The map of geopolitical alliances is being reshaped following the Russia-Ukraine Crisis and the Covid-19 pandemic. With the potential development of a multi-polar world, Algeria is reaffirming its affiliations and defining its strategic and geo-economic areas of interest yet remains committed to its positions of non-alignment. It is clear that Algeria will continue to defend and promote the resolution of crises and conflicts of varying intensities, in particular, in the Arab World, Africa, the Sahel, and the Mediterranean through political solutions rather than military ones. Inclusive dialogue and political reconciliation are the paths that Algeria will continue to advocate. Despite this new geopolitical dynamic, Algeria undoubtedly remains a key player in the processes of reconciliation and stability given its experience and its proven expertise over the past fifty years.

Since its independence in 1962, Algeria has mobilized and will certainly continue to deploy its diplomacy to promote the principles of self-determination, respect for borders inherited from colonial divisions, non-interference in the internal affairs of States, the peaceful resolution of conflicts, non-interventionism, and non-alignment posture. Its struggle for independence produced an uncompromising foreign policy against foreign interference. Faced with the new challenges of a rapidly changing region, issues of security, integration, and regional convergence, Algeria is in a phase of adapting and consolidating its foreign policy doctrine for its strategic repositioning on the international scene which is being “reshaped”.

The diplomatic dynamic initiated by Algeria since the Covid-19 health crisis with its economic diplomacy, proximity diplomacy, parliamentary diplomacy, civil society diplomacy, preventive diplomacy, and multilateral diplomacy, shows its desire to position itself on the international scene as a key partner in the region without calling into question the fundamental doctrinal principles of its foreign, defense and security policy in the face of new emerging players such as China, India, and Turkey, who are shaking up the established order.

In the absence of a systematic alignment which would be synonymous with a denial of the doctrinal principles on which Algeria has built its foreign policy since its independence, or an intransigent opposition which would isolate it, Algeria seems to be moving more and more toward a policy of non-dogmatic interests.

Breathing new life into the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and defining new paradigms for its adaptation to the new era would be the approach for which Algeria seems to be opting. As a result, it clearly displays both its posture of non-alignment, as is the case of the Russia-Ukraine Crisis, but also its belonging to areas of strategic interest such as the Mediterranean, the Sahel, Africa, and the Arab World. The visit in June 2022 of Venezuelan President Maduro to Algiers and the signing of a strategic cooperation agreement between the two countries is a clear message of the revitalization of the Non-Aligned Movement. Algeria’s membership to this movement and its commitment to its objectives are enshrined in the founding act of the Algerian State, which is the Declaration of November 1954 to recover its independence from French colonialism

Today, and taking into account a context carrying the risk of confrontation between the actors of world powers and for many African or Asian countries which refuse to choose to belong to one camp or another, Algeria is called upon to sponsor this movement of non-aligned countries which was born with the Afro-Asian Conference of Bandung in 1955. Algeria’s commitment is part of the logic of its geostrategic repositioning as a pivotal actor thanks to its attachment to the three demands defended by this movement, namely: decolonization, multilateralism, and economic development.

During his visit to Turkey in May 2022, Algerian President Tebboune stated that: “Our policy is Non-alignment and we are not going to give it up”. Since the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine politico-military crisis and despite the historical relations that bind it with Russia, Algeria has remained equidistant from the belligerents. As proof, at the end of March 2022, Algeria welcomed the visit of the US Secretary of State Blinken, followed in May by that of the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Lavrov. On these occasions, Algerian President Tebboune declared that: “Russia and the United States are our friends, all the others are our friends, except the one with whom we have a problem because of Palestine. Whoever wants to judge us let him do it. We are trying as best we can to reinvigorate the Non-Aligned Movement. We see where the world is heading. Regardless of the number of poles, we are equidistant from all. Our commercial interests work with everyone, but when it comes to political interests and stability, we look first and foremost at our interests, the interests of the Algerian people.” Concomitantly, the Chief of Staff of the Algerian Army, General Chengriha, had also reaffirmed the neutrality of Algeria vis-à-vis international conflicts, when he received the Director General of the International Military Staff of NATO, General Wiermann: “On the international level, Algeria continues to adopt a policy of neutrality. Our country takes care to exclude itself from the tensions that oppose the different parties.” For his part, the President of the Senate (Upper House) Goudjil indicated to the Cuban Ambassador in Algiers, Vergara, the need to draw inspiration from the principles of the non-aligned countries and that the countries of the Third World will have to better prepare themselves for profound changes that the world is currently experiencing. The Speaker of the Upper House, during a recent telephone conversation with his Turkish counterpart Sentopa, also stressed: “the need to work together to develop a new concept of non-alignment which is adapted to the new international situation.”

All these concomitant political statements show that there is a consensus among the Algerian ruling elite on the issue of the non-alignment posture of Algeria and its desire to bring the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries up to date.

In addition, by organizing the meeting in Algiers of the Arab League scheduled for 01 November 2022 aligning with the celebration of the 68th anniversary of the outbreak of the revolution against French colonization and also the 44th anniversary of the Declaration of Algiers of November 15th, 1988 by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) retained by the State of Palestine as its declaration of independence, marks the constancy of Algeria’s position for the self-determination and independence of the peoples. Moreover, by organizing the Mediterranean Games in June 2022, Algeria marks its membership of this strategic space in which it is one of the important players with regard to the issues and challenges that will be faced by the two shores bordering the Mediterranean Sea commonly referred to as “the Lake”. Conflicts and their malevolent corollaries around the Lake are becoming serious issues for the development of renewed, peaceful, and balanced cooperation between the northern and southern shores. The Mediterranean remains an issue at three levels: strategic, economic, and ecological. All this means that Algeria cannot be on the sidelines and clearly affirms it.

Algeria is gradually moving towards a new era where it is trying to adapt to the new global context. It displays it with some signals to the international community such as, for example, its adherence to NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue; its call for the resolution of low and medium intensity conflicts in Libya, Mali, and Yemen through inclusive political dialogue; and to offer its good offices as a facilitator with regard to its experience and expertise in this field (e.g. Iran-Iraq, Iran-USA, Ethiopia-Eritrea, and others); the implementation of Arab and African free trade agreements (GZALE and ZLECAf); its desire to revisit the Association Agreement with the European Union to adapt it to the new challenges; and resume dialogue with WTO for its possible accession to membership status. Algeria is already relying on privileged platforms to activate at the regional and sub-regional level (African Union, 5+5 Cooperation, CEMOC, Trans-Saharan Counter Terrorism Initiative, Afripol) and intends to re-launch with new paradigms.

In short, the global geopolitical and geo-economic context is shifting and Algeria’s positions of principle remain irrevocably constant, which explains its commitment to energizing a new concept of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.

The views presented in this article are those of the speaker or author and do not necessarily represent the views of DoD or its components.

This entry was posted in Africa, Algeria, Alumni Publications and tagged Africa, Algeria, Arab World, COVID-19 pandemic, diplomacy, Foreign policy, non-aligned countries, non-alignment, Russia-Ukraine Crisis, the Mediterranean, the Sahel. Bookmark the permalink.

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine in late February could have unprecedented consequences for North Africa. Algeria will be swept up in the resulting shifts, forcing the country’s civilian and military leadership to make difficult international calculations.

Algeria abstained from voting on the United Nations resolution to condemn the war in Ukraine on March 2. Little more than a month later, Algeria joined Syria and 23 other member states in a vote against excluding Russia from the U.N. Human Rights Council. Some observers took these votes as a sign of Algiers’ support for Moscow’s geopolitical aspirations. Algeria’s recent positions, however, can only be understood in light of the country’s attempt to find the golden mean between siding with Russia and siding with Europe. Algeria has sought a middle ground between the Eastern and Western camps since independence in 1962. The newly independent state offered its mediation services and energy resources to the United States and Europe and sought to expand its security cooperation with Russia, maintaining its sovereign foreign policy stances. Algeria’s decision-making is now further complicated by the emergence of China as a major power. Understanding Algiers’ objectives requires an analysis of the various security, economic, and diplomatic dynamics at play.

Strategic interests

Algeria’s post-independence political establishment cultivated strong military bonds with the Soviet Union and later the Russian Federation. This historical partnership provided Algeria with a continuous and preferential flow of military equipment with no end-user license agreement, and this later benefited the Algerian security forces when Western partners imposed an undeclared arms embargo during the 1990s. Between 2016 and 2020, Algiers spent approximately $34 billion on Russian weapons, cementing Moscow’s place as its primary arms supplier. Amid rising tensions with Morocco, maintaining these links with Russia is more essential than ever in the eyes of the Algerian military. In fact, reports indicate that the two armies will hold joint counterterrorist exercises in November 2022 on Algeria’s western borders. This is unsurprising considering the regional agreement between Algiers and Moscow on issues such as Western Sahara. Moreover, statements by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov suggest that Algiers seeks to deepen its relations with Moscow in spite of the potential international backlash. This could raise concerns about Algiers’ willingness to gravitate toward Moscow’s strategic pole at the expense of other partners.

In recent years, the Algerian establishment’s approach to foreign policy has focused on avoiding major crises with international partners. Despite occasional hiccups and underdeveloped regional cooperation, Algiers has largely succeeded in its mission. Through this strategy, it developed a lucrative energy export market, geared toward southern Europe in particular, that helped to boost its foreign exchange reserves to almost $200 billion by 2012. Over the past decade, during a time of growing geopolitical disorder, Algeria has served as a stable and committed energy supplier for the Mediterranean. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, this encouraged unrealistic expectations in the West about Algeria’s short-term ability to replace Russian gas now subject to a partial ban. The Algerian government fed this delusion in talks at the presidential palace with senior Western officials like U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi. At the same time, the authorities have shown a readiness to cut loose European partners that oppose Algeria’s regional interests. During its recent dispute with Madrid over Western Sahara, Algiers suspended a two-decades-old friendship treaty. Hence, the country’s leadership may view the Ukraine war as a suitable moment to rehabilitate and strengthen its global standing, capitalizing on Europe’s desperate need for gas as it seeks to replace imports from Russia.

On March 20, Foreign Minister Ramtane Lamamra travelled to Beijing for a three-day visit. Since the signing of the 2014 “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership,” cooperation between Algiers and Beijing has extended beyond commercial activity into the realms of culture, politics, and the military. Against this background, Minister Lamamra’s trip concluded with a bilateral statement that rejected the “misuse of unilateral sanctions” while fast-tracking the Belt and Road Initiative. This announcement aligns with President Abdelmadjid Tebboune’s willingness to tolerate foreign debt for the sake of developing local infrastructure as well as his directive to focus on a $7 billion phosphate deal with China.

While joint projects could provide a momentary boost for Algeria’s economy, they also offer a window of opportunity for Chinese expansionism. Algiers has so far defended its “neutral” stance on the great power competition, reiterating its commitment to the non-alignment philosophy that has shaped its diplomacy since the Cold War. Still, Algeria today faces a new reality with international and domestic impediments that will determine the cost of its geopolitical choices. The circumstances, impact, and narratives around the war in Ukraine require an adapted doctrine in line with today’s events.

Emerging impediments

Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Tebboune administration restricted its official response to the Arab League initiative that created a Ministerial Contact Group uniting Algeria, Sudan, Iraq, and Egypt. Minister Lamamra joined his counterparts in Moscow and Warsaw to meet with Russian and Ukrainian officials. Furthermore, Army Chief of Staff Said Changriha reiterated, in the presence of a senior NATO official, Algeria’s non-involvement in global conflicts. Changriha’s statement builds off of Algiers’ tried-and-true narrative about its foreign policy, but maintaining “diplomatic flexibility” may become increasingly difficult, especially if the war drags on through next winter. Despite the official rhetoric, the military and economic rapprochement of convenience between Algiers, Moscow, and Beijing is likely to turn into a strategic liability. This will be particularly true as the global battle for influence expands to regions like the Sahel and the Mediterranean. Moreover, the historical and post-colonial lenses through which Algiers perceives the West and the international balance of power could hinder the Algerian establishment’s regional interests and efforts to ensure domestic sociopolitical harmony.

Since coming to power in 2019, Tebboune has declared his intention to revive Algiers’ diplomatic corps and defend its national interests. The administration is convinced of its status as a “regional power” and has staked a claim to leadership over several dossiers, including Arab attempts at mediation between Russia and Ukraine. Yet this ambitious agenda cannot be achieved without an international consensus lead by the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council. The Western bloc’s blessing is not forthcoming, as cozy relations between Algeria and the Eastern camp are apt to be taken as a sign of geopolitical alignment. Moreover, the recent participation of Tunis and Rabat in NATO military talks on Ukraine undermines Algiers’ old assumptions about the security order in North Africa. The emerging strategic shifts, therefore, impose serious limitations on the current administration’s vision for both its immediate neighborhood and the region at large.

Defense and foreign policy issues have clearly captured domestic public attention because of regional tensions and the administration’s focus on its diplomatic posture. Traditionally, the Algerian establishment shaped the country’s international direction according to its desires and with little regard for criticism, capitalizing on the silence of elites and the disinterest of citizens. But the 2019 Hirak protest movement and generational changes will result in calls for more accountability on all levels, making the usual carte blanche a thing of the past. Thus, the policies of the Tebboune administration are likely to face greater scrutiny as the political elite and social actors re-evaluate Algeria’s international stances through a more pragmatic and inclusive strategic lens. As a case in point, the recent round of talks between President Tebboune and the local political class demonstrated an unusual focus on geopolitical developments. In view of the rapidly changing environment, a popular foreign policy would need to provide both stability and socioeconomic relief for the silent majority.

Potential outcomes

The war in Ukraine poses an unconventional test for Algiers’ sovereigntist and principled doctrine. It is safe to say that Algeria is interrogating itself about its regional and international roles, which implies a sober assessment of its needs and comparative advantages. Senior officials, including President Tebboune, have repeatedly referred to the emergence of a new post-COVID global order. Within this context, regional shifts and domestic consensus will determine the administration’s next steps. And while Algeria knows it cannot replace Russian gas, it is still seizing the opportunity to attempt to reform its outdated energy sector and to deliver diplomatic messages. Algiers’ response to the Ukraine war is to walk a fine line between Europe’s gas needs and Russia’s strategic orbit, which may facilitate energy deals, such as that recently signed with Italy. Such steps will not, however, guarantee that Algeria has lasting regional influence.

Finally, the misconceptions at home and misunderstanding abroad about Algiers’ “non-alignment doctrine” highlight a bigger debate regarding its foreign policy. This reflects the new diplomatic dynamics that will be “negotiated” with international partners in the context of the process of recovery from the era of former President Abdelaziz Bouteflika. While Algiers does not respond well to pressure, the continuation and deterioration of the war in Ukraine will force the Tebboune administration to make some hard choices. This will likely trigger an unofficial dialogue within the establishment in anticipation of Algeria’s 2024 presidential elections, and only a national agreement can prevent dangerous sociopolitical polarization and mitigate underlying geostrategic risks.

Zine Labidine Ghebouli is a political analyst, postgraduate scholar at the University of Glasgow, and research assistant with the North Africa and Sahel Program at the Middle East Institute (MEI). His work focuses on Euro-Mediterranean cooperation and Algeria’s political and security dynamics. The views expressed in this piece are his own.

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MEI is an independent, non-partisan, non-for-profit, educational organization. It does not engage in advocacy and its scholars’ opinions are their own. MEI welcomes financial donations, but retains sole editorial control over its work and its publications reflect only the authors’ views. For a listing of MEI donors, please click here.

The Middle East Institute (MEI) is an independent, non-partisan, non-for-profit, educational organization. It does not engage in advocacy and its scholars’ opinions are their own. MEI welcomes financial donations, but retains sole editorial control over its work and its publications reflect only the authors’ views. For a listing of MEI donors, please click here.