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On Monday, 3 October, Tripoli received a large, high-level Turkish delegation headed by Foreign Minister, Mevlut Cavusoglu, and included Turkiye’s Energy, Defence and Trade ministers. In a news conference following the talks, it was announced that both sides have signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on hydrocarbon between the two countries Cavusoglu described the deal as a “win-win” for both sides.

The MOU gives Ankara the right to prospect for oil and gas in Libya’s territorial waters in the Mediterranean Sea. Libya’s Foreign Minister, Najala El-Mangoush, standing next to her Turkish counterpart, Cavusoglu, explained that the MOU is not a legally binding “agreement” and can be cancelled within three months if any party decides to withdraw from it for any reason. But that has not calmed suspicious Libyans.

The very fact that such a document has been signed has ignited a fierce debate among members of the public, who took to social media to express their anger and frustration. Most people accused the Government of National Unity of selling out to Ankara and that the MOU was signed covertly, without the knowledge of Oil Minister, Mohammed Aoun, who was on a business trip in South Africa at the time. They allege that he had, on a previous occasion, refused to sign the deal, prompting Prime Minister, Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh to appoint Minister of Economics and Trade, Mohammed Al-Huweij, as acting Oil Minister specifically to sign the deal. A few days later, Al-Huweij was forced to appear on TV, defending the MOU as a non-binding document and that it did not harm Libya in any way. He called on conflicting politicians to avoid mixing the economy in their political struggles, further poisoning domestic politics. His boss, Dbeibeh, also came to his defence by claiming that the deal is within Libya’s right and that hundreds of such MOUs have been signed before to “promote cooperation with other States.”

READ: Turkiye, Libya sign agreements on hydrocarbon, gas

The government was also accused of breaking its commitment, as stated in the political agreement that brought it to power in February 2021, after the United Nations sponsored lengthy talks in Geneva. Indeed, the political roadmap was produced by Libya’s Political Dialogue Forum – a group of 75 individuals representing most factions. The roadmap bans the interim government from signing any such deals with other countries. In fact, clause 10 of article six of that document reads “during the preparatory phase, the executive authority shall not consider any new or previous agreements or decisions that harm the stability of foreign relations of the LibyanState or impose long-term obligations on it.” The idea here is to make sure that local politicians, most of whom are proxies for foreign powers, do not burden Libya with any long-term obligations until a new government is elected, that has full legitimacy and legal capacity to sign bilateral agreements with other States.

Many commentators also pointed out that the MOU is giving Ankara a favourable economic status, harming any future competition for oil exploration. Turkiye is not the best choice when it comes to oil and gas development. It is not among the world’s top oil producers which have the experience, technology and know-how in the oil industry. Other criticisms included questions about why Libya’s National Oil Corporation was not consulted before signing the deal with Ankara.

Outside Libya, the reaction to the MOU has been one of rejection and condemnation. Greece, France and Egypt have all described the deal as “illegal”. The Foreign Minister of Greece, Nikos Dendias, after urgent talks with his Egyptian counterpart, Sameh Shoukry, said the deal is “a threat to regional stability”. Athens and Ankara have, for years, been locked in dispute over who has the right to drill for oil and gas in the Eastern Mediterranean, thought to be rich in hydrocarbon. Paris, which is supporting Nicosia and Athens in their dispute with Turkiye, issued a statement on 8 October saying that the MOU “is not in accordance with international law of the sea”, reiterating its position of 2019 when Libya and Turkiye signed a maritime and security deal granting the latter the rights to explore for oil and gas in Libya’s territories, both off-shore and onshore.

The European Parliament also stepped in with a warning to Tripoli and Ankara “not to implement any clause” on hydrocarbon, including the latest bilateral agreement. It also said that the 3 October MOU “foresees illegal drilling activities in other countries’ exclusive economic zones, including those of Cyprus and Greece.” The recent controversy is rooted in another deal signed three years earlier. In 2019, Tripoli and Ankara signed maritime and security deals by which Ankara provided military support to fend off General Haftar’s attack on Tripoli. In June 2020, Haftar was defeated, thanks to Turkish military assistance. That deal, signed by Tripoli’s then Government of National Accord, gave Ankara the right to establish military bases in western Libya. Thousands of Syrian mercenaries and hundreds of Turkish troops are still in Libya, despite domestic and international calls, including from the United Nations, to remove all foreign troops from Libya as a way to help national reconciliation that, hopefully, will lead to elections. But this has never happened. The UN estimated that some 20,000 foreign troops and fighters, including Russian mercenaries, are still on Libyan soil.

OPINION: Why Africa needs Turkish drones

Dbeibeh, Libya’s current interim Prime Minister, has been accused of being loyal to Turkiye, counting on its military and political assistance to stay in power, despite the fact that he was dismissed by the Parliament and replaced by Fathi Bashaga last February. He has, repeatedly, vowed not to hand over power except to a newly elected government. There is very little prospect that such elections will take place any time soon, after the 24 December, 2021 polls were shelved, without any new date announced.

Turkiye is keen to maintain and implement any deals made with Libya, given its potential. The country is rich in oil and gas, has great potential for other minerals and is strategically located on the southern Mediterranean banks, with a very long coastline and a large Exclusive Economic Zone – far bigger than Turkiye’s. In fact, Ankara will never relinquish its influence in Libya where it is already enjoying considerable clout, thereby making it a major player in deciding Libya’s future course.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.

Still, Biden said his resolve had not wavered, and the past week has effectively proven that 20 years of war have not produced an Afghan army that can defend the government, or a government willing to remain in the country as the Taliban approached.

“American troops cannot and should not be fighting in a war and dying in a war that Afghan forces are not willing to fight for themselves,” Biden said. “We gave them every chance to determine their own future. We could not provide them with the will to fight for that future,” he added.

“I know my decision will be criticized, but I would rather take all that criticism than pass this decision on to a future president,” Biden said.

The president also spoke directly to the American veterans and diplomats who feel the withdrawal has rendered their sacrifices pointless.

“I want to acknowledge how painful this is to so many of us. The scenes we’re seeing in Afghanistan, they’re gut-wrenching, particularly for our veterans, our diplomats, humanitarian workers, anyone who has spent time on the ground working to support the Afghan people,” he said.

At one point, Biden invoked the military service of his own son — Beau Biden, who deployed to Iraq for a year and later died of cancer in 2015.

“For those who have lost loved ones in Afghanistan, and for Americans who have fought and served in the country, serve our country in Afghanistan. This is deeply, deeply personal. It is for me as well,” he said.

Despite being vastly outnumbered by the Afghan military, which has long been assisted by U.S. and NATO coalition forces, the Taliban carried out a succession of shocking battlefield gains in recent weeks.

As the Taliban moved closer to the capital over the weekend, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani fled the country and Western nations rushed to evacuate embassies amid a deteriorating security situation.

Taliban fighters sit over a vehicle on a street in Laghman province on August 15, 2021.
Taliban fighters sit over a vehicle on a street in Laghman province on August 15, 2021.
AFP | Getty Images
Biden ordered the deployment of approximately 5,000 U.S. troops to Kabul to evacuate U.S. Embassy staff throughout the weekend.

The State Department confirmed Sunday evening that all U.S. diplomatic staff at the embassy had been safely transported to Kabul’s international airport.

Thousands of Afghans swarmed the tarmac at the airport, desperate to escape a country now completely overrun by the Taliban.

Afghan people sit as they wait to leave the Kabul airport in Kabul on August 16, 2021, after a stunningly swift end to Afghanistan’s 20-year war, as thousands of people mobbed the city’s airport trying to flee the group’s feared hardline brand of Islamist
Afghan people sit as they wait to leave the Kabul airport in Kabul on August 16, 2021, after a stunningly swift end to Afghanistan’s 20-year war, as thousands of people mobbed the city’s airport trying to flee the group’s feared hardline brand of Islamist rule.
Wakil Kohsar | AFP | Getty Images
Elsewhere in Washington on Monday, U.S. officials began to paint the outlines of future American engagement with the new Taliban government.

State Department spokesman Ned Price said the decision whether to formally recognize the Taliban leadership as the legitimate government of Afghanistan will be informed by events in the coming weeks and months.

“It will depend upon the actions of the Taliban,” said Price. “We are watching closely … the world is watching closely.”

“A future Afghan government that upholds the basic rights of its people, that doesn’t harbor terrorists and that protects the basic rights of its people, including the basic, fundamental rights of half its population, its women and girls, that is a government that we would be able to work with,” he said.

A Defense Department spokesman said U.S. Marine Corps Gen. Kenneth McKenzie met with Taliban leaders in Doha, Qatar.

“The message was very clearly put to the Taliban, that these operations and our people will not be attacked or there would be a response,” Pentagon spokesman John Kirby said. “As you and I speak there has been no attack on our operation or on our people at the airport,” Kirby said

The Taliban seized Bagram Air Base on Sunday, a development that comes less than two months after the U.S. military handed over the once-stalwart airbase to the Afghan National Security and Defense Force.

The Taliban began emptying out Parwan prison there, which has an estimated 5,000 to 7,000 prisoners, including hardened Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters, according to the officials who spoke on the condition of anonymity.

In 2012, at its peak, Bagram saw more than 100,000 U.S. troops pass through. It was the largest U.S. military installation in Afghanistan.

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Chaos in Kabul, Afghanistan, ensues as the Taliban takes control
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fighting between forces loyal to rival Libyan governments rages on in Tripoli’s outskirts, the capital’s residents fear they are facing the grim prospect of a long, bloody war.

“Life goes on, and it’s surprisingly normal in the capital,” said Salim, 35, messaging from a downtown restaurant.

Just a week ago he was forced to flee his home on Tripoli’s Airport Road, after it was shelled in fighting between the Libyan National Army (LNA), led by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar and Libya’s eastern-based government and forces of the UN-backed Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA).

The World Health Organisation (WHO) said on Thursday that 205, including 18 civilians, had been killed in the two weeks of fighting outside Tripoli with more than 16,000 having already fleeing the capital.

Now living with extended family members in downtown Tripoli, Salim is making plans to try and leave Libya. But his family is large and getting everyone out and paying for rented accommodation in, for example Tunisia, is an expensive option, and one that is beyond the finances of most ordinary civilians.

‘I’m just so tired of living like this, always in a very difficult situation and being afraid of war’

– Salim, Tripoli resident

“I don’t know what’s going to happen but I expect it’s going to be a big and long war, which is why I‘m seriously considering leaving Libya,” Salim said.

“I’m just so tired of living like this, always in a very difficult situation and being afraid of war.”

Normality has long been a very flexible term in Libya. Even in the capital, for years regular intra-militia clashes have been coupled with acute shortages of cash and electricity, and expensive basic living costs.

It is not only civilians who are adapting to current threats. Tripoli’s Mitiga airport has reopened after being bombed by the LNA, in an attack that hit a military plane on the runway, according to an airport source.

But flights are currently only operating at night, when LNA warplanes are unable to carry out further airstrikes.

“Maybe it’s because their aircraft and pilots are old but the LNA don’t seem able to bomb at night, so that’s when we’re running our civilian flights,” the airport source told MEE. GNA forces shot down a LNA warplane in southern Tripoli on Sunday.

Scared of further air strikes on Mitiga, many civilians are opting to travel between the capital and neighbouring Tunisia by road, on a route currently unaffected by the conflict.

LNA forces are, at present, quite far from downtown Tripoli, approximately 20-25 km at their nearest position. But the impact of fighting is creeping closer to more populated neighbourhoods. On Monday, five shells fired by unknown forces fell on Tripoli’s populated Abu Salim district, injuring one civilian, according to Libya Alahrar TV.

“The fighting is mainly in Wadi al-Rabea, Tripoli’s Ain Zara and Qasar Ben Gasheer suburbs and the Airport Road,” explained another resident, Mohamed. He said the most intense recent fighting was in Wadi al-Rabea and Ain Zara.

A video grab published on the Libyan National Army War Information Division’s Facebook page on 16 April 2019 (AFP)
A video grab published on the Libyan National Army War Information Division’s Facebook page on 16 April 2019 (AFP)
“The LNA is focusing on south and south-eastern areas of Tripoli, with many fighters coming from the Tarhouna area. It looks like Haftar is planing to try and cut the road between Tripoli and Misrata, which is a vital supply link for weapons and fighters,” he said.

LNA sources told the Arab Weekly this was a strategy to draw GNA forces into non-residential areas, to avoid a protracted, destructive war inside the capital.

However, Mohamed predicted that, with Misrata reportedly already having sent hundreds of troops to Tripoli’s front-lines, fighting in the suburbs was already turning into a major battle.

The threat of war remains terrifyingly close even in areas of the capital as yet largely unaffected. In the Souq al-Juma district of Tripoli, 27 year-old Khalifa told MEE: “It’s a big war happening in Tripoli’s south-eastern suburbs. We are safe for now because the fighting is still quite far from us but we can sometimes hear the explosions.”

At the opposite end of the city, a resident in the western Tripoli suburb of Janzour, Ahmed, said his area was quiet, although distant fighting could be heard.

Anticipating the worst, he already has his bags packed and his car filled with petrol, ready to evacuate his family.

Memories of 2014
The early stages of the battle for Tripoli are rekindling harsh memories of the capital’s last major war almost five years ago, prompted by the results of Libya’s last parliamentary elections.

Disenchanted with “independent” candidates in previous elections who had later revealed clear allegiances to more radical Islamist factions, in 2014 a low turnout of 18 percent voted for more moderate representation. The result was catastrophic.

As militias loyal to rival sides clashed in Tripoli, the elected government and parliament were chased out of the capital, since when they have been based in eastern Libya.

In a month-long battle, warring militias destroyed Tripoli International Airport and numerous aircraft, set civilian oil infrastructure ablaze and prompted most international embassies, companies and organisations to flee to neighbouring Tunisia.

“It’s like 2014 all over again but, this time, we expect the war will be worse, much worse,” said Khalifa. “Last time they didn’t use warplanes.” Reliance on airpower has left large areas of Benghazi and Sirte in ruins and residents are terrified the same fate could befall Tripoli.

‘It’s like 2014 all over again but, this time, we expect the war will be worse, much worse. Last time they didn’t use warplanes’

– Khalifa, Tripoli resident

With a chilling nod to Tripoli’s 2014 war – which forced the elected government and parliament to flee to eastern libya and left vital infrastructure in ruins – international organisations, which had only started returning to the capital in recent years have already pulled out most expatriate staff. According to a Libyan UN employee, all non-essential foreign UN staff have been evacuated to Tunisia.

American nationals, along with some US military personnel, were evacuated via a US warship from Palm City, a gated coastal enclave popular with expatriates.

The Tripoli fighting is likely to further put back Western embassies’ plans to fully reopen operations in Libya, which have largely ceased since 2014. A British embassy official told MEE three years ago that several years of continuous, uninterrupted peace in the capital were a pre-requisite for the British embassy to become fully-operational again.

Misrata militias return to Tripoli
Another consequence of recent fighting which has filled residents with dread is the redeployment of militias from Libya’s third city of Misrata to Tripoli.

Misrata’s battle-hardened militias are widely-viewed as one of western Libya’s more effective fighting forces but their former presence in Tripoli was controversial.

In November 2013, Misratan fighters opened fire on peaceful anti-militia protestors, killing 47 civilians and injuring over 460. Misrata militias also participated in the 2014 Tripoli war.

Even five years later, people still talk about widely-circulated footage of the leader of Misrata’s al-Marsaa Brigade Salah Badi standing in front of a burning Tripoli International Airport, praising Allah for its successful capture, and footage of his fighters walking around on the wings of brand new Airbus riddled with bullet-holes.

‘I really think this war is going to last for fucking ages’

– Ferhad, businessman

Misrata’s subsequent involvement with the installation of Tripoli’s self-proclaimed National Salvation Government (2014- 2016) after the elected government had fled to eastern Libya, was also controversial. In an interview with MEE last year, a Misratan government official, speaking privately, admitted: “Misrata has made a lot of mistakes since 2011 and, to be honest, a lot of people hate us because of this.”

Misrata forces have clashed with the LNA on a number of battlefronts across Libya in the last four years, most of which they eventually conceded through negotiated peace settlements. The military arm of Misrata has long viewed Haftar and his forces as its greatest enemy in Libya.

Even during the battle against the Islamic State (IS) group in Sirte in 2016, during interviews, many Misratan commanders leading the offensive often wanted to talk more about Haftar, who they routinely termed a “war criminal”, than they did about their own advances against IS.

“This war is already a total disaster. Misrata militias are back in Tripoli and, even if Haftar loses the war, what incentive will there be for Misrata militias to ever leave?” said furious Tripoli businessman Ferhad, who complained that businesses across the capital were already suffering a huge downtown in sales.

“And if Haftar wins, it will also be a disaster for us. There are a lot of weapons involved but I don’t think either side has enough power to actually win this battle, so I think they’ll fight until they suffer great losses and Tripoli is badly damaged, and then they will reach some kind of agreement. I really think this war is going to last for fucking ages.”

Years of negotiations, led mainly by the UN and the international community, towards a peaceful settlement to Libya’s troubled political and military situation post-2011 have repeatedly failed.

The early phases of the battle for Tripoli have left most Libyans giving up hoping for a peaceful solution, and believing any outcome looks set to bring with it further conflict.

“It’s unlikely that Haftar will withdraw from this battle because it would lead to the partition of Libya and further civil wars. If he does withdraw, the GNA’s forces will go to all the pro-LNA towns, especially Tarhuna which is now almost 100 percent with Haftar, and demand they hand over their weapons, which they will obviously refuse to do, and that will spark more fighting,” said Mohamed.

“The most likely scenario is that the LNA will persevere and eventually take Tripoli, but that will not be easy and I think could take at least six months.”

Support for LNA inside Tripoli
How much popular support the LNA actually commands in the capital remains to be seen, but there are solid pockets of LNA loyalists. Under two faltering Tripoli-based governments, among long-term supporters of the eastern-based government, the whispered phrase “Haftar is coming” was heard for years.

Supporters believed that, with his outspoken antagonism towards hardlined Islamist ideologies and militias, Haftar could bring peace and normality to the capital, returning Libya’s only elected governing bodies to their rightful Tripoli institutions.

With the long war in Benghazi and then Derna, a hotbed of extremism even under Gaddafi, as well as other civil conflicts that have repeatedly flared up, the LNA’s arrival to Tripoli’s outskirts has taken almost five years.

Libyan demonstrators hold signs against what they call foreign intervention in Libya, during a protest outside the municipality of Tripoli, on April 16, 2019 (AFP)
Libyan demonstrators hold signs against what they call foreign intervention in Libya, during a protest outside the municipality of Tripoli, on 16 April 2019 (AFP)
Despite this, residents say Haftar and the LNA still have a solid support base, notably in Tripoli’s eastern suburb of Tajoura and the downtown area of Fashloom, where pro-LNA uprisings were mercilessly crushed in 2015.

“These areas are still waiting for Haftar and they are not the only ones,” said Mohamed.

“A group of civilians in [the west-central Tripoli area of] Gergarish recently announced their support for Haftar but their meeting was broken up by armed militiamen, and there are many other supporters who are afraid to publicly voice their opinions.”

If Haftar can achieve victory in Tripoli, indications from the ground suggest he might receive a wider welcome than vehemently anti-Haftar camps and perhaps the international community, would like to believe.

But, at present, that prospect remains a long way off.

During the Obama presidency, the U.S. administration was wary of the Muslim Brotherhood, which had come to power in Egypt after the country’s first-ever free elections. Despite his declared support for democracy and change in the Arab world in the wake of the Arab Spring, then-President Barack Obama did not take a strong position and reject the coup against President-elect Mohamed Morsi. The coup, as we know, led to the military’s return to power in the largest Arab country — along with tyranny, repression, corruption and mismanagement.

That is the conclusion that David D. Kirkpatrick arrives at in his excellent book “Into the Hands of the Soldiers,” which was released this month. A former Cairo bureau chief for the New York Times, Kirkpatrick gives a sad account of Egypt’s 2013 coup that led to the loss of a great opportunity to reform the entire Arab world and allow a historic change that might have freed the region from a thousand years of tyranny.

The United States’s aversion to the Muslim Brotherhood, which is more apparent in the current Trump administration, is the root of a predicament across the entire Arab world. The eradication of the Muslim Brotherhood is nothing less than an abolition of democracy and a guarantee that Arabs will continue living under authoritarian and corrupt regimes. In turn, this will mean the continuation of the causes behind revolution, extremism and refugees — all of which have affected the security of Europe and the rest of the world. Terrorism and the refugee crisis have changed the political mood in the West and brought the extreme right to prominence there.

There can be no political reform and democracy in any Arab country without accepting that political Islam is a part of it. A significant number of citizens in any given Arab country will give their vote to Islamic political parties if some form of democracy is allowed. It seems clear then that the only way to prevent political Islam from playing a role in Arab politics is to abolish democracy, which essentially deprives citizens of their basic right to choose their political representatives.

Shafeeq Ghabra, a professor of political science at Kuwait University, explains the problem in this way: “The Arab regimes’ war on the Brotherhood does not target the movement alone, but rather targets those who practice politics, who demand freedom and accountability, and all who have a popular base in society.” A quick look at the political degradation that has taken place in Egypt since the military’s return to power confirms what Ghabra says. President Abdel Fatah al-Sissi’s regime has cracked down on the Islamists and arrested some 60,000 of them. Now it has extended its heavy hand against both secular and military figures, even those who supported him in the coup. In today’s Egypt, political life is totally dead.

It is wrong to dwell on political Islam, conservatism and identity issues when the choice is between having a free society tolerant of all viewpoints and having an oppressive regime. Five years of Sissi’s rule in Egypt makes this point clear.

There are efforts here in Washington, encouraged by some Arab states that do not support freedom and democracy, to persuade Congress to designate the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization. If they succeed, the designation will weaken the fragile steps toward democracy and political reform that have already been curbed in the Arab world. It will also push backward the Arab countries that have made progress in creating a tolerant environment and allowing political participation by various components of society, including the Islamists.

Islamists today participate in the parliaments of various Arab countries such as Kuwait, Jordan, Bahrain, Tunisia and Morocco. This has led to the emergence of Islamic democracy, such as the Ennahda movement in Tunisia, and the maturing of democratic transformation in the other countries.

The coup in Egypt led to the loss of a precious opportunity for Egypt and the entire Arab world. If the democratic process had continued there, the Muslim Brotherhood’s political practices could have matured and become more inclusive, and the unimaginable peaceful rotation of power could have become a reality and a precedent to be followed.

The Trump administration always says it wants to correct Obama’s mistakes. It should add his mishandling of Arab democracy to its list. Obama erred when he wasted the precious opportunity that could have changed the history of the Arab world, and when he caved to pressure from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, as well as from members of his own administration. They all missed the big picture and were governed by their intolerant hatred for any form of political Islam, a hatred that has destroyed Arabs’ choice for democracy and good governance.

In exploring the most important issues of the international relations, matching the developments with dominant international order and cultivating an understanding of the influence of the interests and competition of the world powers in the course of developments is significant. Without this understanding, in fact, developing a correct historical analysis is impossible. For example, the decades-long US hostilities to Cuba should be analyzed with regard to world’s bipolar atmosphere and the Cold War.

This significant aspect with great influence on the international developments is even more tangible as the post-Cold War unipolar world order is declining and the big powers are competing for bigger political and economic sway on the global stage. So, as another example, if we accept that US hostilities to Iran mostly stems from a conflict of policies in the region, anti-Iranian lobbying by the pro-Israeli circles, Saudi-led anti-Tehran propaganda against Iran, the US-China confrontation’s role in increased pressure on Iran cannot be ignored.

Over the years of the Cold War, the US offered to China special economic privileges to lure it away from Soviet Russia, and even more, to sow division and competition between them for the final aim of undermining the leader of the rival Eastern Bloc. But two decades after the fall of the Soviet Union, Washington was appalled at the fact the Chinese economy is thriving and posing a direct threat to the US global hegemony. Local advantages helped Beijing leaders attract the Western investors, something put China among the world economic powers. The Chinese rise has obsessed American leaders. Former US President Barack Obama prioritized countering China as a top White House policy. He called the 21st century the century of Asia, signaling the significance of the continent in the eyes of the American strategists and policymakers.

The former US president resorted to a set of tricks to check China, like signing the Asia-Pacific trade agreement and helping India to rise in the face of China. Not only they did not work for the American administration but also Beijing became one of the giant investors in the Indian economy. 33.7 percent of the foreign investment in the Indian economy belongs to the Chinese.

When Trump assumed the power in early 2017, he continued what his predecessor started. The Trump administration even went beyond the set lines, and waged a trade war against China in a bid to obstruct the economic thrive of the Asian heavyweight. The successful Chinese economic performance and policies have yielded increased national wealth and thus increase in political and military strength. As of now, the Trump’s anti-China war, which is at the same time directed against other powers like Europe and even neighboring Canada, does not look effective in slowing the Chinese growth. But a change has happened over the past few years. While the US began to produce shale oil and turned into the world’s biggest oil producer not relied on the West Asian oil, China became the world’s biggest oil consumer which needs to secure the oil flow from the region, mainly from Iran as a current and prospective key supplier, to guarantee sustainable economic growth. Aware of this Chinese strategic reliance, the US president is seeking to cut the Iranian oil exports to China to deal a blow to the Asian giant’s economy. To restrict the Chinese access to the energy resources, the US even intensified its naval presence in the East China Sea, where Beijing is at odds with other coastal countries over the oil and gas reserves in the disputed sea.

China has responded not only by reciprocal measures in trade including imposing tariffs on the American products but also by offering to the Islamic Republic surefire guarantees for continued trade ties with Tehran.

Here there is a question, however. Why does China risk being sanctioned by the US but does not replace Iran’s oil with that of Russia as an ally?

To answer the question, it must be said that Trump’s attempts to cozy up with the Russian President Vladimir Putin despite the home opposition echoes Washington’s economic privileges to Beijing to move away from Moscow during the Cold War. This becomes even more serious if we take into consideration the potentials for a rivalry between the Eastern powers. On the other side, Beijing has its own reasons to take such a risk: It opposes the Trump US unilateralism to exhibit itself as a responsible actor attempting to protect the global economy’s stability. Moreover, it tends to save Iran as a regional power and a reliable ally in the strategic West Asia despite Washington’s struggle to eject Tehran at any expense from the circle threats against American hegemony.

In accordance with this policy, the Chinese foreign ministry has announced that Beijing will not be committed to the anti-Iranian embargo. Earlier this month, the US asked China to cut Iran oil imports. China in response said that cooperation with Iran was “transparent, logical, fair, and legal” and did not violate any of the United Nations Security Council’s resolutions.

While the Western insurance companies have said they will cut cooperation with Tehran once the US sanctions are re-imposed, two Chinese oil giants, Hangzhou Genrong and Sinopec, have recently added a new article to their contract with the National Iranian Oil Company that will allow them to use the Iranian ships to carry oil to China.

The ongoing threats to impose sanctions on any party doing business with Iran, like those made by Iran Action Group’s head in response to the Chinese reaction to bow to the American pressures in relation to Iran, all are expressive of Washington’s transregional view of anti-Iranian sanctions and pressures. 

There is a contradiction in General Khalifa Haftar’s narrative. Although he denounces his opponents as “takfiri terrorists and Kharijites” and accuses Misrata of employing political Islam, turning to takfiri groups for help, embracing the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic State (ISIS, ISIL, or Daesh), and supporting Ansar al-Sharia, he also has strong ties to Salafist organizations that are part of the forces fighting under his command in Barqa in eastern Libya. This is a dangerous game because even though the Salafists that Haftar works with, called Madkhlists, supposedly do not take part in politics, they have been active politically and militarily active in Libya since the February 11 revolution.

Haftar is using Salafi Madkhalists to counter takfiri groups like Ansar al-Sharia (which announced its dissolution recently), political opponents—in particular the Muslim Brotherhood—and to counter the Salafi scholarly discourse adopted by the Mufti of Tripoli, Sadiq al-Ghariani, and Salafi groups in Libya’s west, such as the Rada forces led by Abdelraouf Kara.

Salafi Madkhalism—named after the Saudi Sheikh Rabi al-Madkhali—was present under Qaddafi, who tolerated because it forbids elections and democracy and calls for absolute obedience to authority. Even after the February 11 revolution, Madkhalist leaders rejected taking part in the elections, although its members took part in them anyway, feeling it was the pragmatic thing to do.

The Madkhalists role in the current fighting became evident once Haftar launched operation Karama and Sheikh Rabi al-Madkhali issued a fatwa on the need for Salafists to join Haftar as Libya’s legal guardian and fight with him against the Brotherhood. In this context, Haftar dissolved the Madkhali Salafist brigade known as the Tawhid Brigade and incorporated it into his army, spreading it throughout various brigades and important military divisions such as the 210th Infantry Regiment and the 302nd Sa’iqa Special Forces. This allowed Madkhalism to spread further and gain control over military positions in Benghazi, Ajdabiya, and Jabal al-Akhdar.

Madkhali Salafism’s influence in Haftar’s camp does not stop there. On March 28, the internal security forces in Benghazi, controlled by Makhdali Salfists, instructed the Tawhid Brigade, known as the 210th Infantry Regiment within General Haftar’s forces, to arrest three young men planning an Earth Day celebration in the city. Abdel Fattah bin Galboun, one of the leaders of the Tawhid Brigade, considered it a form of un-Islamic Freemasonry, describing it as immoral and indecent and disrespectful to those who had died fighting. In the same context, Galboun praised General Haftar for rejecting such depravity, adding that the greatest threat facing Libya comes from the Brotherhood and ISIS. Moreover, the Benghazi Security Directorate decided to turn the planners over to the military for prosecution, but rescinded the decision and released the detainees once the news spread on social media and there was a public backlash.

In February 2017, the military governor Abd al-Razzaq al-Nazury in eastern Libya issued a decision to ban women from travelling without a mahram (a husband or unmarriageable kin such as a father or brother). However, he rescinded this decision after there was a public outcry on social media. Al-Nazury’s decision has been linked to Saudi preacher Usamah al-Utaybi’s visit to eastern Libya, since the decision came soon after the preacher’s visit. Additionally, those affiliated with Madkhali Salafism have committed numerous crimes to dominate religious space, such as the demolition of Sufi shrines and restricting Sufi religious activity in eastern Libya.

Haftar’s alliance with Madkhali Salafists is not only military, but also includes control over the official religious discourse through group’s control over the General Authority of Awqaf and Islamic Affair in Tobruk’s government. Madkhalists also control the official discourse through fatwas and the effective control of mosques in the east since October 2014.

Haftar and the Madkhalists see their relationship as a win-win situation. Through its alliance with Haftar, Madkhalists aim to give themselves more control over the public domain in Libya. Madkhalism succeeded in increasing its followers through its control over religious discourse, attracting unemployed youth to Salafist brigades where they get military privileges and good salaries because of the brigades’ foreign backing. The climate is right for Salafism to attract even more followers because of its dominance over the official religious discourse and its relatively significant military capacity on the ground. In turn, Haftar aims to take control of the public discourse through the Salafists and use them to fight his opponents, whom he calls jihadists. Haftar needs the Madkhalists because he lacks the needed number of troops.

However, Using Salafist groups in political and military conflicts is a double-edged sword. Libyan society is dominated by Maliki-Sufism and will experience even more unrest with the infiltration of Salafism. In addition, there is the possibility of Salafi jihadism—especially ISIS and al-Qaeda—infiltrating Madkhali Salafist groups, which is easy in a war torn country and an armed society with no real state presence, which may lead to the emergence of even more radical armed groups. This is a problem that has happened repeatedly when Salafist jihadist groups succeed in infiltrating other Salafist organizations and use them to their benefit. It happened at the beginning of the Libyan revolution after the Transitional Council, and later the GNC, attempted to control Salafist jihadist groups like Ansar al-Sharia and incorporate them into the Libya Shield Force, but these attempts failed and ended in the war that has taken place in Benghazi over the past three years.

Khalifa Haftar’s ambiguous relationship with Salafist organizations may help him tactically on the ground in the short term, but harm him in the medium and long term. These types of relationships could increase the anxiety of Haftar’s allies within Libya, such as with the tribes of eastern Libya, who fear extremism and any challenge to the tribe’s authority and independence. As for Haftar’s external alliances, his relationship with Salafists could harm his relationship with his most important backers—Egypt and the UAE—as well as his relations with Western countries. These countries fear that Salafi jihadist groups will infiltrate Libya’s east through the Salafi Madkhalists, which could destabilize Libya and the region, especially neighboring countries such as Egypt, which fears for the security of its long and fragile western borders with Libya.

Absolute support for Haftar in light of his ambiguous relationship with Salafist organizations may have adverse consequences, especially for Egypt, the UAE, and neighboring countries if he fails to control his Salafist followers, if ISIS or some other jihadist group infiltrates them, or if they enter into a dispute with Haftar. His relationship with the Salafists is based on his personal relationship with them, not an institutional one, so if Haftar were to disappear from the scene, chaos may emerge once again in eastern Libya with these groups becoming a threat to the security of the region.

Ahmed Salah Ali holds a dual master degree in Sustainable International Development & Coexistence and Conflict at the Heller School for Social Policy at Brandeis University. In addition to his academic merits, he has over nine years of program management and research experience in the MENA region including Libya, Syria, Iraq, Qatar and Turkey.