropped off a cliff. The country is said to be the source of over 90% of all the world’s illicit opium, from which heroin and other opioids are made. More land is under cultivation for opium in Afghanistan than is used for coca production across all of Latin America, with the creation of the drug said to directly employ around half a million people.

This is a far cry from the 1970s, when poppy production was minimal, and largely for domestic consumption. But this changed in 1979 when the CIA launched Operation Cyclone, the widespread funding of Afghan Mujahideen militias in an attempt to bleed dry the then-recent Soviet invasion. Over the next decade, the CIA worked closely with its Pakistani counterpart, the ISI, to funnel $2 billion worth of arms and assistance to these groups, including the now infamous Osama Bin Laden and other warlords known for such atrocities as throwing acid in the faces of unveiled women.

From statements by U.S. Ambassador [to Iran] Richard Helms, there was little heroin production in Central Asia by the mid 1970s,” Professor Alfred McCoy, author of “The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade,” told MintPress. But with the start of the CIA secret war, opium production along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border surged and refineries soon dotted the landscape. Trucks loaded with U.S. taxpayer-funded weapons would travel from Pakistan into its neighbor to the west, returning filled to the brim with opium for the new refineries, their deadly product ending up on streets worldwide. With the influx of Afghan opium in the 1980s — Jeffrey St. Clair, co-author of “Whiteout: The CIA, Drugs and the Press,” alleges — heroin addiction more than doubled in the United States.

In order to finance the resistance for a protracted period, the Mujahideen had to come up with a livelihood beyond the weapons that the CIA was providing,” McCoy said, noting that the weapons issued could not feed the fighters’ families, nor reimburse them for lost labor:

So what the resistance fighters did was they turned to opium. Afghanistan had about 100 tons of opium produced every year in the 1970s. By 1989-1990, at the end of that 10-year CIA operation, that minimal amount of opium — 100 tons per annum — had turned into a major amount, 2,000 tons a year, and was already about 75% of the world’s illicit opium trade”.

The CIA achieved its goal of giving the U.S.S.R. its Vietnam, the Soviets failing to quash the Mujahideen rebellion by the time they finally pulled out in 1989. But American money and weapons also turned Afghanistan into a dangerously unstable place full of warring factions that used opium to fund their battles for internal supremacy. By 1999, annual production had risen to 4,600 tons. The Taliban eventually emerged as the dominant force in the country and attempted to gain international legitimacy by stamping out the trade.

In this, they were remarkably successful. A 2000 ban on opium cultivation by the Taliban-led government led to an almost overnight drop to just 185 tons harvested the following year, as frightened farmers chose not to risk attracting their wrath.

The Taliban had hoped that the eradication program would win favor in Washington and entice the United States to provide humanitarian aid. But unfortunately, history had other ideas. On September 11, 2001, the U.S. experienced a massive case of blowback, as Bin Laden’s forces launched attacks on New York and Washington. The U.S. ignored the Taliban’s offer to hand him over to a third party, instead opting to invade the country. Less than a month after the planes hit the World Trade Center, U.S. troops were patrolling the fields of Afghanistan.

The world’s first true narco-state

The effect of the occupation was to expand drug production to unprecedented new proportions, Afghanistan becoming, in Professor McCoy’s estimation, the world’s first true narco-state. McCoy notes that by 2008, opium was responsible for well over half of the country’s gross domestic product. By comparison, even in Colombia’s darkest days, cocaine accounted for only 3% of its GDP.

Today, the United Nations estimates that around 6,300 tons of opium (and rising) is produced yearly, with 224,000 hectares — an area almost the size of Rhode Island — planted with poppy fields.

But even while it was financing a widespread and deadly aerial spraying campaign in Colombia, the United States refused to countenance the same policy in Afghanistan. “We cannot be in a situation where we remove the only source of income of people who live in the second poorest country in the world without being able to provide them with an alternative,” said NATO spokesman James Appathurai.

Not everyone agreed, however, that a passionate commitment to defending the quality of life of the poorest was the actual reason for rejecting the policy. Matthew Hoh, a former captain in the U.S. Marine Corps is one skeptic. Hoh told MintPress that airborne fumigation was not carried out because it would be outside the control of Afghan government officials, who were deeply implicated in the drug trade, owning poppy fields and production plants themselves. “They were afraid that, if they went to aerial eradication, the U.S. pilots would just eradicate willy nilly and a lot of their own poppy fields would be hit.” In 2009, Hoh resigned in protest from his position at the State Department in Zabul Province over the government’s continued occupation of Afghanistan. He told MintPress:

NATO forces were more or less guarding poppy fields and poppy production, under the guise of counterinsurgency. The logic was ‘we don’t want to take away the livelihoods of the people.’ But really, what we were doing at that point was protecting the wealth of our friends in power in Afghanistan”.

According to Hoh, there was widespread disillusionment within the military among service members who had to risk their lives on a day to day basis. “What are we doing here? This is bullshit,” was a common sentiment among the rank and file.

The heroin trade implicated virtually everyone in power, including Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s brother Ahmed Wali, among the biggest and most notorious drug kingpins in the south of the country, a man widely understood to be in the pay of the CIA.

U.S. attempts to stymie the opium trade, such as the policy of paying domestic militias to destroy poppy fields, often backfired. Locals came up with ways of profiting, such as refraining from planting in one area, collecting large sums of money from occupying forces, and using that cash to plant elsewhere — effectively getting paid both to plant and not to plant. Even worse, local warlords and drug bosses would destroy their rivals’ crops and collect money from the U.S. for doing so, leaving themselves both enriched and in a stronger position than before, having gained NATO forces’ favor.

One notable example of this is local strongman Gul Agha Sherzai, who eradicated his competitors’ crops in Nangarhar Province (while quietly leaving his own in Kandahar Province untouched). But all the U.S. saw was a local politician seemingly committed to stamping out an illegal drug trade. They therefore showered him with money and other privileges. “We literally gave the guy $10 million in cash for rubbing out his competition,” Hoh said. “If you were going to write a movie about this, they’d say ‘This is too far fetched. No one is going to believe this. Nothing is this insane or stupid.’ But that is the way it is”.

McCoy noted that the Taliban was one of the prime beneficiaries of the drug trade, and used it to increase their power and vanquish the U.S.:

That booming opium production, and the U.S. failure to curb it, provided the bulk of the financing for Taliban, who captured a significant but unknown share of the local profits from the drug traffic, which they used to fund guerrilla operations over the past 20 years, becoming a determinative factor in the U.S. defeat in Afghanistan”.

The needle and the damage done

It is not particularly difficult to grow opium. Opium poppies flourish in warm and dry conditions, away from the damp and the wind. Consequently, they have found a fertile home across much of central and western Asia. The plant has flourished in Afghanistan, particularly in southern provinces like Helmand, close to the tripoint where Afghanistan meets Pakistan and Iran. Much of the irrigation system in Helmand was underwritten by USAID, an organization that acts as the CIA’s public-facing front. In full bloom, the poppy fields look spectacular, with beautiful flowers of vibrant pink, red or white. Underneath the flowers, one can find a large seed pod. Farmers harvest these, draining them of a sap which dries into a resin. This is often transported out of the country through the so-called “Southern Route” via Pakistan or Iran. But, as with any pipeline, much of the product is spilled along the way, causing an epidemic of addiction across the region.

The effect on the Afghan population has been nothing short of a disaster. Between 2005 and 2015, the number of adult drug users jumped from 900,000 to 2.4 million, according to the United Nations, which estimates that almost one in three households are directly affected by addiction. While Afghanistan also produces copious amounts of marijuana and methamphetamine, opioids are the drug of choice for most, with around 9% of the adult population (and a growing number of children) addicted to them. Added to this has been a spike in HIV cases, as users share needles, Professor Julien Mercille, author of “Cruel Harvest: U.S. Intervention in the Afghan Drug Trade,” told MintPress.

Only contributing further to the despair has been 20 years of war and U.S. occupation. The number of Afghans living in poverty rose from 9.1 million in 2007 to 19.3 million in 2016. A recent poll conducted by Gallup found that Afghans are the saddest people on Earth, with nearly nine in ten respondents “suffering” and zero percent of the population “thriving,” in their own words. When asked to rate their lives out of a score of ten, Afghans gave an average answer of 2.7, a record low for any country studied. Worse still, when asked to predict the quality of their life in five years, the mean answer was even lower: 2.3.

The effects of the CIA operation to bleed the Soviets dry in Afghanistan have also produced a humanitarian crisis in neighboring Pakistan. As McCoy noted, in the late 1970s, Pakistan had barely any heroin addicts. But by 1985, Pakistani government statistics reported over 1.2 million, turning the two nations into “the global epicenter of the drugs trade” almost overnight.

The problem has only grown since. A 2013 U.N. report estimated that almost 7 million Pakistanis use drugs, with 4.25 million requiring urgent treatment for dependency issues. Nearly 2.5 million of these people were abusing heroin or other opioids. Around 700 people die every day from overdoses. The highest rate of dependency is, unsurprisingly, in provinces on the Afghan border where heroin is manufactured. The same U.N. study notes that 11% of people in the northwestern province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa use illicit substances — primarily heroin.

The drug crisis, of course, is also a medical crisis, with overstretched public hospitals filled with drugs-related maladies. The social stigma of addiction has ripped families apart while the money and power illicit drugs have brought has turned many towns into hotspots of violence.

Iran has a similar number of opioid users, generally estimated at between two and three million. In towns close to the Afghan/Pakistani border, a gram of opium can be bought with loose change — between a quarter and fifty cents. Thus, despite the extremely harsh penalties for drug possession and distribution on the official books, the country has the highest addiction rate in the world

On a micro level, addiction tears apart families and ruins lives. On an international scale, however, the opium boom has placed an entire region under significant strain. Therefore, one consequence of U.S. policy in the Middle East — from supporting jihadists to occupying nations — has been to unleash a worldwide opium addiction that has made a few people fantastically wealthy and destroyed the lives of tens of millions.

Domestic despair

The boom in production has also led to a worldwide disaster. In the past decade, opioid-related deaths increased by 71% globally, according to the United Nations. Much of the product grown by Afghan warlords ends up on Western streets. “I don’t see how it can be a coincidence that you have that explosive growth in poppy production in Afghanistan and then you have the worldwide opioid epidemic,” Hoh stated, a connection that raises the question of whether users in Berlin, Boston, or Brazil should be seen as victims of the war in Afghanistan as much as fallen soldiers are. If so, the numbers would be staggering. Nearly 841,000 Americans have died of a drug overdose since the war in Afghanistan began, including more than 70,000 in 2019 alone. The majority of these have involved opioids.

Officially, the DEA claims that essentially all illicit opioids entering the U.S. are grown in Latin America. Hoh, however, finds this unconvincing. “When you look at their own information and their reports on the illicit opioid production hectarage in Mexico and South America, it is clear that there is not enough production in the Western hemisphere to meet the demand for illicit opiates in the U.S.,” he told MintPress.

A dirty history

The U.S. government has a long history of directly involving itself with the worldwide narcotics trade. In Colombia, it worked with President Alvaro Uribe on a nationwide drug war, even as internal U.S. documents identified Uribe as one of the nation’s most important drug traffickers, an employee of the infamous Medellin Cartel and a “close personal friend” of drugs kingpin Pablo Escobar. Profits from drug-running funded Uribe’s election runs in 2002 and 2006.

General Manuel Noriega was also a key ally of the U.S. For many years, the Panamanian was on the CIA payroll — despite Washington knowing he was involved in drug trafficking since at least 1972. When he became de facto dictator of Panama in 1984, little changed. But the director of the Drug Enforcement Agency initially praised him for his “vigorous anti-drug trafficking policy.” Eventually, however, the U.S. decided to invade the country and capture Noriega, sentencing him to 40 years in federal prison for drug crimes largely committed while he was still in the CIA’s pay.

At the same time as this was going on, investigative journalist Gary Webb exposed how the CIA helped fund its dirty war against Nicaragua’s leftist government through sales of crack cocaine to black neighborhoods across the United States, linking far-right paramilitary armies with U.S. drug kingpins like Rick Ross.

To this day, the U.S. government continues to support Honduran strongman Juan Orlando Hernandez, despite the president’s well-established connections to the cocaine trade. Earlier this year, a U.S. court sentenced Hernandez’s brother Tony to life in prison for international drug smuggling, while Juan himself was an unindicted co-conspirator in the case. Nevertheless, President Hernandez has proven himself effective at suppressing the anti-imperialist Left inside his country and cementing the U.S.-backed 2009 military coup, one reason he is unlikely to face charges in the near future.

Using the illegal drug trade and the profits from it to fund imperial objectives has been a constant of great empires going back centuries. For instance, in the 1940s and 1950s, the French Empire utilized opium crops in the so-called “Golden Triangle” region of Indochina in order to help beat back a growing Vietnamese independence movement. Going further back, the British used its opium machine to subdue and economically conquer much of China. Britain’s insatiable thirst for Chinese tea was beginning to bankrupt the country, as the Chinese would accept only gold or silver as payment. It therefore used the power of its navy to force China to cede Hong Kong, from which Britain began flooding China with opium it grew in its possessions in South Asia.

The humanitarian impact of the Opium War was staggering. By 1880, the British were inundating China with over 6,500 tons of opium every year — equivalent to many billions of doses, causing massive social and economic dislocation as China struggled to cope with a crippling, empire-wide addiction. Today, many Chinese still refer to the era as “the century of humiliation.” In India and Pakistan, too, the effect was no less dramatic, as colonists forced farmers into planting inedible poppy fields (and, later, tea) rather than subsistence crops, causing waves of huge famines, the frequency of which had never been seen before.

Millions of losers

The story is much more nuanced than some “CIA controls the world’s drugs” conspiracy theories make out. There are no U.S. soldiers loading up Afghan carts with opium. However, many commanders are knowingly enabling warlords who do. “The U.S. military and CIA bear a large responsibility for the opium production boom in Afghanistan,” Professor Mercille said, explaining:

Post-9/11, they basically allied themselves with a lot of Afghan strongmen and warlords who happened to be involved in some way in drug production and trafficking. Those individuals were acting as local allies for the U.S. and NATO, and therefore were largely protected from retribution or arrest for drug trafficking because they were U.S. allies”.

From the ground, the war in Afghanistan has looked a lot like the war on drugs in Latin America and previous colonial campaigns in Asia, with a rapid militarization of the area and the empowerment of pliant local elites, which immediately begin to embezzle the massive profits that quietly disappear into black holes. All the while, millions of people pay the price, suffering inside a militarized death zone and turning to drugs as a coping mechanism. In the story of the opium boom, there are few winners, but there are millions of losers.